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INTRODUCTION
, The goal of this comment—the twelfth in a series of efforts to
summarize recent developments in the field of labor • lawi—is to
assist practitioners to keep abreast of changes in the law which oc-
curred during the twelve months ending on March 31, 1972. Signifi-
cant decisions of the National Labor Relations Board and the courts
are reported in the greatest depth possible in a work of this nature.
Especially noteworthy during the Survey year were the NLRB's
repudiation of prior policy with respect to deference to arbitration,)
the Supreme Court's announcement of an implied exception to the
federal anti-injunction statute,' Supreme Court developinent of the
preemption doctrine,' and amendment of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 5
I. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of ,1964
Since its enactment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 1 has
become increasingly effective as a remedy for minority group employ-
ment discrimination. During the Survey year, the most significant
development regarding Title VII was enactment of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Act of 1972, 2 which amends Title VII in several
important areas, the foremost change being a grant of authority to the
1
 The previous comments are: 1970-1971 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 12
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1026 (1971) ; 1969-1970 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law,
II B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 916 (1970); 1968-1969 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 785 (1969) ; Recent Decisions on Jurisdictional Prob-
lems, 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1059 (1968) ; 1966-1967 Annual Survey of Labor Rela-
tions Law, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 771 (1967) ; 1965-66 Annual Survey of Labor
Relations Law, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L." Rev. 909 (1965); 1964-1965 Annual Survey of
Labor Relations Law, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 815 (1965) ; Recent Developments in
Labor Law, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 629 (1964) ; Recent Developments in Labor Law,
4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 661 (1963) ; Labor's New Frontier; The End of the Per Se
Rules, 3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 487 (1962).
2 See pp. 1376-81 infra.
8 See pp. 1385-88 infra.
4 See pp. 1381-85 infra.
5 See pp. 1348-68 infra.
1 42 U.S.C. HI 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended Pub. L. No. 92-261 (1972).
2 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
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Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) to initiate
court actions to enforce the Act. Judicial developments during the
Survey year include both procedural and substantive interpretations
of Title VII.
Title VII's general purpose is the elimination of employer and
union practices which discriminate against employees and job ap-
plicants on the bases of race, color, religion, sex or national origin .° The
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission was created by the orig-
inal Act with the power to investigate and informally conciliate
grievances alleging racial, religious or sex discrimination. 4 Where there
is a local or state agency to act on such an allegation the EEOC may
not act until such agency has done so.° The grievant in a state with an
equal employment agency must first file his complaint with that agency.
He is then required to wait sixty days or until the termination of state
proceedings, whichever is earlier, before he may file a charge with the
EEOC.° Upon receipt of a complaint, the Commission investigates to
determine whether reasonable cause exists to believe that the charge
is true. If reasonable cause does exist, the EEOC attempts to eliminate
the unlawful practice through informal conciliation and persuasion."'
Prior to the 1972 amendments, if the Commission was unable to
resolve the dispute satisfactorily within thirty days, it notified the
grievant of his right to sue the respondent in federal court within
thirty days of receiving such notice .° The amended Act permits the
EEOC itself to initiate and litigate the court action with one pro-
viso—the grievant may do so should the EEOC defer.°
The EEOC procedures evidence a congressional preference for
informal conciliation of disputes rather than court action." These
procedures provide a relatively inexpensive remedy for aggrieved
parties and allow an employer to explain his action without the public
condemnation resulting from a more formal proceeding. Compliance
with these procedures, however, means that in most cases the grievant
3 42 U.S.C. i§ 2000e-2 (1970).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, -5 (1970). The 1972 amendments to Title VII provide the
EEOC with authority to enforce the Act in federal court following unsuccessful attempts
to conciliate a dispute. See pp. 1366-67 infra.
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970).
8 42 U.S.C. >; 2000e-5(b) (1970).
7
 42 U.S.C. * 2000e-5(a) (1970).
8 42 U.S.C. 1 2000e-5(e) (1970). The thirty day period allotted to the EEOC may be
extended to sixty days where "further efforts to obtain voluntary compliance are war-
ranted."
9 Pub. L. No. 92-261.
10 Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 487, 2 FEP
Cases 574, 582 (7th Cir. 1970). But see Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a
Remedy for Radal Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 Harv. Civ. Rights--Civ. Lib.
L. Rev. 56, 70-71 (1972).
1349
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
must wait a minimum of ninety days before a complaint can be filed
in federal district court alleging a Title VII violation. He then , must
begin anew, since the record of the EEOC proceedings may not be used
as evidence in a subsequent court action." Moreover, the EEOC's case
backlog results in an eighteen to twenty-four month delay between the
filing of a charge and the initiation of the EEOC investigation. 12 This
lengthy waiting period, coupled with the EEOC's failure successfully to
resolve over half of its cases," has led grievants to circumvent the
Title VII, procedures principally through the utilization of three ve-
hicles: (1) district court action under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
(2) private grievance and arbitration proceedings, and (3) NLRB un-
fair labor practice proceedings.
1. Jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of 1866
During the Survey year, the Fifth Circuit, in Caldwell v. National
Brewing Co.," became the second circuit court to assert jurisdiction of
an employment discrimination case based on the Civil Rights Act of
1866 where the plaintiff had intentionally bypassed the Title VII pro-
cedures. The Third Circuit had allowed a similar action in Young v.
International Telephone and Telegraph Co. 18 a few months earlier.
Caldwell is indicative of an increasing number of lower federal court
decisions permitting plaintiffs to bypass completely the procedural re-
quirements of Title VII in the hope of obtaining faster and more effec-
tive relief in the federal courts.
Prior to 1968, little use was made of the nineteenth century civil
rights laws as remedies for non-governmental discrimination. But in
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.," the Supreme Court held that Section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866," and therefore its derivative, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982,18
 was an effective bar against private, as well as governmental,
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970).
12
 Larson, supra note 10 at 72.
13 The Commission has obtained either partially or completely satisfactory concilia-
tion in less than half the cases brought before it. 77 Lab. Rel. Rep. 202 (News & Backgd.
Inf., 1971).
14 443 F.2d 1044, 3 FEP Cases 600 (5th Cir. 1971).
18 438 F.2d 757, 3 FEP Cases 146 (3rd Cir. 1971).
16 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17 Act of April 9, 1966, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted by § 18 of the Enforce-
ment Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 and codified in
§§ 1977 and 1978 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, now 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). In its
original form, section 1 provided:
That all persons . . . of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude ... shall have the same right
to make and enforce contracts . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, hold and convey
real and personal property ... as is enjoyed by white citizens..
18 In its original form 42 U.S.C. 1982 was part of Section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-27 (1968). Section 1982,
1350
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
discrimination in the sale or rental of property. This interpretation
laid the groundwork for utilization of section 1981 10—also a derivative
of the 1866 Act—as a jurisdictional basis for private employment dis-
crimination cases.
The Seventh Circuit, in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l
Harvester Co.,2° was the first circuit court to assert jurisdiction under
section 1981. There, a black employee filed a charge with the EEOC,
but the EEOC failed to achieve resolution of the dispute and notified
the grievant of his right to sue in federal court. When he brought suit,
the district court dismissed the complaint, holding, inter alia, that the
plaintiff had not complied with Title VII procedural requirementsit and
that section 1981 did not create a cause of action for non-governmental
racial discrimination.22 The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that sec-
tion 1981 was applicable to private acts of job discrimination," and
that Title VII did not impliedly repeal section 1981 because the two
statutes can, in large measure, be reconciled." In order to reconcile
the congressional intent expressed in Title VII that complaints of this
nature be settled through conciliation" with its holding that actions
may be brought under section 1981, the court required that a "reason-
able excuse" for the grievant's failure to exhaust EEOC remedies be
pleaded."
Four months after Waters, the Fifth Circuit, in Sanders v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc.,27 agreed with the Waters court and allowed jurisdiction
under section 1981 where the plaintiff made a good faith effort to com-
ply with Title VII." In both Water and Sanders, the plaintiff attempted
in its present form, provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
19 Section 1981 provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ...."
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
20 427 F.2d 476, 2 FEP Cases 574 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Waters, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
21 The court held that the plaintiff's union was an indispensable party to the adjudica-
tion but that the union could not be joined as a defendant because plaintiff, in the EEOC
proceeding, had not charged the union with discriminatory practice pursuant to section
706(e) to Title VII. 427 F.2d at 485-86, 2 FEP Cases at 581-82.
22 Id. at 485, 2 FEP Cases at 580.
28 Id. at 481, 2 FEP Cases at 577.
24 Id. at 484, 2 FEP Cases at 580.
26 See note 10 supra and accompanying text,
26 427 F.2d at 487, 2 FEP Cases at 582. Although the opinion does not give examples
of what would constitute a "reasonable excuse," it would seem that a bona fide effort to
exhaust Title VII remedies would satisfy the court,
27 431 F.2d 1097, 2 FE? Cases 942 (5th Cir. 1970).
28 The plaintiff in Sanders had filed her complaint sixteen days after the thirty day
statute of limitations imposed by Section 706(a) of Title VII had expired. Id. at 1098,
2 FEP Cases at 942.
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to comply with Title VII but through procedural error was foreclosed
from enforcing his Title VII rights. These two decisions may be in-
terpreted, then, as having permitted a court action in order to prevent
an inequitable outcome. If this was their underlying rationale it would
appear that a plaintiff whci has not at least filed a charge with the
EEOC would fail to satisfy the "reasonable excuse" requirement and
thus would be foreclosed from maintaining an action under section
1981.
However, in Young the Third Circuit held that even where the
plaintiff does not allege that he has taken any action under Title VII,
the district court may assert jurisdiction under section 1981. The
Young court cited both Waters and Sanders in concluding that section
1981 was applicable to private acts of discrimination and that Title VII
did not repeal the 1866 Civil Rights Act."
However, the Young court went significantly farther thhn these
decisions in several respects. First, it refused to apply the proviso of
Waters that the plaintiff plead a reasonable excuse for his failure to
exhaust EEOC remedies." Secondly, it suggested that a district. court,
in prescribing relief in a section 1981 case, may properly accommodate
Title VII conciliation procedures with section 1981 jurisdiction.'
In Caldwell, the Fifth Circuit was faced squarely with the issue
it had left open in Sanders and that the Third Circuit resolved in
Young: may a plaintiff deliberately bypass the Title VII administrative
remedies and go directly to federal court under section 1981? Indeed,
the _black employee plaintiff admitted that he had not filed a charge
with the EEOC. The district court dismissed the action, holding that
the plaintiff must plead a "reasonable excuse" for his failure to exhaust
EEOC remedies.82
 The Fifth Circuit reversed. It distinguished Sanders,
noting that there it did not hold that a plaintiff is required.to
 exhaust
EEOC procedures. Moreover, it rejected the "reasonable excuse" re-
quirement of Waters." The court, however, did not reject the Waters
rationale that it is necessary in a section 1981 action to afford due .re-
gard to the conciliatory policy of Title VII. Rather, like Young, Cald-
well recommends that the district court on remand structure relief
consistent with Title VII.. In this regard it specifically emphasized sec-
tion 706(e) of Title VII which permits the court to stay proceedings
29
 438 F.2d at 759-60, 3 FEP Cases at 148-51.
90
 Id. at 762-63, 3 FEP Cases at 150.
31
 This is especially so, stated the court, where the section 1981 action seeks equitable
relief. It noted that, "[b]y fashioning equitable relief with due regard to the availability
of conciliation and by encouraging in appropriate cases a resort to EEOC during the
pendency of § 1981 cases the courts will carry out the policies of both statutes." Id. at
764, 3 FEP Cases at 151.
82
 Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 3 FEP Cases 599 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
as 443 F.2d at 1046, 3 FEP Cases at 602.
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for sixty days pending the outcome. of EEOC conciliation efforts. The
court also cited the power of the trial court to preserve the status quo
with a preliminary injunction while such conciliation is taking place."
While Waters required that a plaintiff make an effort to comply with
Title VII prior to filing his complaint, Caldwell and Young have ap-
parently shifted the point of accommodation of section 1981 and Title
VII to the post-complaint stage of the action.
The impact of Caldwell and the line of cases discussed herein is
still undetermined." It is likely that recognition of section 1981 as a
valid jurisdictional device will attract an appreciable number of plain-
tiffs desirous of avoiding the delay inherent in the Title VII procedures.
However, if the courts'adhere closely to the recommendation of Young
and Caldwell that the conciliatory processes of the EEOC be deferred
to after section 1981 jurisdiction is asserted, the delay will not be
avoided unless courts order the EEOC to dispose of court-referred
cases immediately.
2. Grievance and Arbitration—Effect on Title VII Actions
In many cases where an employee charges his employer with dis-
criminatory practices he may prefer to seek a remedy through the
grievance and arbitration procedures established by the existing collec-
tive bargaining agreement. From a practical viewpoint, arbitration may
be preferable in that it can be accomplished with far less delay than
either Title VII procedures or a suit under the 1866 Civil Rights Act."
The difficulty with arbitration in employment discrimination cases,
however, is that the grievant is often left without adequate representa-
tion in the arbitral proceeding. This may occur when the union has an
34 Id.
35 At present, only the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have approved jurisdiction
of section 1981 employment discrimination cases but district courts subject to review by
four other circuits have ruled on the issue. Allowing jurisdiction: Crosslin v. Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 4 FEP Cases 32 (D. Ariz. 1971); Taylor v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 83, 4 FEP Cases 245 (D. Colo. 1971) ; Tolbert v. Daniel Con-
struction Co., 332 F. Supp. 772, 3 FEP Cases 1077 (D. S. Car, 1971). Denying juris-
diction: Brady v. Bristol-Myers, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 995, 4 FEP Cases 107 (E.D. Mo.
1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-1589 (8th Cir. 1972), Tooles v. Kellogg Corp., 336 F. Supp.
114, 4 FEP Cases 169 (D. Neb. 1972); Foye v, United A.G. Stores Cooperative, Inc., 336
F. Supp. 82, 4 FEP Cases 172 (D. Neb. 1972). Thus, it is likely that other drcuits will be
called upon to rule on this issue shortly. In this regard it should be noted that courts may
no longer have any basis for refusing to allow section 1981 jurisdiction on the ground that
that statute was impliedly repealed by Title VII. Congress rejected an amendment to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 which would have made Title VII the ex-
clusive remedy for discriminatory employment practices.
no Title VII procedures are often delayed up to two years due to the EEOC's backlog
of cases. See Larson, supra note 10 at 72. A discipline case can be disposed of through
arbitration in two to three months. Lev and Fishman, Suggestions to Management:
Arbitration v. The Labor Board, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 763 (1969).
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interest in perpetuating the discriminatory practice." Moreover, labor.
arbitrators may not be fully competent to deal with racial or religious
discrimination grievances, since their expertise is primarily in the more
traditional areas of labor relations.
Until recently, an employee, prior to filing a discriminatory em-
ployment practice charge in court, was required to make a binding elec-
tion of remedies between arbitration and judicial action. Hence, an
aggrieved employee who invoked plant grievance and arbitration ma-
chinery hoping to obtain speedy settlement of his claim would be fore-
closed from filing a subsequent Title VII claim. The dilemma of
the grievant in this situation is clear. The arbitral process is more
expeditious and less complicated than court action, yet the possibility
of inadequate union representation or inadequate treatment of the
charge by the arbitrator is a real one.' On the other hand, while the
EEOC and the federal courts provide more sympathetic and competent
forums, the procedural requirements of Title VII are complex and en-
tail great delay."
Courts ruling on the issue of whether a prior arbitral award pre-
cludes a Title VII action must consider the following fundamental
factors: (1) whether or not the employee's statutory right to be free
from discriminatory employment practices" is fully protected in the
arbitral proceeding,4° and (2) the degree of deference to be given to
arbitration in furtherance .of clear congressional preference for private
settlement of disputes arising from employment discrimination 41
During the Survey year, in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co." the
Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to resolve a split
among three circuits: the Seventh in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,"
and the Fifth in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co." and in Hutchings
37
 The Supreme Court has observed that because the contractual remedies of griev-
ance and arbitration are devised and controlled by the union and the employer, "they
may well prove unsatisfactory or unworkable for the individual grievant." Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
38
 The delay inherent in Title VII procedures is discussed in the text accompanying
note 13 supra.
88 Section 703(a) of Title VII provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. . .." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1970).
40 See text accompanying note 1 supra. The question of contract rights versus Title
VII rights is conceptually similar to the question of contract rights versus NLRA rights
discussed in connection with CoRyer Insulated Wire. See pp. 1376-81 infra.
41 The fact that Congress prefers private, informal settlement of these disputes is
evident in the procedural scheme of Title VII. See note 10 supra.
42 . 402 U.S. 689, 3 FEP Cases 508 (1971). Since the Court was evenly divided, the
decision is no precedent.
43 416 F.2d 711, 2 FEP Cases 121 (7th Cir. 1969).
44 421 F.2d 888, 2 FEP Cases 377 (5th Cir. 1970).
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v. United States Industries, Inc.," had allowed district court jurisdic-
tion of a Title VII case brought subsequent to or simultaneously with
an arbitral proceeding; the Sixth had denied jurisdiction after an ad-
verse arbitral award in Dewey. In a per curiam decision, an evenly
divided Supreme Court affirmed this Sixth Circuit holding, thereby
sanctioning the minority rule4° A subsequent Sixth Circuit decision,
Newman v. Avco Corp.,' however, somewhat confused the meaning of
the Supreme Court's affirmance in Dewey by distinguishing Dewey and
allowing the plaintiff to bring a Title VII action after receiving an ad-
verse arbitral award.
In Bowe, a sex discrimination case, the district court required the
plaintiffs to make a binding election to proceed either in court or
through arbitration." They chose to pursue their court action. After
trial, the district court held for the defendants on all issues except as
to certain layoffs under segregated seniority lists. The Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that it was error to require the plaintiffs to make a
binding election of remedies prior to adjudication. The court stated
that dual prosecution of the claim should have been allowed "so long
as election of remedy was made after adjudication so as to preclude
duplicate relief which would result in . . . [the plaintiffs'] unjust
enrichment."' In explaining this holding, the court analogized the
problem at hand to the concurrent jurisdiction of the NLRB and
private arbitration over unfair labor practices d 0 Then, stressing the
need for concurrent jurisdiction over employment discrimination
cases, the court pointed out the "crucial differences" between arbitra-
tion and judicial proceedings. The court observed, for example, that
an arbitrator may feel bound by the collective bargaining contract
and thus may never reach the substantive legal questions inherent in
a sex discrimination charge, while a court may not be able to delve into
all the ramifications of the contract. Furthermore, an arbitrator might
be restrained from granting relief provided for in Title VII, while the
court may be unable to grant certain types of relief available through
arbitration 5'
45 428 F.2d 303, 2 FEP Cases 725 (Sth Cir. 1970).
40 Both the Seventh and the Fifth Circuits had permitted judicial action under Title
VII where the arbitral process had previously been invoked. See discussion at 1356-57 infra.
47 451 F.2d 743, 3 FEP Cases 1137 (6th Cir. 1971).
48 272 F. Supp. 332, 339-40, 65 L.R.R.M. 2714, 2719, 1 FEP Cases 201, 206 (S.D.
Ind. 1967).
45 416 F.2d at 715, 2 FEP Cases at 123.
50 In this regard, the court noted: "The analogy to labor disputes involving con-
current jurisdiction of the N.L.R,B. and the arbitration process is not merely compelling,
we hold it conclusive." Id. at 714, 2 FEP Cases at 122. Since the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion in Bowe, the NLRB's position with respect to this issue has moved toward greater
deferral to the arbitral process. See discussion at 1376-81 infra.
51 E.g., back pay prior to Title VII's effective dates.
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The Fifth Circuit, in Cu/pepper and Hutchings, 'took the pasition
that invocation of the plant' grievance' machinery tolls the Title VI]
statute of limitations and that an arbitral award is not per se conclusive
of the determination of the grievant's Title VII rights. In Culpepper,
the plaintiff filed a grievance with the union fifteen days after the al- ,
leged discriminatory act occurred." Following unsatisfactory resolu-
tion of the grievance," he filed a charge with the EEOC. This filing
was within ninety days of the termination of the. grievance procedure,
but over one hundred days after the alleged discriininaiion occurred.
The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plain=
tiff had failed to file his charge with the EEOC, as required by statute,"
within ninety days of the alleged discriminatory act. The •Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that the Title VII statute of limititions was tolled'
when the plaintiff invoked .contractual' grievance , remedies bb Since 'the
central theme of Title VII is private settlement of employment dis-
crimination cases, the court noted, it would be contrary to the intent of
Congress to "penalize a common employee, who . . . attempts first in
good faith to reach a private settlement . without litigation. . . .""
In Hutchings, the Fifth' Circuit applied the Bowe rationale to a
case where an arbitration award had already been rendered. The plain-
tiff, following an adverse arbitral decision, filed a charge with the
EEOC, and subsequently 'initiated an 'action in federal district court
charging his employer with racially discriminatory promotion practices.
The district court held that the plaintiff's utilization of the grievance
and arbitration procedures constituted a binding election of • remedies
which foreclosed his right to pursue Title VII •remedies. In reversing,
the Fifth Circuit stressed the differences that existed between the func-
tions of arbitrators and of the courts both in their scope of consider-
ation and in their remedial power." It-Concluded` that: 
52
 The plaintiff, a black employee, charged that he had been discriminated against
because of his race in not being promoted ahead of a ivhite employee with less plant
seniority. 421 F.2d at 890, 2 FEP Cases at 378.
53
 The employer offered, as a comproreiie settlement, to give the plaintiff a position
where he would be trained for the job he desired, but this would be at a .Iower rite of
pay than he was earning at that time. Id.
64
 42 U.S.C. I 2000e-5(d) (1970).
55 421 F.2d at 891, 2 FEP Cases at 379.
56 Id.
67 The court, citing Bowe, noted that:
[T]he arbitrator's role is to determine the contract rights of the employees, as
distinct from the rights afforded them by enacted legislation such as Title VII ....
The arbitrator, in bringing his informed judgment to bear on the problem sub-
mitted to him, may consider himself constrained to apply the contract and not
give the types of remedies available under Title VII, even though the contract
may contain an anti-discrimination provision. Conversely, of course, a court may
not be able to delve into all the ramifications of the contract . . . or to afford
some types of relief privately available through arbitration.
428 F.2d at 312, 2 FEP Cases at 731-32 (emphasis in •
 original).
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In view of [these differences] ,	. it would be fallacious to
assume that an employee utilizing the grievance-arbitration
machinery . . . and also seeking a Title VII remedy in court
is attempting to enforce a single right in 2 forums."
It appears, then, that this holding is limed on ,the assumption that while
resort to arbitration is desirable as effectuating congressional preference
for private settlement, the Title VII rights of the aggrieved individual
are adequately protected only by the courts. Implicit in this rationale
is the belief that arbitrators often do not have the power to decide stat-
utory charges.
In Dewey, the plaintiff refused to work on Sundays because of
his religious beliefs and was discharged by Reynolds for this refusal.
Alleging discrimination on account of his religious beliefs, he filed a
grievance in accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement and simultaneously applied to the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission forissuance of a complaint against Reynolds."° Following
an adverse arbitrator's award and. dismissal of his case by the state
Civil Rights Commission, Dewey filed a charge with the EEOC, claim-
ing discrimination in violation of Title VII. The EEOC found reason-
able cause to believe.that Reynolds had engaged in an unlawful practice
in discharging Dewey and, after failing to settle the dispute, notified
Dewey of his right to sue in federal court. The district court held in
favor of Dewey and ordered reinstatement with back pay.°°
The Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that (1) the district court im-
properly found the plant rule requiring Sunday work violative of Title
VII," and (2) , the Title VII action was precluded by the arbitration
award.°2
 Regarding the latter holding, the court noted: "Where the
grievanceS are based on an alleged civil rights violation, and the parties
consent to arbitration by a mutually agreeable arbitrator, in our judg-
ment the arbitrator has a right to finally determine them." 88 In a refer-
ence to the Bowe court's analogy to concurrent jurisdiction over unfair
labor practices, the court stated that it saw no good comparison between
the jurisdiction of the NLRB and that of the EEOC.° 4 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit rejected the "separate rights" rationale of Bowe and Hutch-
ings." In so doing, the court apparently relied upon the hypothesis that
58 Id. at 312-13, 2 FE? Cases at 732.
59 Title VII requires the grievant to give the state agency sixty • days to settle the
dispute before filing with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)'(1970).
60 300 F. Supp. 709, 71 L.R.R.M. 2406, 1 FE? Cases 759 (W.D. Michigan 1969).
61 The court held that the district court had improperly applied an EEOC regulation
retroactively in finding a violation of Title VII. 429 F.2d at 330-31, 2 FEP Cases at 689-90.
02 Id. at 332, 2 FEP Cases at 691-92.
es Id., 2 FEP Cases at 691.
04 Id., 2 FEP Cases at 692.
65 See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
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an arbitrator is sufficiently empowered to deal with the civil rights
guaranteed by Title VII as well as the contract rights preserved by the
collective bargaining.agreement. 6°
Following the Supreme Court's per curiam affirmance of Dewey,
the Sixth Circuit again held, in Spann v. Kaywood Div. Joanna Western
Mills Co.," that a plaintiff who carried his grievance to arbitration was
precluded from maintaining a subsequent Title VII action for racially
discriminatory employment practices. In Spann, the plaintiff not only
had pursued his arbitral remedy, but had received a favorable award.
However, the arbitrator awarded only reinstatement, and Spann
brought a Title VII action seeking back pay as well. In Spann, the
court reiterated its opinion that the arbitrator was empowered to decide
the issue of racial discrimination."
After Spann, it appeared that the Sixth Circuit had made its posi-
tion clear. But in Newman, decided less than three months after Spann,
that court severely limited the Dewey-Spann rule by allowing a Title
VII action after an arbitrator had rendered an award adverse to the
plaintiff. The black plaintiff in Newman had been discharged by Avco
for allegedly discriminatory reasons. He filed a grievance with the union
asserting wrongful discharge and seeking reinstatement. When the
union indicated that it would not allege racial discrimination in the
proceedings, Newman amended his grievance to include that charge.
One week after the arbitration hearing, but prior to the arbitrator's
decision, Newman filed charges of racial discrimination against both
the employer and the union with the EEOC. Subsequently, the arbitra-
tor found against Newman. A year later the EEOC notified the plaintiff
of his right to sue in federal court. The district court• held that the
plaintiff's resort to arbitration constituted a binding election of reme-
dies and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.°°
The Sixth Circuit reversed. In distinguishing Dewey, the court
noted that in that case it had before it a full evidentiary record from
which it could determine that the employer had not violated Title VII.
In Newman, it was considering an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment and did not have a full record before it. Despite this distinc-
tion the court still had to distinguish its holding in Dewey that the
ee In a separate opinion denying the plaintiff's motion for rehearing, the court ex-
pressly rejected Hutchings. It held that Hutchings did not comport with the Supreme
Court's recent observation in Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970), that Congress has attached great importance to private settlement of labor dis-
putes. 429 F.2d at 334, 2 FE? Cases at 872.
OF 446 F.2d 120, 3 FEP Cases 831 (6th Cir. 1971).
08
 The court quoted language from the collective bargaining agreement which requires
the employer to act "regardless of race, creed, [or] color." Id. at 123, 3 FEP Cases at
833. Such language was not cited by the court in Dewey.
09 313 F. Supp. at 1071-72, 2 FE? Cases at 517-18.
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arbitral award precluded the plaintiff from bringing a Title VII action.
In doing so, the court noted that the Dewey holding was not based on
an election of remedies theory, but rather on the basis of "estoppel by
arbitrator's award.'" 70 This must be so, said the court, because "[p] ri-
vate parties cannot by private contract deprive the District Court of
jurisdiction . . . conferred by federal statute." 71 The court described
the estoppel rationale utilized in Dewey as follows: "Where the parties
have agreed to resolve their grievances before (1) a fair and impartial
tribunal (2) which had power to decide them, a District Court should
defer to the fact finding thus accomplished.' However, it then held
that deference to arbitration was not appropriate in Newman because
(1) the fairness of the arbitration proceeding was questionable, and
(2) it was doubtful that the arbitrator had the right to decide the racial
discrimination issue because the contract contained no prohibition
against such discrimination."
With respect to the fairness of the arbitration proceedings, the
court noted as especially significant that Newman's court action named
the union and the employer as co-conspirators in the maintainence of
a long-standing system of racial discrimination at the plant. Therefore
it concluded that since the union had participated on Newman's behalf
at the arbitration proceedings, and since the arbitrator—whose selec-
tion was controlled by the union and the employer—had given weight
to the union's refusal to argue the claim of racial discrimination, the
fairness of the proceeding was doubtful. The implication of this ruling
is that since the union may have had an interest in maintaining the
allegedly discriminatory system being attacked by the plaintiff, the
impartiality of a forum which is controlled jointly by the union and
the employer is to be questioned strenuously."
For purposes of distinguishing Dewey and Newman, the court
could have stopped at this point, since the complaint in Dewey charged
only the employer with discriminatory practices. However, the New-
man court went further. It held that the arbitrator lacked the power
to decide the question of racial discrimination. Newman noted that the
arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement expressly
limited the arbitrator's jurisdiction to questions involving interpreta-
tion of the contract, and that the contract contained no provision pro-
7° 451 F.2d at 746, 3 FEP Cases at 1139.
71
 Id., 3 FEP Cases at 1140.
72 Id. at 747, 3 FEF Cases at 1140, citing United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S.
61 (1878) (emphasis in the original).
78 Id. at 748, 3 FEP Cases at 1141.
74 The court relied on Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), for its holding that the
fairness of the arbitration proceedings was doubtful. For relevant language from that
decision, see note 37 supra.
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hibiting racial discrimination by the employer." Thus, the court
concluded that "major aspects of this . . . complaint :were either not
submitted to arbitration or were beyond the arbitrator's power of
decision. To such issues plainly neither the doctrine of res judicata , nor
collateral estoppel can apply."".It is submitted, however, that on the
basis of the arbitrator's power to decide certain issues,. Dewey is not
distinguishable from Newman. In Dewey, do contractual 'clause pro-
hibiting religious discrimination•. was noted by the court. The only
contractual language noted in Dewey was' language requiring em-
ployees to perform all overtime work required by the company "except
when the employee has a substantial and justifiable reason for not
working.'" Although it could be argued that the question of whether
religious belief is a "substantial and.justifiable excuse" for not working
on Sundays and therefore within the scope of contract interpretation,
the Dewey court gave no indication that its holding was predicated' on
this theory. Therefore, 'the Newman court's rationale that the dis-
crimination charge was not within the arbitrator's power is equally
applicable to the facts of Dewey. •
Since the doctrine of estoppel applied in Newman requires both
fairness in the arbitral proceeding and ,power to decide the question of
employment discrimination, the argument that Dewey was reversed by
Newman is persuasive.
There remains, however, one.possible basis for distinguishing the
two •cases on the issue of the • arbitrator's power—the nature of the
charge filed:In Newman the complaint alleged along-standing system
of discrimination, while Dewey was concerned•with a single work rule
of the employer. Assuming that the collective bargaining agreement in
both cases provided for some. limitation on the employer's right to dis-
cipline," it is far more likely that the allegation in Dewey would be
within the scope of the arbitrator's power. The Newman court, how-
ever, did not mention the distinguishable allegations in' its discussion
of the arbitrator's power. Rather, it limited its discussion of the nature
of the charge to the question of fairness and impartiality. Despite the
existence of this ground for distinguishing Dewey, however, it must be
admitted that' Newman has cast doubt- on the continuing validity of
the earlier decision. ,  •
Although, after Newman, the Sixth Circuit's position on the effect
of prior arbitration is somewhat unclear, it can be said to be generally
in line with the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. Further, the Supreme
75 451 F.2d at 748, 3 FEP Cases at 1141.
78 Id.
77 429 F2d at 328, 2 FEP Cases at.689•
78 See Anderson, NLRB and Private Arbitration: Should Collyer Be Extended To
Employee Discipline Cases?, p. 1465 infra at note 24.
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Court's decision in Dewey has no value as precedent since the court
was evenly divided in that case. It is probable that discriminatees in
other circuits will follow this trend to invoke arbitration initially in
an attempt to expedite their charges and avoid the time consuming Title
VII procedures.
3. Filing Requirement of Title VII
Section 706(c) of Title VII" provides that no charge shall be filed
with the EEOC prior to sixty days after submitting a charge to a state
or local agency authorized to remedy employment discrimination, un-
less the state or local proceedings are terminated before the expiration
of sixty days. In Love v. Pullman Co.," decided during the Survey
year, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who initially files a charge
with the EEOC 'need not re-file with that Commission after a state
agency to which he was referred disposes of his case.
The plaintiff in Love filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that
his employer had engaged in unlawful practices by classifying blacks,
who performed the same functions as conductors, as porters-in-charge.
This job classification had a lower 'pay scale than conductors. The
EEOC informed the Colorado Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission of the plaintiff's complaint. Within two weeks the EEOC re-
ceived written confirmation that the Colorado Commission was waiving
its opportunity to take further action. The EEOC then proceeded, with-
out a re-filing by the grievant, to investigate the charge. Upon a finding
of probable cause, the EEOC sought to conciliate the dispute. After un-
successful conciliation it notified the plaintiff of his right to sue in
federal court.
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the pro-
cedural requirements of Title VII had not been satisfied. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed,8' holding that the plaintiff's discrimination charge had
not been "filed" with the EEOC'in conformity with Title VII require-
ments. It reasoned that since section 706(b) 82 provides that no charge
may be filed with the EEOC before the expiration of sixty days after
proceedings have been commenced under state or local law, unless such
proceedings have been earlier terminated, Love's complaint, submitted
prior to commencement of the state commission proceedings, did not
constitute a "filing" under Title VII.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the action should have
79
 Formerly § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970). The section was changed to
section 706(c) by the 1972 amendments to Title VII, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). The 1972
amendments did not affect the substance of the section.
80 404 U.S. 522, 4 FEP Cases 150 (1972).
81 430 F.2d 49, 2 FEP Cases 141, 839 (10th Cir. 1970).
82 This case was decided prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII. See note 79 supra.
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been allowed because "the filing procedure followed in this case fully
complied with the intent of the Act."" The EEOC may hold a com-
plaint in "suspended animation" during the state or local agency's
proceedings and automatically file it upon termination of such proceed-
ings. The intent of section 706 is to give state agencies the first oppor-
tunity to deal with employment discrimination disputes. Since this
purpose was fulfilled, the EEOC should not be barred from acting on
Love's charges.
The Supreme Court's holding in Love has been approved by Con-
gress in the 1972 amendments to Title VII. The Joint Conference
Committee's explanatory statement on the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunities Act of 1972 states that "the decision in Love v. Pullman .. .
interpreting the existing law to allow the Commission to receive a
charge (but not act on it) during . . . [the] deferral period is co_ n-
trolling." 84
4. Seniority Systems and the "Business Necessity" Test
Since enactment of Title VII, a fundamental question has existed
as to the effect that statute will have on racially neutral post-Act prac-
tices which have the effect of perpetuating pre-Act discrimination. In a
1971 decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 85 the Supreme Court an-
swered that question by holding that an employment practice which
has a racially discriminatory effect, even though prima facie neutral,
is prohibited by Title VII unless the employer can justify the practice
by a showing of "business necessity."" In holding certain employment
examinations invalid, the Griggs Court reasoned that: (1) since blacks
in the locality had historically received inferior education in segregated
schools, the effect of the examinations was to bar them from employ-
ment and promotion; (2) the fact that the employer may have utilized
the testing policy without intent to discriminate was irrelevant when
the ef ect was to discriminate; B 7 (3) the employer failed to prove that
the tests bore a demonstrable relationship to successful job perfor-
mance."
During the Survey year, a number of circuit courts applied the
88
 404 U.S. 522, 4 FEP Cases at 151.
84
 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Managers at the Conference on H.R. 1746
to Further Promote Equal Employment Opportunity for American Workers, 118 Cong.
Rec. 1697-98 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1972).
85
 401 U.S. 424, 3 FEP Cases 175 (1971).
86
 "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431, 3 FEP Cases at 178.
87 "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment prac-
tices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432, 3 FEP Cases at 178.
88 Id. at 433, 3 FEP Cases at 178.
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Griggs criteria to post-Title VII racially neutral seniority systems,
thereby clarifying the Supreme Court's "business necessity" criterion."
The seniority and promotion systems in issue in these cases are
typical of the departmental craft or class systems presently in effect
at a substantial number of industrial plants. These systems provide for
parallel lines of seniority in separate crafts or groups. This seniority is
applicable only to promotion within a specific job group. Two or more
groups of related jobs are organized into separate seniority districts,
each of which bears little functional relationship to the other." The
business rationale for this grouping is that an employee with experience
in one job group possesses little or no training, by virtue of his ex-
perience, for higher paying jobs in the other non-related groups. 91 The
collective bargaining agreement usually either prohibits inter-group
transfer or provides that a transferring employee forfeits any seniority
he has accumulated in his former job category."
In a plant with a pre-Title VII history of discriminatory hiring
policies which limited minority employees to lower-paying job cate-
gories, the effect of the craft or class seniority system is to "lock"
presently employed minority employees into their 'present job group.
Seniority accumulated by a minority employee in a lower-paying job
group cannot be utilized to give him preference over a white employee
with a later seniority date in a higher-paying group when both are
bidding for promotion to a job in the higher-paying group. The ques-
tion presented, then, is whether these seniority systems, admittedly ra-
cially neutral in the abstract, are violative of Title VII where they have
the effect of perpetuating the effects of pre-Act discriminatory hiring
policies.
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.," Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp.,°4 and United States v. Jacksonville Terminal," three circuit
courts were required to apply the Griggs criteria to a craft or class
89 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 3 FEP Cases 589 (2d Cir.
1971) ; Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 3 FEP Cases 653 (4th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 3 FEP Cases 862 (5th Cir. 1971).
Each of these cases considered both the hiring and promotion policies in effect at the
defendant's place of business. For purposes of this discussion, however, only the seniority
policies will be considered.
90
 Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1260, 1265 (1967).
91 This rationale was seriously questioned on the facts of the cases herein discussed.
See, e.g., the Robinson court's conclusion that "the record is barren of any real evidence
that the jobs in the formerly all-white departments are so complex and interrelated that
progression through a series of jobs is necessary to efficient performance of the more dif-
ficult tasks." 444 F.2d at 799, 3 FEP Cases at 658.
92 See Note, supra note 90 at 1265.
98 466 F.2d 652, 3 FEP Cases 589 (2d Cir. 1971).
94 444 P,2d 791, 3 FEP Cases 653 (4th Cir. 1971).
°5 451 F.2d 418, 3 FEP Cases 862 (5th Cir. 1971).
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seniority system. In each case, the court first found, primarily on the
basis of statistical evidence, that the effects of pre-Act discrimination
were in fact perpetuated by post-Act seniority and promotion systems.
Each found that overtly discriminatory pre-Act hiring policies had
resulted in minority employees being assigned jobs in lower-paying job
categories, and that promotion and seniority systems in effect subse-
quent to Title VII had effectively "locked" the existing complement of
workers into their pre-Act job categories. However, the courts held that
a. mere showing that present policies had this "locking" effect did not
constitute a per se violation of Title VII. Rather, they held that the
employer may justify the seniority system, in spite of its discriminatory
effect, by a showing of legitimate business necessity."
.	 In determining the meaning and applicability of the "business
necessity" criterion, the Fourth Circuit in Robinson reviewed Griggs.
It noted that in Griggs, the circuit court had approved the defendant's
testing program on the ground that there existed a legitimate business
purpose, but that the Supreme Court, in reversing, the circuit court,
applied the business necessity test. The Fourth Circuit concluded that
the applicable test is not merely whether there exists a busi-
ness purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test
is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business pur-
pose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and effi-
cient operation of the business. Thus . . . there must be
available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which
would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or
accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial im-
pact."
In applying this rationale, the Robinson court held that such alleged
"business necessities" as maintenance of the status quo, conformance
with other plants in the industry and avoidance of union pressure were
clearly not sufficient to vindicate the otherwise unlawful promotion and
seniority system." More significantly, the court held that the argument
that employees will more efficiently perform a job if they have experi-
ence in other jobs in the same department did not sufficiently meet the
business necessity criterion because "seniority is necessarily an in-
efficient means of assuring sufficient prior job experience." 89 The ra-
tionale underlying this finding is that seniority systems, by their
nature, do not provide promotion for the "best qualified" employee,
98 This holding was merely an application of the black letter law set forth in Griggs.
See note 86 supra.
97 444 F.2d at 798, 3 FEP Cases at 657-58.
98 Id. at 798-99, 3 FEP Cases at 658.
99 Id. at 799, 3 FEP Cases at 659.
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but rather for the "qualified" employee with the earliest seniority date.
Consequently, it will be a rare case in which a craft or class seniority
system will be deemed sufficiently connected with job efficiency to
vindicate such a system which locks previously discriminated-against
employees into lower paying job categories.'"
In Bethlehem Steel, the Second Circuit expressed its interpretation
of the business necessity rule as follows:
[T]he "business necessity" doctrine must mean more than
that transfer and seniority policies serve legitimate manage-
ment functions. . . Necessity connotes irresistable demand.
To be preserved, the seniority and transfer system must not
only directly foster safety and efficiency of a plant, but also
be essential to those goals. If the legitimate ends of safety and
efficiency can be served by a reasonably available alternative
system with less discriminatory effects, then the present poli-
cies may not be continued.'"
The Bethlehem Steel court then held that this business necessity stan-
dard was not satisfied since, as in Robinson, the existing seniority
system would allow promotion of the "qualified" employee with the
earliest seniority date rather than the "best qualified" employee. The
court also dismissed the company's argument that to abolish or alter
the craft or class seniority system would deteriorate white employees'
morale by ruling that this "business purpose" was simply not sufficient
to override the public interest in nondiscriminatory policies. 10"
In Jacksonville Terminal, the Fifth Circuit followed Robinson and
Bethlehem Steel in holding a craft or class seniority system violative
of Title VII.'" After quoting with approval the Bethlehem Steel inter-
pretation of the "business necessity" doctrine, the court stated: "Cru-
cial to . . . [the defendant's] justification was proof of the unstated
predicate—that current occupants of a class or craft are necessarily
the only employees qualified to fill vacancies in that craft or class."'"
Applying this test, the court noted the trial court's finding that no job
at. the Terminal required, as a condition precedent, service in a lower
100 This point was made even more explicitly in the Jacksonville Terminal opinion.
Sec text at note 104 infra.
101 446 F.2d at 662, 3 FEP Cases at 596 (emphasis added),	 .
102 Id.
103 In a somewhat tangential but significant ruling, Jacksonville Terminal held that
a court may look to hiring and promotion policies as far as fifty years prior to the bringing
of the action in order to determine whether present policies violate Title VII. 451 F.2d 418,
440, 3 FEP Cases 862, 878-9. Previous decisions' had limited the period of inquiry to five
years, Georgia Power Co. v. E.E.O.C., 295 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ga. 1968), and six years,
Dobbins v, Local 212, I.B.E.W., 292 F. Supp. 413, 1 FEP Cases 387 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
1-04 451 F.2d at 451, 3 FEP Cases at 889 (emphasis added).
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job classification. Therefore, reasoned the court, craft or class seniority
could not be determinative of job. qualification. Rather, those systems
serve to protect employees with job experience in particular crafts or
classes without ascertaining whether they are the best qualified. to hold
positions in those crafts or classes. Thus the court reasoned that since
qualification in a craft or class was not a pre-requisite to appointment
to a higher-paying job in the craft or class, the current occupants of a
craft or class were not the only employees qualified to fill vacancies in
their craft or class. Consequently, the court held that the seniority
systems were not sufficiently connected with the business necessity of
job efficiency to satisfy the Griggs test.
It is now clear that the Second, Fourth and Fifth Circuits will
interpret the Griggs "business necessity" doctrine as • meaning "es-
sential" to the achievement of legitimate business goals. A seniority
system which serves to perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discriminatory
policies will be held violative of Title VII so long as another less dis-
criminatory policy is reasonably available. Furthermore, it can be
inferred from the treatment given to the seniority systems in Robinson
and Jacksonville Terminal that the company will be required to show
that its seniority system is structured in such a way as to insure that
"best qualified" is tantamount to "most experienced" before the plan
will receive court approval.
5. 1972 Amendments to Title VI1
The Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972 1 " significantly
modified Title VII. The Act authorizes the EEOC to litigate a civil
action in federal district court against a respondent charged with
employment practices violative of Title VII. Other sections of the
1972 .Act enlarge the class of persons covered by Title VII, lengthen
the time limitations for filing charges, broaden the scope of religious
discrimination protection, and limit back pay remedies.
Enforcement Power. Under the original Act,'" the EEOC was
limited to the investigation and informal conciliation of Title VII dis-
putes. Court action under Title VII had to be initiated by the individ-
ual grievant, with one exception—the Attorney General was authorized
to initiate actions where a "pattern or practice" of discrimination was
alleged. The 1972 revisions grant the EEOC the authority to initiate
and litigate civil actions either on behalf of an individual grievant or
as a class action.'" The EEOC is also granted, for two years, authority
1 °5
 86 Stat. 103 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §{ 2000e et seq. (1970).
im 42 U.S.C. H 2000e et seq. (1970).
107 86 Stat. 103	 4(a) (1972). The sole exception to this grant of authority exists
where the defendant in the action would be a federal, state or local governmental body.
In such a situation the Attorney General retains exclusive authority to bring the action.
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concurrent with the Attorney General to initiate and conduct "pattern
or practice" actions. After two years, the EEOC will assume exclusive
authority over this litigation. 108
 In addition to the power to bring a
court action, the Commission is granted authority to petition for pre-
liminary or temporary injunctive relief where an investigation leads it
to believe that prompt judicial action is necessary.
To preserve the individual grievant's right to pursue his claim,
the 1972 Act provides that he may file an independent action in federal
court should the EEOC fail to file one in his behalf. The Commission
has been given authority to intervene in an action brought by an
individual grievant.
The 1972 amendments provide the EEOC with subpoena power
equal to that of the NLRB, augmenting its power under the original
Act to "demand" documents and records.
In order to prevent delay in Title VII cases, the 1972 Act
requires the judge designated to hear Title VII actions to "assign the
case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case
to be in every way expedited.'"" The amendments also relax the strin-
gent requirements of Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
by permitting the judge to appoint a master to expedite the case where
it has not been scheduled for trial within 120 days after issue has
been joined.1 t0
In order to provide the legal resources necessary to implement
the above enforcement powers, the amendments create the Office
of General Counsel to the Commission. The General Counsel is to be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
He is to be responsible for the conduct of litigation and the supervision
of EEOC regional offices.
Coverage. The 1972 Act significantly enlarges the class of persons
covered by Title VII. Most important is its inclusion of state and local
governments and their political subdivisions in the Act's definition of
"persons,"1 " which makes them "employers" covered by Title VII.
The amendments also lower from twenty-five to fifteen the number
of employees required to bring their employer or union within Title VII
coverage. 112
 However, the former exemption for the religious activities
of religious corporations, societies, and educational institutions is
108 86 Stat. 103 § .5 (1972).
100 86 Stat. 103 § 4(a) (1972).
119
 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Managers at the Conference on H.R. 1746 to
Further Promote Equal Employment Opportunity for American Workers, 118 Cong. Rec.
1697-98 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1972).
111 86 Stat. 103 § 2 (1972).
112 86 Stat. 103 § 2 (1972).
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broadened by the. amendments to include all the activities of . such
organizations.' '
Time Limitations. The new amendments to Title VII extend - the
basic statute of limitations for filing a charge with the EEOC from 90
to 180 days after the occurrence of the discriminatory act.' Where a
local or state agency exists to handle charges'of discriminatory prac-
tices, the time limitation is extended from 210 to 300 days after oc-
currence - of the discriminatory act.- Sections 706(b) and 706(c) of
the Act were not amended, but the Joint Conference Committee
expressly declared that the rule of Love v. Pullman"' allowing the
EEOC to receive a charge during the statutory sixty-day period of
deferral, to local or state agencies should be left. intact.
Religious Activities. The 1972 Act amends Title VIPs definition
of "religion" to include all aspects of religious observance, practice,
and belief." 7 As a result of this change, employers will be required to
make reasonable efforts to accommodate working schedules and condi-
tions to such religious practices as Sabbath observance. The purpose
of the amendment is to provide statutory authority for EEOC guide-
lines on religious discrimination such as that alleged in Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals, Inc.""
Remedies. The basic remedial powers of a court deciding a Title
VII action are retained by the 1972 amendments. One major change
limits back pay orders to a period including two years prior to the
filing of the charge.' The deletion by the Joint Conference Committee
of the House bill provision that made Title VII the exclusive remedy
for unlawful employment practices"° is significant in that it clearly
exhibits a congressional intent to permit actions for discriminatory
employment practices to be brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act
of J866121 and the National Labor Relations Act.' 22
B. The Philadelphia Plan—Affirmative Action Requirement
During the Survey year, in Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Schultz, 128 the Third Circuit affirmed the legality of the hotly
118 86 Stat. 103 § 3 (1972).
114 86 Stat. 103 1 4(a) (1972).
115 86 Stat. 103 § 4(a) (1972).
116 See pp. 1361-62 supra.
117 86 Stat. 103 § 2 (1972).
118 Explanatory Report on Proposed Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972,
submitted to the Senate with the joint Conference Committee's reported bill by Senators
javits and Williams, 115 Cong. Rec. 3460-63 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1972).
119 86 Stat. 103 § 4(a) (1972).
129 Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 110.
in See pp. 1350-51, supra.
122 See pp. 1425-1430, infra.
128 442 F.2d 159, 3 FEP Cases 395 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Contractors
Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Hodgson, 404 U.S. 854, 3 FE? Cases 1030 (1971).
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debated revised Philadelphia Plan which was established to increase
the number of minority group employees in the construction trades.
This was the first appellate court test of the Philadelphia Plan. The
court dealt with all of the principal arguments that have been advanced
against the Plan, and in so doing apparently set the stage for Supreme
Court determination of its legality. The Supreme Court, however,
denied certiorari.'
The Philadelphia Plan was initiated in November, 1967, when the
Philadelphia Federal Executive Board put into effect the Philadelphia
Pre-Award Plant" whose purpose was to effectuate compliance with the
"affirmative action" requirement of Executive Order No. 11246 in the
construction industry. 120 This program required each apparent low
bidder on a federal construction project to submit a written affirmative
action program designed to assure minority group representation in
eight construction trades.'" The 1967 Plan witnessed some progress,'"
but was suspended in 1968 after the Comptroller General expressed his
opinion that it was inconsistent with the basic principles of competitive
bidding.120
In response to the Comptroller General's objection, the Labor
Department, in the summer of •1969, put into effect the revised Phila-
delphia Plan. This Plan requires bidders in a five-county area sur-
rounding Philadelphia to inchide in their bids on federal construction
contracts exceeding $500,000 an affirmative action program for minority
employment which meets specific goals established by the Area Coordi-
nator of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance.'" The Area Coor-
124 Id.
123
 This program was adopted in Philadelphia following successful implementation
of a similar one in Cleveland. For a detailed discussion of the development of the original
program, see Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis
of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 84, 89-90 (1970).
128 Exec. Order No. 11246 * 202(1) provides for the inclusion of the following
language in all government construction contracts: "The contractor will take affirmative
action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during
employment without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 3 C.F.R.
339 (1964-65 Comp.), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967 Comp.),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) (hereinafter cited as Exec. Order 11246).
127 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Revised Philadelphia Plan for Compliance with Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Requirements of Executive Order 11246 for Federally-Involved
Construction, § 4 (June 27, 1969), reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec. 21398 (July 30, 1969)
and in Lab. Rel. Rep., FEP Manual at 401:251 (hereinafter cited as June 27 Order).
128 June 27 Order, supra note 127, § 4.
120 In so finding, the Comptroller General stated that the basic principles of com-
petitive bidding require that bidders "be assured that award will be made only on the
basis of the low responsive bid submitted by a bidder meeting established criteria of re-
sponsibility ... and that award will not thereafter be dependent upon the low bidder's
ability to unsuccessfully negotiate matters mentioned only vaguely before bidding." 47
Comp. Gen. 666, 670 (1968) (emphasis added).
130 June 27 Order, supra note 127, 5.
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dinator is directed to specify, after consideration of several factors, the
range of minority manpower utilization expected for each of the seven
trades. 21
 In Septeinber 1969, the Labor Department published an
order specifying ranges of minority employment to be included in bid
invitations on all federal construction projects in the five-county Phila-
delphia area."' This order set ranges of required minority employment
in six trades at increasing intervals for each year up to and including
1973.183
The impact of the revised Plan on contractors and unions in the
construction industry was both direct and significant, and its nation-
wide implications were immediately affirmed by the Labor Depart-
ment.'" Objections were raised immediately by members of Congress
who questioned the imposition of "quotas" on federal contractors.135
In August, 1969, the Comptroller General issued an opinion which indi-
cated that the revised Plan was inconsistent with the intent of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and Executive Order No. 11246, both of which pro-
hibit the use of race or national origin as a basis of employment.'"
However, Secretary of Labor Schultz announced his intention to go
ahead with the Plan.'"
The plaintiffs in Contractors Ass'n, an association composed of
121 Id. § 6. The factors to be considered in determining the required ranges of
minority employment include: (1) the current extent of minority group participation in
the trade, (2) the availability of minority group persons for employment in the trade,
(3) the need for minority group training programs in the area, and (4) the impact of the
program upon the existing labor force.
132 U.S. Dept. of Labor Order, Establishment of Ranges for the Implementation of
the Revised Philadelphia Plan for Compliance with Equal Employment Opportunity
Requirements of Executive Order 11246 for Federally-Involved Construction (Sept. 23,
1969), reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec. 39953 (Dec. 18, 1969) and in Lab. Rel. Rep., FE?
Manual at 401:255 (hereinafter cited as Sept. 23 Order).
133 The following ranges were set by the Department of Labor.
CALENDAR YEAR
until
12/31/70	 1971	 1972 1973
Trade
Ironworkers 5%-9% 11%-15% 16%-20% 22%-26%
Plumbers & Pipefitters 3%-8% 10%-14% 15%-19% 20%-24%
Steam fitters 5%-8% 1170-15% 15%-19% 20%-24%
Sheetmetal workers 4%-8% 9%-13% 14%48% 19%-23%
Electrical workers 4%-8% 9%-13% 14%-18% 19%-23%
Elevator construction workers 4%43% 9%-13% 14%48% 19%-23%
Id, at § 4.
134 In a June, 1969 briefing of federal contract compliance officers, the Assistant
Secretary of Labor, Arthur A. Fletcher, stated that it was anticipated that the Philadelphia
Plan would be put into effect as soon as possible in all the major cities in the nation. 1969
Labor Relations Yearbook at 593 (1970).
138 See, e.g., Senator Fannin's admonition. Id. at 595.
1241 49 Comp. Gen. 59, 65 (1970). The legal arguments upon which the Comptroller
General based his opinion were all raised in Contractors Ass'n and are discussed infra.
137 1969 Labor Relations Yearbook at 599 (1970).
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more than eighty contractors, and eight contractors suing in their in-
dividual capacities, regularly employ workers in the six trades specified
in the Labor Department Order in the five county area around Phila-
delphia. Seeking to enjoin the Plan's enforcement, they sued the Secre-
tary of Labor and other federal government officials. They alleged,
inter alia, that the Plan represents executive action beyond executive
power, that it imposes quotas inconsistent with the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and that it is inconsistent with the National Labor Relations Act.
Furthermore, they alleged that it violates Executive Order No. 11246,
the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment, and the equal
protection clause of the Fifth Amendment.'" The district court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment' s' and the plaintiffs ap-
pealed.
1. Executive Authority
The plaintiffs contended that the Philadelphia Plan is "legisla-
tion ... enacted by the Executive without the benefit of statutory or
constitutional authority."' The Government relied on case law to
support its contention that the Executive possessed the power to impose
fair employment conditions on federally assisted state contracts. The
Third Circuit rejected both arguments."" Rather it surveyed the
predecessors to Executive Order No. 11246, and indicated that the or-
ders appeared to be authorized by the congressional grant of procure-
ment authority to the Executive in Titles 40 and 41 of the United
States Code."' While Titles 40 and 41 are concerned with direct federal
procurement, the court observed that under three former presidents
federally assisted construction had been sufficiently analogized to fed-
eral procurement to allow finding, in Titles 40 and 41, congressional
authorization of the Executive to act regarding the latter. Further-
more, if executive action in this regard has not been expressly autho-
rized by Congress, it falls within that area of government activity
where the Executive and Congress have concurrent authority."' Thus
138 442 F.2d at 165, 3 FE? Cases at 399.
122 311 F. Supp. 1002, 2 FEP Cases 472 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
140 442 F.2d at 166, 3 FEP Cases at 399.
141 The defendants relied on Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d
Cir. 1964) and Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967), for this contention. The court distinguished these cases on
the grounds that their discussions of the Executive Order were dicta, and by noting that
the statutory authorization for the Executive Orders there involved was not relevant to
federal assistance programs. Id. at 167, 3 FEP Cases at 400.
142 Id. at 169-70, 3 FEP Cases at 402. The broad grant of authority referred to Is
embodied in 40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (1970), which grants the President authority to "pre-
scribe such policies and directives . . . as he shall deem necessary . .
143 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (opinion
of Justice Jackson).
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the court concluded that the President had implied authority to initiate
the Philadelphia Plan unless it was prohibited by a specific congres-
sional enactment!"
ti•
2. Civil Rights Act of .1964
	 ,
The plaintiffs asserted that Executive Order No. 11246 and the
Philadelphia Plan are inconsistent with Titl6 VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and that therefore the Executive has no authority to put
the Plan into effect. In rejecting the argument that Executive Order No.
11246 is inconsistent with Title VII, the court first observed that in
Title VII, Congress expressly indicated its approval of the Executive
Order Programl" - and then noted its holding in Young v. International
Telephone and Telegraph Co. that Title VII is not the exclusive
remedy for discriminatory employment practices!"
The plaintiffs further argued, however, that the Philadelphia Plan
itself requires a violation of Sections 703 (a), 703(h) and 703 (j) of
Title VII. Section 703 (j) provides that Title VII` does not require any
employer or union to grant "preferential treatment" to any individual
because of race,'" and Section 703 (h) permits employers to utilize
different compensation standards and employment conditions pursuant
to a bona fide seniority system!" The court held that both these sec-
144
 442 F.2d at 171, 3 FEP Cases at 403.
145 Id. at 172, 3 FEP Cases at 404. Section 709(d) of the original Act states in
pertinent part:
Where an employer is required by Executive Order 10925, issued March 6, 1961,
or by any other Executive order prescribing fair employment practices for Gov-
ernment contractors and subcontractors, or by rules or regulations issued there-
under, to file reports relating to his employment practices with any Federal agency 	 ,
or committee, and he is substantially in compliance with such requirements, the
Commission shall not require him to 'file additional reports pursuant to subsection
(c) of this section.	 •
42: U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d) (1970). Following the Contractors Ass'n decision, Congress re-
stated its intention that Title VII was not meant to repeal Executive Order No. 11246.
It added anew Section 718 to Title VII which provides that, where the Government has
accepted an affirmative action program within the previous twelve months, no government
contract can be denied or superseded under Executive Order No. 11246 without a full
hearing. 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
146 In Young, the Third Circuit approved direct court action bypassing Title VII
remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. For a discussion of Young and related cases, see text
accompanying notes 14-35 supra.
147. Section 703(j) provides: "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be inter-
preted to require any employer . . . [or] labor organization . . . to grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group of individuals because of . . . race. . . ."
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(j) (1970).
148 .Section 703(h) provides: "[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to employ different standards of compensation, or different terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system... ."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
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tions limit only Title VII and have no effect on remedies outside that
statute.'"
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that section
703 (a) prohibits enforcement of the Philadelphia Plan. Section 703 (a)
makes it an unlawful employment practice to refuse to hire a person
because of his race.'" The plaintiffs argued that the Plan required
them to refuse to hire white employees because of their race. The court
insisted that this argument ignored the findings which led to the Plan's
adoption.'" Specifically, the court pointed to a Labor Department find-
ing that contractors could comply with the specified minority employ-
ment goals in the Plan without: adverse impact on the existing labor
force.'
3. National Labor Relations Act
The Philadelphia Plan requires the contractor on a federally as-
sisted contract to take affirmative action to meet his goal of minority
group employment even if the union hiring hail refers no minority group
employees to him.'" The plaintiffs argued that this requires the con-
tractor, in effect, to violate the exclusive hiring hall clause which is
contained in the collective bargaining agreement and which is validated
by Section 8(f) of the NLRA. 134
 The court rejected this argument by
noting that the Plan sets criteria for government contracts, for which
a contractor may or may not bid. If a contractor wishes to participate
in an exclusive hiring hall arrangement with a union, he is not pre-
cluded from doing so by the Plan, though he may be foreclosed from
qualifying for federally assisted contracts if the union refuses, because
of the exclusive hiring hall clause, to cooperate with his affirmative
action program. 16"
149
 442 F.2d at 172, 3 FEP Cases at 404.
159 Section 703(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire . . . any individual . .. because of such individual's race ... or
(2) to ... classify his employees in any way which would deprive .. any in-
dividual of employment opportunities . . . because of such individual's race. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
In 442 F.2d at 173, 3 FE? Cases at 404-05.
152 Id. at 174, 3 FEP Cases at 405. The findings of the Department of Labor are
detailed in its Sept. 23 Order, supra note 132, § 3.
153 Section 8(b) of the June 27 Order, supra note 127, provides:
It is no excuse that the union with which the contractor has a collective bargain-
ing agreement failed to refer minority employees. .. To the extent that con-
tractors have delegated the responsibility for some of their employment practices
to some other organization or agency which prevents them from meeting their
obligations pursuant to Executive Order 11246 . . . such contractors cannot be
considered in compliance with Executive Order 11246 ... or the implementing
rules, regulations and orders.
154
 29 U.S.C.
	 158(f) (1970).
155 442 F.2d at 174, 3 FE? Cases at 406.
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4. Executive Order No. 11246
The plaintiffs further argued that the language of Executive Order
No. 11246 prohibiting discrimination based on race° limits the affirma-
tive action mandate to a mere policing against actual present discrimina-
tion. Furthermore, they contended that since the Philadelphia Plan
requires contractors to discriminate against white applicants, it violates
the prohibition of the Executive Order.
The court first admitted that administrative action would be in-
valid if beyond the scope of the Executive Order. However, it then
pointed to the fact that the Secretary of Labor was given a broad grant
of discretion in enforcing the Order,'" and noted that it would give
"more than ordinary deference to an administrative agency's inter-
pretation of an Executive Order . . . . which it is charged to admin-
ister."158 Therefore, the court held it was proper to defer to the in-
terpretation of Executive Order No. 11246 that the Labor Department
had developed in establishing the Philadelphia Plan pursuant to that
Order."9
5. Due Process
The plaintiffs also asserted that the Philadelphia Plan violated the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because (1) it imposes on
government contractors contradictory duties impossible of attainment,
and (2) it is arbitrary and capricious in singling out the contractors
to remedy the unions' acts of discrimination. The court dismissed the
first of these contentions by observing that since the findings, in the
Labor Department's September Order indicate that the specific goals
can be met without adverse effects on the existing labor force, the duties
imposed are not contradictory."° With respect to the argument that the
Plan is arbitrary in requiring the contractors to remedy union actions,
the court noted that the Plan is not punishment for past misconduct,
but rather is an exaction of a covenant, no different from other cove-
nants speCified in an invitation to bid."'
6. Equal Protection
The plaintiffs further argued that the specific goals required by
the Plan are racial quotas prohibited by the equal protection clause of
159 Exec. Order No. 11246, § 202(1), supra note 126.
157 Section 201 of Exec. Order No. 11246, supra note 126, authorizes the Secretary
of Labor to "adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as he deems necessary
and appropriate."
158 442 F.2d at 175, 3 FEP Cases at 407.
159 Id.
100 Id. at 176, 3 FEP Cases at 407.
181 Id.
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the Fifth Amendment. The court summarily dismissed this argument
by asserting that the Plan is "valid Executive action" aimed at pro-
viding jobs for people , who have been denied them in the past.'" This
apparently is an implicit holding by the court that, even if the Plan
does establish minority quotas and classifications, the governmental in-
terest in promoting minority group employment is sufficiently com-
pelling to justify them.
An additional noteworthy argument in favor of the Philadelphia
Plan's validity was overlooked by the Third Circuit in Contractors
Ass'n. The court, in rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that the Plan
violates the general non-discriminatory language in Title VII and in
Executive Order No. 11246, failed to refer to the "good faith" proviso
in the June 27 Order establishing the revised Philadelphia Plan. This
proviso states that "in the event of failure to meet the required goals,
the contractor shall be given an opportunity to demonstrate that he
made every good faith effort to meet his commitment."'" Although the
meaning of "good faith effort" as used here has not been interpreted
by the courts,'" it is at least arguable that it would not require a prac-
tice that would violate Title VII or Executive Order No. 11246. Indeed,
the Labor Solicitor has pointed to the "good faith" aspect of the Plan's
compliance criteria in refuting the claim that the Plan would require
a contractor to discriminate against a qualified white craftsman in favor
of an unqualified non-white applicant.'"
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Contractors
Ass'n, it is doubtful that the question of the Plan's validity has been
laid to rest. Similar plans are now in effect in Washington D.C., San
Francisco,'" and Atlanta' and further court tests can be expected,
especially in light of a recent report issued by the Senate Subcommittee
on Separation of Powers. That Subcommittee charged that the Plan is
"a blatant case of usurpation of the legislative function by the execu-
tive branch of the Government.'""
162 Id. at 177, 3 FEP Cases at 408.
10 June 27 Order, § 8(a).
104 In a hearing held by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare regarding
a violation of the Philadelphia Plan Order, the hearing officer found that a contractor did
not make a "good faith effort" because he failed to attempt to influence the union to invite
minority membership or to take other action aimed at encouraging recruitment of minority
craftsmen. 76 Lab. Rel. Rep. 332 (News & Backgd. Inf., 1971).
106 Legal Memorandum submitted by Labor Solicitor Lawrence H. Silberman to the
Comptroller General, quoted in part in 1969 Labor Relations Yearbook at 597 (1970).
106 77 Lab. Rel. Rep. 124 (News & Backgd. Inf., 1971),
167 77 Lab. Rel. Rep. 169 (News & Backgd. Inf., 1971).
166 77 Lab. Rel, Rep. 3 (News & Backgd. Inf., 1971).
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II. NLRB DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION:
Collyer Iniulated Wire
In Collyer Insulated Wire,' a landmark decision issued during the
Survey year, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) refused to
consider a section 8(a) (5) unfair labor practice charge because the
parties had failed to submit their dispute to arbitration as required by
the mandatory grievance and arbitration clause in their collective bar-
'gaining contract. This decision extends to cases in which arbitration
has been bypassed the NLRB's well established policy of deferring to
arbitration where an arbitral award exists.
The dispute in Collyer arose when the company unilaterally raised
wages and reassigned certain jobs during the term of the collective bar-
gaining contract. The first change was a wage increase for certain
skilled maintenance tradesmen whose contractual wage rates were sub-
stantially lower than those offered for comparable jobs by other em-
ployers in the vicinity. Secondly, the company reassigned a cleaning
job from maintenance machinists to machine operators. Third, the
incentive wage rate factor for certain machine operators was increased
to equalize the pay of the three shifts. The union, without invoking the
contractual ,grievance and arbitration machinery, filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB. It alleged that the company had made
unilateral changes in violation of the collective bargaining agreement,
and thereby had, violated Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5) of the Act.
The Trial Examiner found that the wage increase for maintenance
tradesmen was bargained over during the contract negotiations but was
not included in the contract. Furthermore, the company had proposed
the rate increase after the agreement went into effect, but the union
refused to negotiate increases on other than a plantwide basis. The im-
plicit conclusion in these findings is that• the contract foreclosed future
wage changes in the absence of union consent. Therefore the Trial
Examiner concluded that the company had violated section 8(a)(5)
by taking unilateral action prohibited by the collective bargaining
agreement. The company's job re-assignment was not sanctioned by
the contract, the Trial Examiner found, and thus was also violative of
section 8(a) (5). The incentive rate adjustment, however, was found
to be contractually authorized and therefore not in violation of the Act.
The company's principal argument was that its 'actions were sanc-
tioned by the collective bargaining agreement. In suppOrt of this argu-
ment, it pointed to contractual language stipulating that (1) individual
wage rate adjustments "to remove inequities or for other proper rea-
sons" are not prohibited, and that (2) the union may challenge new
1 192 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
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pay rates for new or changed jobs through the grievance procedure.
Moreover, the company contended that any action without contractual
authorization should properly be challenged through the grievance and
arbitration machinery.
The majority of the Board agreed with the latter contention. It
held that since the dispute was essentially over the meaning of the col-
lective bargaining contract, it should have been resolved puisuant to
the grievance and arbitration procedures provided for in the contract.
The Board insisted that it was properly within its discretion to with-
hold its unfair labor practice processes in this case2 because the contract
provided for a quick and fair means of resolving the dispute. The Board
noted that an arbitrator's experience and special skills were especially
required for satisfactory resolution of the subtle issues of contract in-
terpretation involved in Collyer. The Board dismissed the case but
retained jurisdiction of it for the limited purpose of permitting the
filing of a motion to reopen upon a showing that the arbitration process
was unfair or irregular, or that the result reached through arbitration
was repugnant to the purposes of the Act. -
Prior to Collyer, the Board's policy was to hear and decide unfair
labor practice cases where no arbitration award had been rendered.
However, it would honor existing arbitration awards by deferring to
them. In Timken Roller Bearing Co.,' the Board deferred to .a pre-
viously rendered arbitral award that was adverse to the union even
though it believed the employer had violated the Act. The Board set
out specific guidelines for future cases involving existing arbitral
awards in the well known Spielberg case.4 There, it indicated that de-
ferral would be appropriate when (1) the proceedings have been fair
and regular, (2) all parties had agreed to be bound, and (3) the result
was not "clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act."'
In the Collyer-type situation where no arbitration had occurred
the Board had persisted in hearing and deciding cases even though the
alleged unfair labor practice could have been adeqUately resolved by
2 Member Fanning, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the Board's power to with-
hold its processes is foreclosed by Section 10(a) of the NLRA, which provides that the
Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise." 77 L.R.R.M. at 1943.
It has been observed, however, that the circuit courts have consistently enforced de-
cisions in which the Board has relied upon section 10(a) as establishing a discretionary
right to exercise its jurisdiction. See Anderson, Concurrent Jurisdiction—NLRB and Pri-
vate Arbitration: A Pragmatic Analysis, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 179, 181 (1970).
a 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946).
4 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
a Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. See also International Harvester Co., 138
N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962), where the Board stated that it would defer
where the arbitrator's award was not "palpably wrong."
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an arbitrator's impartial interpretation of the contract. Although there
had been indications that a deferral policy might be adopted for this
class of cases,' the Board's decision in Adams Dairy' concretely estab-
lished its policy of refusing to defer where no arbitral award existed. The
one , exception to the Adams policy was Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.8
There, the Board dismissed the charge because the arbitral process had
not been invoked. This exception, however, was made on the basis of
the particular facts involved in Schlitz,9 and prior to Collyer the Board
had refused to defer in similar cases.
Collyer, then, represents a major shift in Board policy with respect
to deferral when no arbitral award has been rendered. The decision is
an attempt by the NLRB to accommodate more effectively its obliga-
tion to prevent unfair labor practices with the national labor policy
stressing private means of conciliating disputes in order to avoid in-
dustrial strife. Congress's high regard for private settlement is mani-
fested in Section 203 (d) of the NLRA" which declares that resolution
"by a method agreed upon by the parties" is the preferable means of
resolving industrial disputes. Furthermore, in the famous Steelworkers
trilogy' and more recently in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770,12
 the Supreme Court indicated that arbitration is central to effec-
tuation of industrial stabilization, an important national labor goal. In
Collyer, the Board has concluded that where an alleged breach of con-
tract as well as an alleged violation of the NLRA exists, congressional
objectives are best furthered by requiring the parties to arbitrate the
dispute in accordance with the contractual procedures. : -
The NLRB's awareness of its statutory duty to prevent unfair
labor practices where an arbitrator finds no contractual violation is evi-
denced by its retention of jurisdiction over Collyer. Apparently the
Board intends to utilize the Spielberg standards in examining the ar-
bitral award once it is rendered to insure that serious unfair labor prac-
tices are not allowed to continue.
The future of the deferral policy adopted in Collyer is left in
doubt since Collyer was a 3-2 decision" and the term of Board Member
Brown, who voted with the majority, has expired. It is possible that the
6 See, e.g., Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 12 L.R.R.M. 44 (1943);
Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648, 50 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1962); Dubo Mfg. Corp.,
142 N.L.R.B. 431, 53 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1963).
7 Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 56 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1964).
8 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1969).
0 Anderson, supra note 2 at 187.
10 29 U.S.C. $ 173(d) (1970).
11 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ;
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
12
 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
13 Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented.
1378
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
new Board may either reverse itself on this issue, or severely restrict
Collyer's application. Indeed, the Collyer Board expressly stated that
the following circumstances weighed heavily in favor of deferral: (1)
the dispute arose in the context of a thirty-five year history of amicable
collective bargaining between the parties; (2) the union made no
charge that the company acted with the intent of undermining the
union's strength; (3) the company asserted its willingness to arbitrate
the dispute; and (4) the dispute was "eminently well suited to resolu-
tion by arbitration" since the essence of the dispute was the meaning of
the contract.
Whether Collyer will be extended to cases involving alleged viola-
tions of sections other than 8(a) (5) has not yet been answered by the
Board. In a recent decision, Tulsa-Whisenhut Funeral Homes, Inc.,"
the Board was requested to defer to arbitration a case involving a
section 8(a) (3) unfair labor practice charge, but it did not reach' this
issue. Since the collective bargaining agreement in question did not
provide for compulsory arbitration, the Board held Collyer inapplica-
ble and ruled on the section 8(a) (3) charge.
In another recent decision, Coppus Engineering Corp.," the union,
in two separate charges, contended that the employer had violated sec-
tion 8(a) (5) by taking unilateral action on certain mandatory subjects
of bargaining. The union first alleged that the employer had violated
the Act by unilaterally discontinuing a past practice of giving em-
ployees an annual party. Rather than defer this charge to arbitration,
the Board fully considered the issue and held that the company's action
had not violated section 8(a) (5) because the collective bargaining
agreement contained no reference to the annual party and the issue of
the annual party had been bargained over during contract negotiations.
The Board apparently decided that since the company's discontinuance
of the annual party clearly was not prohibited by either the contract
or the Act, requiring arbitration of this issue would be futile. Further-
more, since the contract contained no reference to the annual party,
the Board may have decided that an arbitrator would not be empowered
to rule on this issue.
However, the Board, citing Collyer, did require arbitration of
the union's second charge that, by changing Saturday shift hours
and employment conditions, the company had taken unilateral ac-
tion in violation of section 8(a) (5). In determining that arbitra-
tion was proper, the Board found that (1) the company's position
was not patently erroneous, but was based upon a reasonable inter-
pretation of the contract, (2) the company had expressed its wit-
14 195 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 79 L.R.R.M. 120 (1972).
15 195 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 79 L.R.R.M. 1949 (1972).
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lingness to arbitrate the dispute, and (3) the contract and its meaning
were at the core of the dispute. Because these findings are similar to
those made in Collyer, Coppus appears to be little help in determining
the future application of Collyer. The only distinction between the two
opinions is that Coppus contains no reference, as does Collyer, to a
long and harmonious bargaining relationship between the parties,
thereby implying that this factor might not be as significant in the
decision to defer as Collyer indicates. -
The General Counsel of the NLRB has formally indicated that
Collyer's application will be limited to section 8(a) (5) cases in which
a reasonable construction of the collective bargaining agreement pre-
cludes a finding that the employer's action violated the NLRA. 16
 NLRB
Regional Offices have been directed not to defer where there exists
substantial dispute as to the existence of the contract as a whole at
the time the dispute arose, or where the dispute does not involve a
construction of the substantive terms of the contract but which is never-
theless made arbitrable pursuant to a provision making all disputes
between the parties arbitrable." Furthermore, in cases where there is
evidence that the alleged section 8(a) (5) violation was motivated by
anti-union animus or was inherently discriminatory against the union,' 8
or where the disputed conduct constitutes a violation of section 8(a)
(3), deferral is not recommended by the General Counsel 19 Other dis-
putes declared inappropriate for deferral by 'the* General Counsel in-
clude questions of accretion to the bargaining unit and disputes over a
union's request for information necessary to its evaluation and process-
ing of grievances." In addition, in order for Collyer to apply, the col-
lective bargaining contract must contain a mandatory arbitration
clause. 21 The General Counsel, apparently limiting the Collyer policy
to the facts of that case, has also directed that deferral is appropriate
only where the bargaining relationship has been "successful" and "pro-
ductive" and the employer his not deliberately interfered previously
With the employees' section 7 rights 22
It is' to be hoped that NLRB action in the near future will
clarify the policy to be adopted in cases where deference to arbitra-
tion is possible. Should the Collyer decision be extended to include
18 Peter G. Nash, General Counsel of NLRB, Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral
Policy under Collyer 2-3 (Feb. 28, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Nash Memorandum].
11 Id. at 4.
28 Cf. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
18 Nash Memorandum at 5.
20 Id. at 8.
' 21 Mandatory arbitration clauses may be inferred from contractual language such as
"disputes shall be submitted to arbitration," and "all disputes will be submitted to
arbitration." Id. at II.
22 Id. at 14-15.
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other unfair labor practices, a significant reduction in the Board's
caseload and concomitant acceleration in the resolution of other
Board cases will result.
III. PREEMPTION; BOARD AND COURT JURISDICTION
A. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge
In Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 1 the Supreme Court set
out what appears to be the fullest explication of preemption principles
since they were enunciated in San Diego Building Trades v. Garman?
Vigorous dissenting opinions by Justices Douglas and White, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, took issue with the
majority on both practical and legal grounds.
Lockridge, a Greyhound employee and a union member pursuant
to a union-security clause in the collective bargaining agreement, re-
quested Greyhound to stop checking off his monthly union dues.
Shortly thereafter the union suspended Lock ridge from Membership on
the sole ground that he was in arrears for one month's dues, and
simultaneously requested Greyhound to remove him from employment
because he was no longer a union member. Within a few days Lockridge
tendered his dues, but the union refused to accept them. The union
apparently acted on the assumption that its action was justified by the
union constitution, which provided that a member whose dues were
one month in arrears could be suspended from membership and removed
from employment, if the applicable collective bargaining contract re-
quired employees to be union members "in good standing."' In fact,
however, the union security clause in the agreement with Greyhound
required only that employees be "members" of the union, and the
union constitution provided that an employee be suspended from mem-
bership only after a two months failure to pay dues.'
When Lockridge filed suit against the union' in an Idaho court,
the complaint was dismissed on grounds of preemption; the union
activity on which the action rested was found to be, in essence, an
unfair labor practice and hence within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed,' holding that the state
court had jurisdiction under the doctrine, established in Machinists v.
Gonzales,7
 that an action based on a wholly internal union matter was
1 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
2 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
3 403 U.S. at 278.
4 Id.
5 The original suit was filed against Greyhound and the union, but the former was
then dropped as a party. Id. at 281. 	 •
6 Lockridge v. Motor Coach Employees, 84 Idaho 201, 369 P.2d 1006 (1962).
7 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
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not preempted.° On remand, Lockridge filed an amended complaint;
the first count alleged that the suspension was willful action on the part
of the union which resulted in Lockridge's loss of employment, and
the second alleged a breach of the contract created between the union
and Lockridge by the union constitution. The state district court
awarded both a decree restoring Lockridge to union membership and
damages for lost wages.° The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.° The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the ground that the Idaho decision
"demonstrated the need for . . a fuller explication of the premises
upon which Garman rests" and the extent to which that decision
modified Gonzales." The Court reversed, holding that the action in
question was preempted under Garmon. Gonzales did not apply because
Lockridge's employment relationship was in fact involved, even though
the action on its face pertained only to internal union matters.
Since the Court's decision in Lockridge will presumably be ex-
tensively noted, this discussion will be limited to observations on the
impact of the decision on labor law generally. In the first place, the
majority,opinion by Justice Harlan is apparently intended to serve as a
textbook statement of the principles of preemption in labor law. It
discusses the raison d'être of the doctrine and its development in labor
law. Turning to the instant case, it refutes the three theories on which
the Idaho Supreme Court rested its finding of jurisdiction. The Court
holds that since preemption regulates conduct it will not be limited by
the "formal description" of an action; that for the same reason
preemption applies even though the state court may insist that it is
dealing with the interpretation of contractual terms, not union dis-
crimination; and that when the employment relationship is involved, as
it was here, the action does not concern merely an internal union matter.
In sum, so long as the conduct which is at the heart of the action is
arguably protected or prohibited by the Act, the Court rules that pre-
emption would apply. Gonzales is limited to internal union matters that
in no way involve the employment relationship. The few specific ex-
. ceptions to this doctrine are squarely set out.
Thus Lockridge would appear to foreclose the possibility that
Garmon might come to be narrowly applied 1 2 It formally rejects°
8 In Gonzales, the union member sued on a breach-of-contract theory, claiming
that he had been expelled from his union in violation of rights conferred upon him by
the union constitution. The Supreme Court ruled, inter cilia, that the suit "did not
purport to remedy .. . union conduct on the ground that it was designed to bring
about employer discrimination against an employee. . . ." Id. at 622. Lockridge discusses
Gonzales and successor cases, underlining their narrow scope. 403 U.S. at 293-97.
9 Id. at 282.
10
 93 Idaho 294, 460 P.2d 719 (1969).
11 403 U.S. at 277.
12 Cf. Justice Douglas: "While I joined the dissent in Gonzales, experience under
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Justice White's contention that preemption of "arguably protected"
as well as "arguably prohibited" conduct creates the paradoxical
situation wherein only by deliberate commission of an unfair labor
practice can an employer gain a forum in which to protest "arguably
protected" activity.14 The Court insists upon the overriding importance
of developing, through Board preemption, a unified national labor
policy. That insistence appears to preclude any chance of future judicial
application of another contention of Justice White's, that the current
trends of Board deference to arbitration' and of judicial broadening
of section 301 jurisdiction" constitute proof that diverse forums and
remedies can coexist comfortably with a single national Board policy.
Such coexistence might have justified a moderate narrowing of Garmon;
that possibility, however, seems finally foreclosed by Lockridge.
The decision takes care to set out exactly what forums and
remedies do remain outside of the sweep of Gannon, and what kinds
of pleadings are necessary to keep a claimant within those exceptions
to preemption. The Court lays down the elements requisite for a suit
against an employer under section 301, a suit against an employer and
a union under section 301 and Humphrey v. Moore, and a suit for
breach of fair representation under Vaca v. Sipes." It notes that the
instant facts, which would not support a charge of arbitrary or in-
vidious discrimination, would preclude Lockridge's bringing a Vaca v.
Sipes suit."
Garmon convinces me that we should not apply Its rule to the grievances of individual
employees against a union." Id. at 309 (dissenting opinion). Justice White cites criticism
of the Garmon "arguably protected" test. Id. at 326-27. A major thrust of his dissent
is that so many exceptions have been carved out of the scope of Garmon that "the
`rule' of uniformity that the Court invokes today [in Lockridge] is at best a tattered
one. . . ." Id. at 318 (dissenting opinion).
13 Id. at 290.
14 Id. at 325-28 (dissenting opinion). Justice White quotes the Assistant General
Counsel of the NLRB:
The employer cannot obtain relief from the state court . .. , and the only
way that he can obtain a Board determination . . . is by resorting to self-help
measures; if he guesses wrong, this may subject him not only to a Board remedy
but also to tort suits.
Id. at 326 (dissenting opinion).
18 Id. at 310-13 (dissenting opinion).
18 Id. at 313-14 (dissenting opinion).
17 Id. at 298-301. See generally Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
18 The Court points out that making out a claim of unfair representation requires
proving arbitrary or bad-faith conduct on the part of the union, and that Lockridge had
"not even asserted" such facts in the state court proceedings. 403 U.S. at 299-300. It also
notes that Lockridge's pleadings below precluded him from claiming jurisdiction under
section 301 or Humphrey v. Moore. Id. at 300.
Since Lockridge had dropped Greyhound from his complaint, he could not press a
section 301 claim; and since neither the facts of the case nor his pleadings suggest breach
of fair representation by the union, his action was not within the scope of Humphrey v.
1383
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
That last problem illustrates some of the practical and equitable
problems inherent in the decision's logical hammering out of Garmon.
Lockridge requires an employee to take his claim against his union to
the Board unless he can fit that claim within the confines of a section'
301 suit or an action for breach of the duty of fair representation.
Going to the Board, however, can involve delays beyond the average
employee's financial capacity to endure, and, because the Board's
remedies are limited, 19 cannot ensure eventual satisfaction. Justice
Douglas marshals statistics illustrating these problems" and notes
too a threshold obstacle, the wholly discretionary" power of the General
Counsel to issue or withhold a complaint." Such burdens, be argues,
may be manageable by a union or an employ& but rarely by a single
employee, and so he would argue that on grounds of equity and
practicality the employee should be able, under Gonzales, to seek his
remedy against a union • from the local courts." These problems sug-
gest, then, that in some degree Lockridge is good laW making hard
cases.
It is submitted that the majority is not unaware of the damaging
impact the•decision could have on those employees whose actions, like
Lockridge's, fail to meet the precise criteria required for safety from the
sweep of preemption. In a footnote of startling implications, the Court
points out that a new exception to the preemption doctrine possibly
could arise "where the Board affirmatively indicates that, in its view,
pre-emption would not be appropriate." 23 This note then makes a cross-
reference to a note of Justice White which states that Section 10(a) of
the Act would allow the Board to cede jurisdiction over labor disputes
to state agencies if state law is not inconsistent with federal law." Thus
a majority of the present Court appears to have offered the Board a
weapon, provided for in the Act but never utilized, 25 that would cut
through some of the problems implicit in Lockridge. By following the
Court's suggestion, the Board could resolve problems arising from
Moore, which protects from preemption a section 301 suit against the union to redress
union interference, in breach of the duty of fair representation, with rights conferred on
the employee by the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 298-99.
10
 Cf. NLRB v. Local 485, WE (Automotive Plating), 454 F.2d 17, 79 L.R.R.M. 2278
(2d Cir. 1972), discussed at 1455-59 infra.
20
 403 U.S. at 304 and n.1 (dissenting opinion).
21 Id.. The experience of another Greyhound employee, Elmer Day, whose suspension
and discharge were similar to Lockridge's, is instructive. When Day filed an unfair labor
practice charge, the Regional Director refused to issue a complaint. Day did not seek
review from the General Counsel, but brought a court action against the union, alleging
tortious interference. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed a judgment in his favor on
grounds of preemption. Id. at 280 n.3.
22 Id. at 305 (dissenting opinion).
22 Id. at 298 n.8.
24
 Id. at 319 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
20 Id.
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inadequate remedial power in certain fields"' and relieve employees in
Lockridge's position of the necessity of resorting to its "long-drawn,
expensive remedy."2T The Board could cede only a narrowly prescribed
category of disputes so that such cession would not withdraw Board
relief from employees who need it. Finally, such cession would appear to
be correlative with the Board's Survey year decision, Collyer In-
sulated Wire," in which the Board significantly expanded its long-
established policy of deferring to arbitration.
B. Exception to the Anti -Injunction Statute: Nash Finch
In NLRB v. Nash Finch Co.," the Supreme Court found an im-
plied exception to the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute" and held that
the Board could seek a federal injunction to enjoin enforcement of a
state court injunction regulating peaceful picketing. The decision
apparently allows the Board to seek the injunction even when no unfair
labor practice charge has been filed regarding the picketing, despite the
NLRA's requirement that a charge be filed before the Board may act
in any case.
The facts of the case were that a union seeking to organize a
company began peaceful picketing of the company's stores, and the
company procured a state court injunction restricting the picketing. No
unfair labor practice charge was filed regarded the picketing, but at the
time the activity began a Trial Examiner's recommendation that a
cease and desist order issue against the same company was pending
before the Board; the order related to unfair labor practice charges
that the picketing union had earlier filed against the same company.
The Board accepted in part the Trial Examiner's recommendations and
then filed the instant suit in the federal district court, seeking injunctive
relief against the state injunction on the ground that it regulated
conduct governed exclusively by the NLRA. Both the district and the
appellate courts denied relief. . The circuit court held that such relief
was precluded by the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970),
and that the Board's suit did not fall within any exception to § 2283."
2° Justice Douglas notes that "the Board would not have the power to supply the
total remedy which Lockridge seeks even if the employer had committed an unfair labor
practice. True, the Board has authority to award back pay but it has no authority to
award damages beyond back pay." Id. at 307 (dissenting opinion). See also the discussion
of Automotive Plating at 1455-59 infra.
27 403 U.S. at 304 (dissenting opinion).
28 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
2° 404 U.S. 138 (1971).
8° 28 U.S.C. 2283 (1970) provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where nec-
essary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
Ili 434 F.2d 971, 75 L.R.R.M. 2860 (8th Cir. 1970).
1385
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
• The Supreme Court reversed, finding an implied82 exception to
§ 2283 that allowed the Board to seek injunctive relief against the state
court action on the ground that the latter action sought to regulate
activities preempted by the Board. The Court declared first that state
action against peaceful picketing activity was preempted by the Board's
federal power." Accordingly the Court must apply to the Board, as the
sole protector of the national interest in this area, the doctrine of
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States." That doctrine finds in § 2283
an implied exception permitting the United States, as sovereign, to seek
injunctive relief against state proceedings in order to protect the
national interest. To exclude the Board from the Leiter Minerals
exception, the Court argued, would impute to § 2283 a purpose which
would frustrate the federal system of regulation established in the
NLRA.
Justice White, in dissent, argued that the Board may not act on its
own motion;" that since the Board's juridical status is- not congruent
with that of the United States, the Leiter Minerals exception to §2283
does not apply to the Board; and that the enumeration in the NLRA
of specific Board powers to seek injunctions, together with the legis-
lative histories of the Act and the Norris LaGuardia Act, precludes the
implication of additional injunctive powers." He was joined in these
arguments by Justice Brennan."
Whether the majority satisfactorily resolved the issues Justice
White raised is questionable." However, as a practical means of ef-
fecting preemption the decision appears to be sound. If in the future the
Board utilizes the power given to it by the decision, a company in the
32
 The Court admitted that the action did not come within the express exception of
§ 2283 that permits injunctions "in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction." The Court
pointed out that that exception would apply only after a charge had been filed, a com-
plaint had issued, and the Board had sought a federal injunction to restrain those activ-
ities upon which the complaint had issued. In such case the vacation of the state injunction
would be ancillary to the federal court's issuance of the injunction sought by the Board.
404 U.S. at 141-42.
83 The Court noted that "ape exdusiveness of the federal domain is clear . . ."
Id. at 147.
34 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
85 Justice White pointed out that the picketing issue had never been put before the
Board. 404 U.S. 148 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
36 Justice White also argued against the decision on the ground that only arguably
prohibited activity should be preempted. 404 U.S. at 154-56 (dissenting opinion). Compare
his position in Lockridge, supra at note 14.
87 Justice Brennan did not, however, join Justice White in the argument summarized
in note 36 supra.
88 The majority did not deal at all with the fact that no charge had been filed. They
might have argued that the dispute between the two parties in the picketing was in a
sense before the Board by virtue of the union's charge regarding the employer's unfair
labor practices, but they, did not do so, contenting themselves with observing that the
company had filed no charge regarding the picketing. Id. at 142.
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shoes of Nash Finch would presumably decide not to go to a state court
in the first place for an injunction against peaceful picketing. The
company would realize that a state injunction would be vulnerable to a
Board-sought injunction, and presumably would go to the Board for
relief by filing a charge against whatever unfair labor practices seemed
to be involved in the picketing." The picketing union would be relieved
of the task of appealing to the higher state courts, on the grounds of
preemption, for vacation of a state court's order; prior to the instant
decision, such an action would have been the union's only means of
securing relief from the state order, so long as the employer did not
commit an unfair labor practice." Accordingly, Nash Finch appears
to effectuate the purposes of the Act insofar as those purposes entail
exclusive Board jurisdiction over peaceful picketing. 41
However, the exclusiveness of the Board's jurisdiction in the area
has not been unquestioned. The Supreme Court recognized, in San
Diego Building Trades v. Garman, that the states retained jurisdiction
over activity of merely peripheral concern to the NLRB, as well as over
activity traditionally regulated by the state's police powers." Those
exceptions were again noted in the Lockridge decision." However, the
exact boundaries of these areas of exception remain indefinite; for ex-
ample, the Court has thus far given no explicit ruling regarding the
preemption of picketing alleged to be trespass. 44
In Nash Finch, the Court apparently recognized the need for
further definition of the non-preempted area. It explicitly left open for
decision on remand the question of "[w]hether there are parts of the
state court injunction that should survive our reversal."' Of course,
this statement may be merely a reference to those parts of the in-
junction that regulate arguably non-peaceful activities traditionally
susceptible to state regulation." However, throughout its opinion the
Court consistently characterized the injunction as one regulating
80 The General Counsel could then seek injunctive relief against the picketing under
section 10(j) or section 10(1). Id. at 147 n.5. Cf. dissenting opinion at 152. Cf. also
Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solon, 444 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971), discussed infra
at 1388-91.
4° See 404 U.S. at 154 (dissenting opinion).
41 Whether such an effectuation is always of practical benefit is another matter. It
has Iong been recognized, for example, that preemption creates a potential no-man's land.
See 404 U.S. at 155-56 (dissenting opinion).
42 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959). See Section of Labor Relations Law, American Ear
Association, The Developing Labor Law 644 (C. Morris ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
Morris].
" 403 U.S. at 297 and n.7.
44 See Morris 793-94 and n.64. In Lockridge, Justice White discusses the practical
effects of the preemption of picketing alleged to be trespass, 403 U.S. at 327.
45 404 U.S. at 147-48.
40
 Among the activities enjoined by the state court was interference with traffic. Id.
at 140.
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peaceful picketing. Thus the Court's statement may be an invitation
to the federal courts to delineate, on the facts of each individtial case,
those activities within a peaceful picketing action that are properly
susceptible to state regulation despite the Board's theoretical pre-
emption of the entire area. Should this assessment of the Court's position
be correct, it suggests a practical response on the part of the Court
to specific problems left unresolved by the statement of broad doctrine'
in Lockridge.
IV. BOARD PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. Section 10(1): Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solien
Section 10(l) of the NLRA imposes on the Board's Regional Offi-
cers a mandatory duty to seek provisional injunctive relief for the
charging parties, whenever certain specified requirements have been,
fulfilled.' In three Survey year cases arising from a single dispute, the
Eighth Circuit clarified both the nature of the Regional Director's duty
under 10(1) and the rights of charging parties to intervene in settlement
proceedings either preceding or attendant upon a 10(0 suit. The deci.:
sions are Solien v. Drivers Local 610 (Solien IV Terminal Freight
Handling Co. v. Solien (Solien II) a
 and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Solien
(Solien III). 4
 The second case in the series also deserves notice for its
jurisdictional finding, which recognized another exception to the gen-
eral rule that a federal court may not entertain suits to vacate or direct
Board actions. The Supreme Court has denied review of all three cases!:
1
 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1) (1970) provides in part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) or section 158(b) of this
title, or section 158(e) of this title or section 158(b) (7) of this title, the prelim-
inary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority
over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed
or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional
attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such
charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board,
petition any United States district court within any district where the unfair
labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein
such person resides or transacts business, far appropriate injunctive relief pending
the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of
any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunc-
tive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper notwith-
standing any other provision of law . . . .
2 440 F.2d 124, 76 L.R.R.M. 2780 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Solien, 403 U.S. 905 (1971).
444 F.2d 699, 77 L.R.R.M. 2625 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 92 S. Ct.
1246 (1972).4 450 F.2d 353, 78 L.R.R.M. 2700 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 92 S. Ct.
1252 (1972).
5 Certiorari has also been denied in a fourth related case, Terminal Freight Coop-
erative Ass'n v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 1099, 78 L.R.R.M. 2097 (3rd Cir. '1971), cert. denied,
— U.S. —, 92 S. Ct. 1252 (1972).
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The dispute arose from the problems inherent in the conditional
phrase attached to the otherwise straightforward mandate of section
10 (l). When a charge has been filed alleging violation of certain provi-
sions of the NLRA, Section 10(l) requires the Director to petition for
a federal injunction against the activity if he "has reasonable cause to
believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue." As the
instant cases indicate, that condition is interpreted to give the Director
broad discretion. Before seeking an injunction, he may negotiate with
the alleged offender either a settlement or a cessation of the activity;
or, should he petition for the injunction, he may thereafter arrange a
settlement and request the judge to approve the settlement in lieu of
issuing an injunction. Statistics presented in Solien II indicate that the
Directors did not seek injunctions in about three-fourths of the cases in
which reasonable cause had been shown.° Although presumably such
preliminary settlement or voluntary cessation is the appropriate method
of resolution in most cases, the instant dispute indicates that in some
circumstances the Director's slowness to seek injunctive relief may
conflict with the apparent purpose behind 10(i).
The dispute in the three Survey year cases arose when the com-
pany filed a charge alleging secondary boycott activity, including pic-
keting, by the unions. Although the Director determined that there
was reasonable cause to believe the charge true,' he considered settle-
ment with the union instead of seeking an injunction, since the union
assured him that it had eliminated the secondary aspects of the picket-
ing. A week after filing its charge, the company sought, in Solien II, a
federal injunction compelling the Director to petition for a 10(0 in-
junction against the picketing. After a second week, it amended its
petition to seek, as additional relief, a declaratory judgment that the
Director's failure to ask for an injunction violated the mandatory duty
imposed in 10(l). Within the next three days the union resolved its
primary dispute and, seventeen days after the initial charge had been
filed, stopped all picketing. On the same day that the picketing stopped,
the Regional Director, having determined that the picketing was sec-
ondary, petitioned for a temporary injunction (Solien I). The company
again amended its Solien II complaint by dropping the prayer for in-
junctive relief, but the district court dismissed the remaining action
for declaratory relief as moots The company appealed. The Director
then made a settlement with the union, and the company sought party
status in Solien I to contest such a settlement. When party status was
denied,9 the company unsuccessfully petitioned, in Solien III, for a
6 444 F.2d at 704 n.9, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2628 n.9.
7 Id. at 703, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2626.
8 321 F. Supp. 248, 76 L.R.R.M. 2251 (ED. Mo. 1970).
9 321 F. Supp. 245, 75 L.R.R.M. 2846 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
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federal order enjoining the Director from approving that settlement.
The company appealed all three decisions.
Solien II focuses on the central issue, the nature of the 10(1) duty.
In that case, the General Counsel argued that the phrase "and that a
complaint should issue" allows the Regional Director virtually com-
plete discretion to make a threshold determination; '° that is, if the
Director fails to determine that "a complaint should issue," the manda-
tory provision of 10(1) never takes effect. Moreover, within this thres-
hold exercise of discretion the Director has virtually unlimited au-
thority regarding negotiation of settlements.
The Eighth Circuit held that this interpretation was incorrect. The
discretionary authority recognized by the phrase "and that a complaint
should issue" must be viewed not as the power to make a threshold
decision but as a limited area of discretion within a provision whose
letter and legislative history show a clear congressional intention to
impose a mandatory duty." If precise limits are not established for
the area of discretion, the mandatory duty becomes meaningless. The
court decided that the Director had discretion, after making a reason-
able cause determination, to make a summary demand and negotiate
for the cessation of the activity. The court indicated that the negotia-
tion must be brief." Should such summary demand and negotiation fail,
the Director must seek an injunction.
Although 10(l) has long been recognized as mandatory," the
Solien II statistics and the General Counsel's argument" show that in
some cases Directors have laid more stress on the discretionary than on
the mandatory clause. By reversing or limiting that regional practice,
the Solien //' interpretation of 10(0 should have a marked impact
on the use of tactics susceptible to 10(l) injunctions in labor disputes.
The General Counsel's interpretation, that provides the Director with
virtually unlimited discretion to negotiate with the union, could in some
circumstances permit an alleged violator to use tactics susceptible to
an injunction long enough to gain an edge, if not victory, in the primary
dispute. The union in the instant case was able to continue picketing
until the primary dispute was concluded." Presumably the Eighth Cir-
10 444 F.2d at 705, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2629.
11 Id. at 708, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2632.
12 The phrase "such summary demand and negotiation" refers back to the phrase
"an initial demand upon the union." Id. (emphasis added). "Initial" indicates one short
period of negotiation rather than negotiation over a prolonged period, as does "summary."
13 See, e.g., Retail Clerks Local 137 v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 351 F.2d 525
(9th Cir. 1965). Section 10230 of the Board's Field Manual was interpreted by the Solien
II court as imposing a mandatory duty on the Regional Director; the Region had argued
that the rule should be interpreted to support the position advocated by the General
Counsel in Mien II. 444 F.2d at 709, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2632.
14 See text at note 10 supra.
13 444 F.2d at 702, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2627.
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cult's narrowing of the Director's discretion will discourage the use of
such tactics by markedly limiting the time during which they could be
utilized.
Solien II is also significant for the Eighth Circuit's finding that the
district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the company's
complaint," a decision that recognizes another exception to the general
rule that actions of the Board or General Counsel may not be vacated
or directed by independent suits." The test for an exception was estab-
lished in Leedom v. Kyne,' 8 which held that a district court could
entertain a suit to set aside a Board certification order when the Board
had plainly exceeded its statutory authority and there was no other
adequate remedy. In Solien II the Eighth Circuit held that the Leedom
requirement was fulfilled by the Director's failure to satisfy the man-
datory 10(l) duty." That holding, of course, depended on the court's
precise limitation of the discretionary area within 10(0, since Leedom
does not apply to discretionary decisions.
Besides developing Leedom, the jurisdictional holding is interest-
ing insofar as it illustrates, in the labor law context, the current trend
of extending hospitality to standing for private attorneys general seek-
ing review of administrative decisions." The court makes little refer-
ence to standing, but it notes that section 10(1) "does afford the
charging party certain rights"21 and it refers to the protection of public
interests,22 thus suggesting that standing here rested on an "inter-
blending" of public and private interests in the NLRA. 2 a
In Solien I and Solien III, the company attacked the Regional
Director's practice of making a unilateral settlement with the alleged
offender. In Solien I, the appellate court upheld the district court's re-
fusal to allow the company to intervene as a party litigant in the 10(1)
proceeding brought by the Director; the company had sought party
status in order to participate in the settlement that the Director nego-
10 Id. at 703, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2628.
17
 A final Board order is normally reviewable only by appeal to a circuit court under
Section 10(f) of the NLRA. The decision of the General Counsel to issue or withhold a
complaint is discretionary under section 3(d).
18 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
10
 The original requirement of violation of a negative clause was held to be fulfilled
by a failure to obey a mandatory provision of the Act. See, e.g., Miami Newspaper Print-
ing Pressmen's Union Local 46 v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
20 See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
21 444 F.2d at 709, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2632.
22 Id 
•
23
 A recent statement on "interblending," made in a section 10(l) case, Retail Clerks
Local 137 v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 351 F.2d 525, 529 n.2 (9th Cir. 1965), was
cited with approval in United Automobile Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 220 and n.17
(1965).
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tiated in lieu of pressing for the injunction. 24 Then, in Solien III, the
circuit court affirmed the district court's dismissal, for lack of jurisdic-
tion, of the company's petition for an order enjoining the Director frbm
approving the settlement agreeMent and from engaging in further set-
tlement negotiations without the "informed participation" of the
charging party. 25 The company had claimed that the Director violated
a Board rule by denying to the company the right to participate in
those negotiations."
The circuit court ruled that in Solien III, in contrast with Solien
II, the Leedom v. Kyne jurisdictional requirements were not met. Since
full Board and appellate review of the settlement agreement were avail-
able under a Board rule," the company had not yet exhausted its
administrative remedies, and moreover the Director's conduct here—
unlike that in Solien II—was not clearly in excess of his power.
The court's decision leaves for the Board determination as to
whether the Director's refusal to admit the charging party to nego-
tiations violates Board rules. It is submitted that such refusal does not
accord with the rule" and that the Regional practice should be changed.
However, should the Board determine that the practice is lawful; it
would seem that the rule as so interpreted is open to attack. The Su-
preme Court has allowed participation in appellate proceedings by
charging parties and has recognized, in dicta, the rights of such parties
to intervene in Board proceedings generally. 25 Its Survey year decision
Plasterers' Local3° also reflects construal of the NLRA as hosPitable to
intervention in Board proceedings by virtually all interested parties.
B. The Blocking Charge Rule: Templeton v. Dixie Color
In Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 31 the Fifth Circuit
affirmed a district court's decision that the Board's blocking charge
rule, as applied to an employees' decertification petition, violated sec-
tion 9(c) (1 )," and that the court had jurisdiction under Leedom v.
24
 440 F.2d at 126, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2781.
25 450 F.2d at 354, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2701.
26
 29 C.F.R. a 101.9 (1971).
27 29 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(2) (1971).
28 The rule requires that "ail parties [shall be afforded] every opportunity for the
submission and consideration of facts, argument, offers of settlement, or proposals of
adjustment . . ." in negotiations. 29 C.F.R. § 101.9(a) (1971) (emphasis added).
25 United Automobile Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 219 and n.14 (1965).
66
 NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971), discussed at 1448-52, infra.
81 444 F.2d 1064, 77 L.R.R.M. 2392 (5th Cir. 1971).
82 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1970) provides in part:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regula-
tions as may be prescribed by the Board—
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor or-
ganization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of em-
ployees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their
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Kyne" to grant injunctive relief compelling the Board to process the
petition. Although the lower court's decision" was reported in the
1970-71 Survey," its affirmation in an opinion by Associate Justice
Clark deserves notice here because this is apparently the first time that
a decision invalidating use of the blocking charge rule has been upheld.
The employees in the instant case had filed a petition for an elec-
tion to decertify the incumbent union, but since the union had filed an
unfair labor practice charge against the employer the Board applied its
blocking charge rule; that is, it refused to process the election petition
because an unfair labor charge had been filed. Although section 9(c)
-(1) imposes on the Board a mandatory duty to process election peti-
tions, the blocking charge rule has not been decisively held violative of
9(c) (1).88
 Hence the Board argued that its refusal to process the em-
ployees' petition was an appropriate exercise of discretion under the
blocking charge rule; and that, since an exercise of discretion is not
subject to judicial review in an independent court action, the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the employees' action for an injunction
to compel the Board to process their petition. The district court had
rejected the Board's arguments and granted the injunction."
In affirming, the Fifth Circuit held that application of the blocking
charge rule in the instant circumstances was an abuse of discretion
and arbitrary. Justice Clark's vigorous opinion pointed out that here
the rights of employees rather than those of a union or an employer
were involved. An employer could always obtain review of a Board
certification by refusing to bargain, but the employees in this case
employer declines to recognize their representative as the representative de-
fined in subsection (a) of this section, or (ii) assert that the individual or
labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized
by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representa-
tive as defined in subsection (a) of this section; or (B) by an employer,
alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented
to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in subsection
(a) of this section; the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has
reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting com-
merce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such
hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office,
who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board
finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation
exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results
thereof.
88 358 U.S. 184 (1958). See text at note 18 supra.
34 313 F. Supp. 105, 74 L.R.R.M. 2206 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
85
 1970-71 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
1026, 1033 (1971).
80 Compare 313 F. Supp. at 112 ("in those few cases in which the practice has been
discussed, the courts have been clear in their criticism") with 444 F.2d at 1069, 77
L.R.R.M. at 2396 ("[t]he Board cites many authorities approving the use of the blocking
charge practice").
87 313 F. Supp. 105, 74 L.R.R.M. 2206 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
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had no means of obtaining review of certification save by the decerti-
fication election procedure. Moreover, the circumstances that might
justify use of the blocking charge rule were not present here. The
petition in question was not the'ruse of an employer who was trying
to delay bargaining with a certified representative."
Rather, Justice Clark wrote, the Board's application of the rule
to refuse action on a petition filed by employees denied them their
statutory right to bargain through representatives of their own choos-
ing. The union should not be able to avoid the consequences of its loss
of majority status by merely filing an unfair labor practice charge
against the employer. The Board's refusal to process the petition re-
sulted in an "intolerable" deprivation of the employees' statutory
rights." Accordingly the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the dis-
trict court with instructions to order the Board to proceed promptly
under section 9(c) (I) to process the petition.
While striking down use of the rule when an employees' decerti-
fication petition has been filed, the decision explicitly avoids the ques-
tion of its valid application under other circumstances. It also retains
for the Board some discretion in the actual processing of the petitiOn,
by denying the original district court order requiring the Board to hold
the election within forty-five days and amending that order to require
only that the Board process the petition. This amended order, the ap-
pellate court pointed out, did not supplant the Board's expertise."
Thus this decision, like Terminal Freight v. Solien, recognizes a
discretionary area within a generally mandatory provision, but pre-
cisely limits that area in order to prevent the Board from using discre-
tion to preclude entirely the operation of the mandatory clause.'
V. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Recognition Without Election—Card-based Bargaining Orders
1. Judicial Development of Gissel
In a celebrated 1969 case, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,' the Su-
preme Court attempted to clarify the law regarding NLRB bargaining
orders based on authorization cards. There, the Court affirmed the
NLRB's policy of looking to the effects of an employer's coercive tac-
38 444 F.2d at 1069, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2396.
39 Id.
49 The court ruled that "we do not reach the issue of the extent to which the block-
ing charge might be validly applied—e.g., against employers, or under what circumstances
the Board might justifiably exercise its discretion in refusing to process a representation
petition." Id. at 1070, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2396.
41 See text at notes 11-12 supra.
I 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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tics during a union organization campaign, rather than to his "good
faith doubt" 2 of the union's Majority status, in deciding whether a bar-
gaining order is appropriate. Gissel, then, affirmed the Board's policy
that "the key to issuance of a bargaining order is the commission of
serious unfair labor practices that interfere with the election processes
and tend to preclude the holding of a fair election." 3 It was hoped that
Gissel would settle the conflict among the Board and the courts in this
highly disputed area, but subsequent decisions have again cast the is-
sues into doubt.'
In the typical case, the union presents to the employer cards signed
by a majority of the employees authorizing the union to serve as their
collective bargaining agent and demands recognition. The employer
refuses to recognize the union and conducts a campaign, during which
he commits unfair labor practices, to persuade his employees to vote
against the union in the subsequent representation election. Following
a union election loss, the union files unfair labor practice charges with
the NLRB. If the NLRB finds that the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices had the effect of undermining the union's majority, it will set aside
the election and choose one of two remedial alternatives: (1) it may
order a re-run election following notice to the employees of their section
7 rights, or (2) if it determines that the employer's coercive activities
were so pervasive as to render a fair re-run election unlikely, it may
certify the union on the basis of its card-based majority and order the
employer to bargain with it. It is this latter remedy—the card-based
bargaining order—which was at issue in Gissel, and which is still the
subject of conflicting judicial and administrative opinions.
Probably the most serious policy question regarding card-based
bargaining orders is that of the NLRB's chronological point of refer-
ence in determining whether a bargaining order is an appropriate
remedy. The question is whether the NLRB should issue a bargaining
order based on the fact that an employer's coercive activity undermined
the union's majority at some point, even though a fair election is pos-
sible at the time of the NLRB hearing. The problem is compounded by
the fact that the NLRB often disposes of a case more than a year after
the original filing of the unfair labor practice charge,' and occurrences
during the pendency of the charge—such as employee turnover—might
create a situation in which the majority of employees do not desire
union representation by the time a bargaining order is issued. The
2
 Cf. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 27 L,R.R.M. 2012 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
3 395 U.S. at 594.
4 See 1970-1971 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
1026, 1037-59 (1971).
5 395 U.S. at 611 n.30.
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Hobson's choice faced by the Board is either to issue the bargaining
order, thereby certifying a union which the employees may not want,
or to order a re-run election which the employer may win, thereby per-
mitting him to profit from his unfair labor practices.
The solution to this problem lies in a determination of the purpose
of the card-based order to bargain. If the primary function of these
orders is to ensure free employee choice on a case-by-case basis, the
Board clearly should conduct a re-run election where it determines
that the present atmosphere is conducive to fairness. However, if
card-based bargaining orders are to be a deterrent to coercive em-
ployer activity, or a device for remedying past illegal conduct, the
Board is justified in issuing a bargaining order even though the coer-
cive effects of employer unfair labor practices have subsided. The
problem can be phrased in terms of a conflict between the statutory
right of employees not to be represented by a union° and the principle
that an employer should not be permitted to profit from his unfair
labor practices?
Since the Supreme Court's decision of Gissel, a conflict has arisen
between the Fifth Circuit and the NLRB regarding the question of the
relevant time frame for consideration of the appropriateness of a card-
based bargaining order. In NLRB v. American Cable Systems, lnc.,s
the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce an NLRB bargaining order because
the Board had failed to consider evidence of a complete employee turn-
over between the commission of the unfair labor practices and the
issuance of the order.° The case was remanded to the NLRB for a de-
termination of the present election atmosphere. The court insisted that
a card-based bargaining order "is not a traditional punitive remedy, but
is a therapeutic one," which should not be resorted to unless the elec-
toral atmosphere at the time the Board issues such an order is not
conducive to a fair and free election."
The NLRB later disagreed with American Cable in Gibson Prod-
0 Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or , all of such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. 157 (1970).
7 Cf. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944),
8 427 F.2d 446, 73 L.R.R.M. 2913 (5th Cir. 1970).
fl The bargaining order in question was reissued by the NLRB on remand with
directions to consider the case in accordance with the standards set forth in Gissel. The
original order was based upon the pre-Gissel standard of "good faith doubt."
10 427 F.2d at 448, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2914.
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ucts Co.,11 expressing its opinion that the appropriateness of a bar-
gaining order is properly determined by an analysis of the electoral
atmosphere as it existed at the time of the unfair labor practice. In
support of this position, the Board noted the Gissel Court's observa-
tion that "a bargaining order is designed as much to remedy past
election damage as it is to deter future misconduct. 11 "
During the Survey year, three circuits dealt with this issue. The
Fourth Circuit, in General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB,' adopted the
rationale of American Cable and held that the NLRB, on remand,
should consider the fact that, subsequent to the unfair labor practice,
a change in ownership and management had occurred at the plant. The
dispute in General Steel arose when the company refused to recognize
the union, stating that it did not believe the union's claim of majority
status although the union had obtained authorization cards from 120
of the 207 employees in the unit. Following an election favorable to
the company, the NLRB, applying the pre-Gissel standard, found that
the company's refusal to bargain was not based on a "good faith doubt"
as to the union's majority and that the company had violated section
8(a) (1) of the Act by engaging in coercive activity. The Board set
aside the election and ordered the company to bargain with the union.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding that the employer had violated
section 8(a) (1), but refused to enforce the bargaining order because
the unfair labor practices were not so pervasive as to render a fair re-
run election unlikely." On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the case
was consolidated with Gissel arid remanded to the NLRB for "proper
findings" in compliance with the standards announced by the Court in
Gissel." On remand, the NLRB denied the company's petition for a
new hearing at which it proposed to present arguments based on the
Gissel criteria as well as evidence of a turnover in ownership that had
occurred after the original Board decision. The Board reaffirmed its
bargaining order, and issued a supplemental decision framed in the
language of the Gissel standards.'''
The Fourth Circuit denied enforcement of the order and criticized
the NLRB for its "apparent unwillingness . . . to consider seriously the
11 185 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 75 L.R.R.M. 1055 (1970).
12 Id., 75 L.R.R.M. at 1056.
111 445 F.2d 1350, 77 L.R.R.M. 2801 (4th Cir. 1971).
14 398 F.2d 339, 68 L.R.R.M. 2639 (4th Cir. 1968).
18 395 U.S. at 620.
18 In explaining its order, the Board stated:
The Respondent's unfair labor practices were so flagrant and coercive in nature
as to require, even absent the 8(a) (5) violation we have found, a bargaining order
to repair their effect. Our further view is that it is unlikely that the lingering
effects of the Respondent's unlawful conduct would be neutralized by resort to
conventional remedies which would have produced a fair rerun election.
180 N.L.R.B. 56, 57; 72 L.R.R.M. 1579, 1580-81 (1969).
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new questions raised by Gissel."" The court observed that the com-
pany offered evidence of facts that occurred prior to the original Board
hearing, which although not relevant under the "good faith doubt"
standard, was "not only relevant, but controlling" under the standards
set forth in Gissel. Therefore it held that this evidence should have
been received and considered by the NLRB. The court also held that
the evidence of a management changeover should have been considered
by the Board. Although the court recognized the principle that an em-
ployer should not be permitted to profit from his own wrongful refusal
to bargain, it nevertheless felt compelled to give more weight to the
Supreme Court's dictum in Gissel that a fair election is generally more
reliable than authorization cards in determining the will of the majority
of employees.' With respect to the function of card-based bargaining
orders, the court stated that "the primary purpose of a bargaining order
is not punitive; it is to protect the rights of the employees, and to in-
sure that their wishes are carried out."" Therefore it held that the
evidence of events subsequent to the Board hearing should have been
considered by the Board on remand because it might allow the finding
that a fair re-run election was no longer precluded by the effects of the
unfair labor practices, and thereby permit completion of the "preferred
method" of determining the employees' wishes.
The holding in General Steel was grounded partly on the rationale
that since the NLRB was required to conduct a new hearing on other
issues, it should also consider evidence of a subsequent management
changeover. However, it is clear that the Fourth Circuit considers the
primary function of card-based bargaining orders to be that of ensuring
implementation of the employees' will on a case-by-case basis. The
Seventh and Eighth Circuits, however, have agreed with the NLRB's
position that the card-based order serves a deterrent function, and
therefore is appropriate where the employer's conduct tended, at any
time, to undermine the union's majority.
In NLRB v. Dixisteel Buildings, Inc.," the Eighth Circuit held
that the employer's showing of a change in the working force between
the time of the coercive activities and the election was not sufficient to
invalidate the NLRB's bargaining order. The union had obtained au-
thorization cards from 45 of the company's 70 employees and demanded
recognition from the company. The company refused to recognize the
union, contending that it doubted that the union represented "an un-
coerced majority" of the employees. Two months later the union lost
the representation election by a vote of forty-one to twenty-nine. Both
17 445 F.2d at 1354, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2803.
18 Id. at 1356, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2805.
18 Id.
2° 445 F.2d 1260, 77 L.R.R.M. 3147 (8th Cir. 1971).
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before and after the union's recognitional demand, the company con-
ducted a campaign against the union, including speeches and distribu-
tion of printed matter which promised benefits to the employees
conditioned upon a company victory in the election, a clear violation
of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. The NLRB set aside the election and
ordered the company to bargain with the union, 21 explaining its decision
in terms of the "lasting scars and lingering coercive effects upon the
employees" which were so substantial as to "preclude the holding of a
fair and free election in the reasonably foreseeable future"
On the NLRB's petition for enforcement, the company argued
that its actions, even if coercive, did not affect the outcome of the elec-
tion because the union lost its majority solely as a result of employee
turnover. The Eighth Circuit disagreed. It held that, although employee
turnover is a relevant factor for NLRB consideration, the appropri-
ateness of the remedy rests on "whether the unfair labor practices
tended to undermine the majority strength and impede the election
process."' The court noted that a bargaining order is justified so long
as the union held a majority at one point, even though the majority no
longer existed at the time of the election. In so holding, the Eighth Cir-
cuit cited language from Gissel indicating that card-based bargaining
orders serve the dual function of protecting the majority sentiment
reflected in the authorization cards and deterring future unfair labor
practices by employers.24
In NLRB v. Henry Colder Co.," the Seventh Circuit enforced an
NLRB card-based bargaining order even though seven years had
elapsed since the dispute arose and the employer's work force had
changed during that time. Like General Steel, Colder was originally de-
cided by the Board prior to Gissel and was remanded to it for "proper
findings" in accordance with the Gissel standards. The Board rendered
a supplemental decision confirming the bargaining order and requested
enforcement. The court rejected the company's argument that the bar-
gaining order was inappropriate because employee turnover since the
1964 violations had nullified the union's majority. It stated that events
subsequent to the original order "should not be permitted to preclude
enforcement, since the delay is 'the unfortunate but inevitable result of
the process prescribed in the Act' " 20
 The court, however, did modify
the Board's order to include a provision for notifying the employees
21 186 N.L.R.13. No. 25, 76 L.R.R.M. 1955 (1970).
22 445 F.2d at 1264, 77 L.R.R.M. at 3150-51.
22 Id. at 1265, 77 L.R.R.M. at 3151.
29 The following is the relevant language from Gissel: "(Al bargaining order is de-
signed as much to remedy past election damage as it is to deter future misconduct."
395 U.S. at 612.
26 447 F.2d 629, 77 L.R.R.M. 3153 (7th Cir. 1971).
20 Id. at 630, 77 L.R.R.M. at 3153.
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of their independent right to petition the Board for a decertification
election at an appropriate time.'
Dixisteel and Colder, then, accept the NLRB's position that the
card-based bargaining order serves a deterrent function as well as a
"therapeutic" one, and that therefore such orders may be appropriate
even though the present situation is such that the union's majority has
deteriorated and a fair election might be held. A number of factors
militate in favor of this approach. In American Cable and General Steel,
the courts relied upon the Supreme Court's observation in Gissel that
authorization cards are inferior to free elections as a method of de-
termining the will of the employees. However, a close reading of Gissel
discloses that the Court relied heavily on the NLRB's judgment in
reaching this conclusion 28 From this it can be inferred that the Su-
preme Court has deferred to the NLRB's judgment as to which method
is preferrable. Further, adoption of the General Steel rationale could
have the effect of encouraging an employer with substantial employee
turnover rate to violate the Act, knowing that by the time of the Board
hearing he will be able to show that enough of the original employees
have left the plant to justify a finding that a fair election is possible.
This result would clearly serve to reward the employer for his unlawful
refusal to bargain. A final justification for adoption of the NLRB's
interpretation is that even if the union certified in the bargaining order
is not representative of the majority, the employees have the right to
petition the Board for decertification after a reasonable period of
time.29
2. NLRB Development of Gissel: Restaurant Associates Industries,
Inc.
During the Survey year, the NLRB decided Restaurant Associates
Industries, Inc.," which has been interpreted as altering the rule of
Gissel that a bargaining order is appropriate where the employer's con-
duct has a tendency to undermine the union's majority. 81 The employer
owned and operated several restaurants. The union requested recogni-
tion after obtaining signed authorization cards from seven of the twelve
27 Id. at 631, 77 L.R.R.M. at 3154.
28 The Gissel Court stated that an election is, from the Board's point of view, the
preferred route for recognition and certification. 395 U.S. at 596. Later, the Court stated:
"The Board has recognized, and continues to do so here, that secret elections are generally
the most satisfactory—indeed the preferred—method of ascertaining whether a union has
majority support." 395 U.S. at 602 (emphasis added).
29 Section 9(c)(1) of the NLRA directs the Board to direct a secret election if it
finds that a valid question of representation exists. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
80 194 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 79 L.R.R.M. 1145 (1972).
81 Speech by Max Zimney, Associate General Counsel, 	 Boston University
Seventh Annual Labor Law Institute (March 25, 1972).
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unit employees at one of the company's restaurants. When the company
refused to recognize the union, all of the employees went out on strike
and began picketing. During the strike, the manager of the restaurant
engaged in conversations with various employees in which he promised
pay raises as a reward for returning to work. The strikers subsequently
returned to work, but the company refused to grant the pay raises it
had promised. Consequently, the union filed section 8 (a) ( 1 ) charges
with the Board, requesting it to issue a bargaining order in accordance
with Gissel.
The NLRB agreed with the Trial Examiner's finding that the com-
pany had violated section 8 (a) ( 1) by promising pay raises to the
employees, but refused to follow his recommendation that a bargaining
order should issue. It reasoned that, although the employer's promises
served to undermine the union's majority, the fact that the promises
were subsequently broken eliminated any lingering effect they might
have. Therefore the Board ordered the employer to cease and desist
from further coercive activity and to assure the employees that it would
bargain with the union upon certification."
In reaching its conclusion, the Board stated that "we have con-
cluded that the unfair labor practices are not so likely to have an in-
evitably lingering effect as to preclude the holding of a fair election.""
Board Member Fanning took issue with this statement in his dissent. He
argued that, under the criteria of Gissel, all that is required is that the
employer's activities have the tendency to impede the election process."
The dissent also implied that the majority had permitted the company
to profit from its unlawful action, since the primary goal of the promises
was to get the strikers back to work.
In Restaurant Associates, then, the Board apparently refused to
follow its previous interpretation of Gissel" that a bargaining order is
appropriate if, at any time, the employer's coercive activities under-
mine the union's majority. Rather, it has adopted the position that only
where subsequent events make the likelihood of a fair election im-
possible is a bargaining order appropriate.
B. Pre-Election Statements
1. Applicability of § 8(c) to Representation Cases: Bausch & Lomb,
Inc. v. NLRB
In Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. NLRB," the Second Circuit affirmed
the NLRB's holding that the "free speech" proviso of section 8(c) of
82 194 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1147.
88 Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1146 (emphasis supplied).
84 Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1147 n.5.
88 Cf. Gibson Products Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 75 L.R.R.M. 1055 (1970).
88 451 F.2d 873, 78 L.R.R.M. 2648 (2d Cir. 1971).
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the Act" is not applicable to representation cases in which an unfair
labor practice is not alleged. Two days before a representation election,
the employees received a letter from the company informing them that
the union local at another company plant had recently agreed to a con-
tract without a Christmas bonus provision. 38 The letter, however, failed
to mention that the union had obtained a wage increase, extended sick
pay, and terminated rest periods for its members in exchange for drop-
ping its demand for a Christmas bonus. The union lost the election
and petitioned the NLRB to set it aside, alleging that the letter suffi-
ciently disturbed the desired "laboratory conditions" and that therefore
the election was not fairly conducted. The NLRB agreed with the
union and ordered a new election which was won by the union. The
Board then certified the union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the
unit and, when the company refused to bargain, found that it had
violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. A bargaining order issued, and
the NLRB sought enforcement in the Second Circuit.
The appellate court first held that the Board's finding that the
letter contained a misstatement of material fact was supported by
substantial evidence. Observing that collective bargaining ordinarily
entails a process of "give-and-take," the court concluded that the local
referred to in the letter had engaged in "package bargaining," and that
its demand for a Christmas bonus was dropped in order to gain con-
cessions from the company. 8° Consequently, the letter contained a half-
truth which the NLRB properly held to be a misstatement.
Regarding the company's allegation that the NLRB had abused
its discretion in invalidating the first election, the court noted that the
traditional tests for determining the significance of pre-election state-
ments were satisfied. First, the misstatement was of a material fact; the
employees would obviously be concerned with the valuable right to a
Christmas bonus. Second, the union did not have time to reply; the
letter was received only two days prior to the election. Third, the com-
pany was in a position to have "special knowledge" of the facts. And
fourth, the employees lacked independent knowledge with which to
evaluate the statement." The desired "laboratory conditions" for an
37 Section 8(c) provides that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion or the dissemination
thereof ... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under
any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
29 U.S.C. 1 158(c) (1970).
as The letter stated: "The Local in Minneapolis of the same union trying to represent
you agreed last November that the four B & L employees represented by them will not
receive a Christmas bonus." 451 F.2d at 875, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2649.
89 Id. at 877, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2650.
40 These tests have been developed by both the Board and the courts. See, e.g., Holly-
wood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600,` 1602 (1962); NLRB v.
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election were thereby significantly disturbed so that the Board did not
abuse its discretion in ordering the new election.
The company argued, however, that imposition of the "laboratory
conditions" standard by the Board violates section 8(c)'s free speech
proviso and unconstitutionally abridges the right to freedom of speech.
The court admitted that Congress could not, through restricting the
section 8(c) protection to unfair labor practice determinations, grant
the Board discretion to violate the First Amendment. But it observed
that a balance must be struck between the interest of the employer in
freedom of speech, and that of the public at large in free and informed
representation elections. Although the Board's "laboratory" standards
may have a chilling effect on both the employer's and union's speech,
the court held that in the "highly charged atmosphere" of a representa-
tion election, misrepresentations can have a "devastating" effect. There-
fore, since permitting election-eve lies or misstatements would un-
dermine the policies of the NLRA, the court held that the Board's
laboratory standards do not abridge the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.
The rule that section 8(c) applies only to unfair labor practice
cases was first adopted by the NLRB in General Shoe Corp.,41
 where
it noted that "[c] onduct that creates an atmosphere which renders
impossible a free choice will sometimes warrant invalidating an elec-
tion, even though that conduct may not constitute an unfair labor
practice."" Although the General Shoe rule was abandoned in 1953,"
it was reinstated by the Board in 1962 in the well-known Dal-Tex
case," which again held that section 8(c) has no application to repre-
sentation cases.
The Second Circuit, in Bausch & Lomb, becomes the third circuit
to agree with the NLRB's Dal-Tex rule." However, Board Chairman
Miller has recently registered his dissent, arguing that section 8(c)
protects statements at issue in representation cases, as well as those in
unfair labor practice cases."
2. Promise of Benefits; Threat of Reprisals
In Hineline's Meat Plant, Inc.,'" the NLRB set aside an election
where the employer announced to its employees a new profit-sharing
Southern Foods, Inc., 434 F.2d 717, 720 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Trancoa Chemical
Corp., 303 F.2d 456, 460 (1st Cir. 1962).
41 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
42 Id. at 126, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1340.
48 National Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300, 33 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1953).
44 Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1962).
46 See NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 322 F.2d 89 (3rd Cir. 1963); Sonoco Products
Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1968).
40 McLaughlin Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 76 L.R.R.M. 1317 (1971).
47 193 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 78 L.R.R.M. 1387 (1971).
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plan eleven days before the election. The plan had been decided upon
prior to the start of the union's organizational campaign and submitted
to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for approval prior to the filing
of the election petition. IRS regulations required the employer to in-
form his employees of a proposed profit-sharing plan prior to the end
of his tax year, which in this case was more than three months after the
election."
" The Board found that since the announcement could have been
delayed until after the election, it was possible that the company had
tithed the announcement to influence the employees' vote. Consequently
it found a violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act and set aside the
election. The Board relied on the Exchange Parts rule that an employer
who times a promise of benefits to influence a representation election
violates section 8(a) (1)."
Hineline's serves as a warning to employers that pre-election an-
nouncement of benefit plans, even if the plans are decided upon before
the start of the union's organizational campaign, may be sufficient cause
to set aside an election.
During the Survey year, the Board also dealt with the question of
whether pre-election statements constitute "predictions" or ."threats of
reprisal." In Rospatch Corp.," the company had in effect a profit-
sharing plan to which it paid ten percent of its pre-tax profits for dis-
tribution to the employees. Four days before the election, the company
held a meeting at which the company president told the employees that
selection of -the union as exclusive bargaining representative would re-
quire the company to incur legal expenses which would come out of
profits, and would thereby reduce the profit-sharing fund. The NLRB
held that the president's speech was not a threat to reduce the com-
pany's contributions to the plan, but merely a "prediction of a possible
economic consequence.""
Although the NLRB resolved Rospatch in favor of the employer,
the Supreme Court's statement in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.' that
such statements are not statements of fact " 'unless . . . the eventuality
. . . is capable of proof,' "53 must still be reckoned with by the courts.
45 The election was held on March 9, 1971. The end of the employer's tax year was
June 30, 1971.
19 NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 55 L.R.R.M. 2098' (1964).
5° 193 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 78 L.R.R.M. 1360 (1971).
81 Id., 78 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
52 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
53 Id. at 618-19, quoting from NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157, 160. (1st Cir.
1968).
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VI. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Duty to Bargain
I. Benefits for Retired Employees: Pittsburgh Plate Glass
In Allied Chemical Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co.,' the Supreme Court held that benefits of already retired em-
ployees were not mandatory subjects of bargaining and that an em-
ployer's unilateral modification of a contract term did not breach his
duty to bargain, if that modification related to a permissive rather
than a mandatory subject of bargaining. The decision is also note-
worthy for its sharp reminder to the Board that expertise must op-
erate within the limits imposed by the NLRA.
The employer, Pittsburgh Plate Glass, and the union had nego-
tiated an employee group health insurance plan whose provisions
included benefits for already retired workers. When Medicare was
enacted, the union sought mid-term bargaining regarding the retirees'
benefits, and Pittsburgh Plate respqnded that it was planning to sub-
stitute, in place of the contract beriefits, supplemental Medicare cov-
erage. The union challenged the employer's right to do so unilaterally;
the employer challenged the union's right to bargain for the retired
employees; and when the employer unilaterally proposed changes to
the retirees and instituted those changes for the retirees who accepted
the proposal, the union filed a refusal to bargain charge.
The Board held' that the employer's refusal to bargain over the
changes in benefits violated section 8(a) (5) . The holding rested on
the alternative grounds that retirees are employees within the mean-
ing of the NLRA4 for the purpose of bargaining about their benefits,
and that retirees' benefits are of sufficient interest to active employees
to be a mandatory subject of bargaining. Both theories were supported
by the Board's "expertise" finding that bargaining over pensioners'
rights had become established industrial practice.
1 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
2 117 N.L.R.B. 911, 71 L.R.R.M.'1433 (1969).
8 Section 8(a) (5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 159(a). . * ." 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (5) (1970).
4 Section 2(3) provides in part:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a con-
sequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and sub-
stantially equivalent employment ....
29 U.S.C. $ 152(3) (1970).
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The Court of Appeals reversed,' holding that retirees are not
"employees" within the meaning of the Act and that, accordingly, the
company had no duty to bargain about their benefits. The Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate decision by a six to one majority, with
Justice Douglas dissenting."
Justice Brennan set out three grounds for the decision in an opin-
ion apparently intended as a textbook commentary on the duty to bar-
gain. In the first place, pensioners are not themselves employees, nor
may they be considered members of an appropriate bargaining unit.
The ordinary meaning of the provision defining "employee," section
2 (3), plainly excludes retirees.' Even were the issuein doubt, both the
legislative history of section 2 (3) and decisions construing that pro-
vision reveal that only members of the active work force may be con-
sidered as employees. All of the decisions the Board relied on to show
that section 2(3) may apply to persons not actually employed, such
as hiring hall applicants, involved people who were at least available
for hire. Moreover, the section 9(a) requirement of an "appropriate"
bargaining unit" would automatically exclude retirees from member-
ship in the unit, since they lack the community of interest with other
members that is an essential element of appropriateness.°
In the second place, the benefits of already retired workers are
not of sufficient interest to the active employees to permit including
them among the active employees' "terms and conditions of employ-
ment" and accordingly classifying them as mandatory bargaining sub-
jects under section 8(d).10 To be mandatory subjects, third-party con-
cerns must "vitally" affect the active employees' terms and conditions
° Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 936, 74 L.R.R.M. 2425 (6th Cir.
1970).
404 U.S. 157 (1971).
7 See note 4 supra.
8 Section 9(a) provides in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
The Court discusses Board holdings revealing a sharp divergency between the
interests of pensioners and those of active employers. 404 U.S. at 172-75. It notes the
broad discretion accorded to the Board in making unit determinations but points out
that when, in the exercise of that discretion, the Board oversteps the law, it must be
reversed. Id. at 171-72.
10 Section 8(d) defines the bargaining obligation as "the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). "Terms and conditions of
employment," then, are mandatory subjects.
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of employment." The Board's "expertise" assessment of retirees'
rights as "vitally" affecting the active employees' interests is unten-
able;" the Board simply neglected to give the adverb its ordinary
meaning, and its citation of industrial practice did not convince the
Court that the connection between retirees' benefits and employees'
interests is "vital.713
Finally, the Court holds, even if the employer's proposal to the
retirees constituted a unilateral modification of the contract, such a
modification was not an unfair labor practice because it affected only
a permissive subject of bargaining. 14 The Court construes section 8(d),
including the mid-term contract modification proviso," in terms of the
"whole law,"" and finds that just as 8(d) defines the bargaining duty
with respect to mandatory terms alone, so the duty not to modify a
contract unilaterally extends only to mandatory terms. A party injured
by the other party's unilateral modification of a permissive term should
seek relief, not from the Board, but from the courts in an action for
breach of contract."
The impact of Pittsburgh Plate Glass need not be urged. The deci-
sion immediately removes a broad area from the category of mandatory
subjects. Equally significant, one would think, is the check adminis-
11 The Court agrees with the Board that in determining whether matters involving
individuals outside the employment relationship are mandatory subjects, the principle of
Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), and Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), is controlling. That principle was whether "the third party
concern ... vitally affects the 'terms and conditions' of [the bargaining-unit employees']
. . . employment." 404 U.S. at 179.
12 The Court explicitly notes the limits of expertise:
We recognize that "classification of bargaining subjects . . . is a matter
concerning which the Board has special expertise." . . . The Board's holding in
this cause, however, depends on the application of law to facts, and the legal
standard to be applied is ultimately for the courts to decide and enforce.
Id. at 182. See also note 9 supra.
In The Court notes that the workers' own future retirement benefits may indeed be of
concern to them. Such benefits, however, are not the benefits of already retired workers.
Id. at 182.
14 In NLRB v. Wooster Div, of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), the Court
explicitly distinguished between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, A third
category, illegal subjects, was also recognized. Id. at 360 (concurring opinion).
15 The proviso stipulates, in part, that "where there is in effect a collective-
bargaining contract . . . , the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party
to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract" except upon (1) timely notice
to the other party, (2) an offer to meet and negotiate, (3) timely notice to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service and local agencies regarding the existence of a
dispute, and (4) continuation in full force of all the terms of the existing contract until
sixty days after notice is given or its expiration date, whichever is later. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1970).
10 404 U.S, at 185.
17 The Court notes that the injured party may bring a § 301 suit, Id. at 188 and
181 n,20.
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tered to the Board's interpretation of the scope of section 8(d): Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass may be one mark of the end of a trend toward
expansive interpretation that the Board has followed since Fibreboard,18
a conjecture supported by another Survey case that followed Pittsburgh
Plate Glass by several months.1° Finally, the Court's holding that a
unilateral breach of the collective bargaining contract does not violate
section 8(a) (5), unless the term involved is a mandatory subject, ex-
plicitly limits Board jurisdiction over certain contract issues", at a time
when the Board has tended to expand its reach in the contract area.'
2. Decision to Close: General Motors; Summit Tooling
El two landmark decisions, General Motors Corp." and Summit
Tooling Co.,23 the Board reversed its previous position respecting an
employer's duty to bargain over his decision to close a plant and ac-
cepted the rulings of the circuit courts that had consistently refused
to accept that position. The Board had held that an employer who
closes or moves part of his enterprise was obligated by section 8 (a) ( 5) 24
to bargain about his decision. Thii doctrine, it argtied, followed from
the Supreme Court's ruling, in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB," that an employer must bargain regarding his decision to sub-
contract work formerly performed by his own employees. The Court
had emphasized that its decision was limited to the particular fact
situation and should not be applied to all subcontracting decisions. 26
The Board, however, considered that Fibreboard stood for the doc-
trine that termination of employment was included within the cate-
gory of "conditions of employment" which are mandatory bargaining
subjects under section 8(d)." Accordingly, the Board maintained that
Fibreboard should be interpreted to require bargaining over any deci-
sion that terminated employment, whether or not that decision was
classified as "managerial.""
18 See discussion of the development of Fibreboard at notes 27-29 infra. '
19 See discussion of Summit Tooling at 1409-13 infra.
20 NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967), recognizes, as an exception
to the general rule that the Board lacks statutory power to interpret and enforce a
collective bargaining contract, that the Board may interpret an agreement insofar as it is
necessary to do so in order to decide an unfair labor practice case.
21 See NLRB v. Local 485, IUE (Automotive Plating Corp), 454 F.2d 17, 79 L.R.R.M.
2278 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed at 1455-59 infra.
22 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971).
25 195 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 79 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1972).
24 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
28 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
26 Id. at 215.
27 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
28 The Board set out these principles in some detail in Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161
N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966). The Board ruled that the employer was
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• On this ground the Board developed Fibreboard, applying it to
decisions regarding such matters as plant closings and removals as
well as to subcontracting decisions." The Eighth and Third Circuits
rejected this development, insisting that the entrepreneurial nature of
certain decisions, including certain kinds of subcontracting, precluded
any finding of an employer's duty to bargain." The Board and the
courts agreed that the employer had a duty to bargain about the ef-
fects of the decision,31 but they maintained a collision course regard-
ing the duty to bargain on the initial decision.•Now, with the Survey
year cases, the Board has changed its course. It will be submitted,
however, that it may still be steering for the same port.
In the first Survey year case, General Motors Corp.,82 the Board
considered for the first time an employer's duty to bargain over a
decision to sell part of its enterprise, and for the first time turned for
authority to the circuit courts rather than to its own Fibreboard prog-
eny. The appellate courts had refused to find a bargaining duty con-
cerning financial and managerial decisions that lay "at the core of
entrepreneurial control"; 88 and this rationale, a majority of the Board
ruled in General Motors, applied to a decision to sell. Members Brown
and Fanning dissented.
In the second case, Summit Tooling Co.," the employer was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Ace Tools, located on the same premises
as Ace and operated as a division of Ace. Summit closed its operations.
Although the Board found that Ace and Summit were a single em-
ployer, and that the closing could be characterized as a partial closing,
a majority held that the company had no duty to bargain over that
decision with the union that represented Summit's employees. The fact
that the closing was motivated by anti-union animus was not con-
sidered. Member Fanning dissented.
Summit Tooling represented even more of a revision of the Board's
former position than did General Motors, where the "sale" factor was
a novel element, on the basis of which the Board could apply the "core
of entrepreneurial control" doctrine without wholly forsaking its pre-
obligated to bargain about any management decision that affected employees' jobs and
job security, even if that decision involved a sale. See text at notes 35 and 36 infra.
29 The dissent in General Motors provides a list of cases. 191 N.L.R.B, at — n.12,
77 L.R.R.M. at 1540 n.12.
80 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 60 L.R.R.M 2084 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d
191, 60 L.R.R.M. 2033 (3rd Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Wm. J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency,
Inc., 346 F.2d 897, 59 L.R.R.M. 2523 (8th Cir. 1965).
81 See, e.g., the cases listed in General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. at — n.9, 77
L.R.R.M. at 1540 n.9.
82 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R,R.M. 1537 (1971).
88 Id. at —, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1539.
84 195 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 79 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1972).
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vious position. In Summit the closing was, technically, a "partial
closing"; and previously, in Ozark Trailers, Inc.," the Board had held
squarely that a decision to close an operation only partially was a
mandatory subject of bargaining, even though the decision was eco-
nomically, not discriminatorily, motivated. The Board had rejected
the circuit courts' theory, enunciated in similar cases, that a decision
involving a major change in the nature of the business is ipso facto
freed of the bargaining duty because of its managerial nature; rather,
the Board had insisted, the impact of such a decision on employees
justifies imposing on the employer the duty to discuss the decision with
the employees before finally making it."
Then, in Summit Tooling, the Board not only accepted the courts'
rationale but extended it by applying it to a decision that was
found to be discriminatorily motivated. The Board ruled that it would
inquire only as to the nature of the change resulting from the decision.
If the change was "major," reflecting a decision on matters at the core
of entrepreneurial control, the Board would not require bargaining on
the decision." The employer's motive would be irrelevant.
Startling as the Board's forsaking of its Ozark Trailers position
may appear, it would seem that the new doctrine correlates more than
does the old with the scope of the bargaining duty mandated in sec-
tion 8(d). The old position rested on the hypothesis that any decision
that would terminate employment must have a major impact on em-
ployees' working "conditions"; accordingly the Board required that
the employer bargain about the decision itself. Logically developed,
that hypothesis would require bargaining even on major decisions that
in practice were so far removed from the subject matter embraced in
8(d) that the limits imposed by 8(d) would be meaningless. That is,
the theory of Ozark Trailers, if followed, would in effect replace the
restricted 8(d) duty with a virtually limitless duty to bargain over
every major decision on the ground that it would have a major impact
on employees' wages, hours and working conditions. The Supreme
Court appears to have precluded such a sweeping extension of the bar-
gaining duty by its warning in Fibreboard that that decision did not
embrace other forms of subcontracting that "arise daily in our com-
plex economy.""
Summit Tooling now rejects Ozark Trailers by imposing on the
employer only the long-acknowledged duty to bargain about "effects"
of the decision, a requirement nicely correlative with the language of
as 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966).
as Id. at 566-67, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1269.
37 195 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1400.
as 379 U.S. at 215.
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8(d). It could even be argued that the duty to bargain about effects
is what the Board was trying to impose in the first place by requiring
the employer to bargain about the decision. That is, the Ozark Trailers
doctrine may reflect the Board's determination to make the employer
bargain about effects at a time when such bargaining could be genuine
negotiation: before the decision itself, which would necessarily freeze
certain "effects," was completely fixed. This interpretation of the old
position is suggested by the dissent in General Motors, wherein Mem-
ber Fanning forcefully pointed out that genuine bargaining about "ef-
fects" required bargaining about the decision itself ; that once the
decision was made, the employer's capacity to modify its effects on
employees was severely circumscribed."
It is submitted, however, that the Board's position in General
Motors and Summit Tooling may resolve the problem Member Fan-
ning pointed out while at the same' time staying within the statutory
limits of 8(d). If viewed in conjunction with the remedial policy enun-
ciated in Summit Tooling, the Board's imposition of only the long-
recognized duty to bargain about effects may be interpreted as the
imposition of a very far-reaching duty indeed. In short, the Board
appears to be using the duty to bargain about "effects" to require, in
practice though not in theory, that the employer negotiate with the
union about certain parts of the decision itself, or at least that the em-
ployer bargain about the effects before actually closing the operation
involved in the decision.
The discussion of remedies in Summit Tooling suggests that the
Board's new position may be so interpreted. The Board laid down a
warning that, should practical considerations so dictate, an appropriate
remedy for a clear-cut refusal to bargain over effects could be an order
to return to the situation existing before the decision took effect at all."
at} 191 N.L.R.B. at —, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1541 (dissenting opinion).
AO The Board stated:
In fashioning his remedy the Trial Examiner concluded that the only effective
remedy would be one that required the Respondent to reopen the Summit
operation, to offer reinstatement to the employees who were terminated, and to
make them whole for any loss they may have sustained by reason of Re-
spondent's discrimination against them. While we are mindful in fashioning our
affirmative orders that the remedy should "be adapted to the situation that
calls for redress," with a view toward "restoring the situation as nearly as
possible to that which would have obtained but for the unfair labor practice],"
and that the nature of the violation could probably best be remedied in directing
the Respondent to restore the status quo ante by reestablishing the discontinued
operation, we are of the opinion that such reestablishment is not essential in
this case to the framing of a meaningful remedy. Aside from the fact that the
Trial Examiner has cited no precedent justifying such a drastic remedy in a
situation where, as here, the Respondent has discontinued a major operation and
its remaining operation is independent of and bears little relationship to the
discontinued operation, we believe that practical considerations dictate against
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This was the same remedy proposed in Ozark Trailers for failure to
bargain over the decision; and in stating its policy in Summit Tooling
the Board even quoted the Ozark Trailers thesis that the remedy should
44restor [6 the situation as early as possible to that which would have
obtained but for [the unfair labor practice] .r41 If breach of the duty
to bargain about effects will lead to an order requiring him to reinstate
a discontinued operation, it would seem that the prudent employer
would bargain about effects before making the change, and possibly
the decision, in the first place.
In Summit, admittedly, the Board did not order a return to the
status quo ante, but it noted that only the particular facts of the case
prevented its doing so; it emphasized the fact that Ace's remaining
operations were entirely different from the manufacturing operations
that its subsidiary Summit had undertaken, that the latter may now be
outmoded, and that the company had announced publicly that it was
no longer in the manufacturing business. In short, the decision had
been in effect a complete closing decision.' The inference that an order
to reinstate operations would follow, were the closing genuinely partial,
appears inescapable. Finally, the Board ordered, in addition to tradi-
tional remedies, back pay to employees whom the employer had dis-
charged discriminatorily before it made the decision to close. The pay
was to run from the time of their discharge until the employer should
bargain with the union concerning the effects of the decision on all
employees and reach either impasse or agreement. This remedy was
imposed in order to restore to the union some of the economic strength
that it had lost when the employer terminated operations without bar-
gaining."
It is submitted that Summit Tooling shows that the Board has ex-
panded its remedial policy vis-à-vis the duty to bargain over the effects
of a major decision in an attempt to reach the goals that it had formerly
tried to achieve by imposing a duty to bargain over the decision itself.
By suggesting that it may require employers to reinstate operations in
order that they might properly carry out the "effects" bargaining duty,
our ordering the Respondent to reestablish its Summit operation. In reaching this
conclusion, we have reviewed the nature of the Respondent's general business
operations, considered the possibility that the discontinued operation may now
be outmoded, and noted that the Respondent had publicly announced that it is
no longer in the manufacturing business and that a major concern of the Union
has been an attempt to bargain only about the effect of the shutdown on the
employees involved. We shall not, therefore, require reestablishment of the
Summit operation.
195 N.L.12.11. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1401 (emphasis added).
41 Id.
42 Id. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1400 and n.3.
4B Id, at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1401.
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the Board is virtually warning . them that they must bargain over those
parts of the decision itself that would constitute the subject matter of
good-faith "effects" bargaining. Although it is unlikely that the Board
would carry out its threat if the closing is complete, it has made no
promises, and indeed strongly suggested that, had the facts in Summit
been even slightly different, a reinstatement order might have issued.
3. Successor Employer: Burns and Ranchway
In a case decided during the 1970-71 Survey year, William J.
Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc.," the Board held for the first time
that a successor employer is obligated by his bargaining duty to honor
a collective bargaining contract negotiated by his predecessor. During
the present Survey year, the Second Circuit refused to enforce the
Board's order requiring Burns to honor its predecessor's contract with
the union, holding in Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB"
that the Board bad exceeded its powers in issuing such an order. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Meanwhile, in another Survey year
case, Ranch-Way, Inc. v. NLRB," the Tenth Circuit granted enforce-
ment of an order similar to that issued in Burns, and so sharpened the
conflict already existing between the Board and the Second Circuit re-
garding the authority of the Board to require an employer to assume
his predecessor's contract. Presumably the three-way conflict will be
resolved when the Supreme Court's imminent decision in Burns is
handed down,' although it is possible that the decision will rely on
the threshold question of whether Burns was a successor employer.
It seems probable that the Court will reject the Board's doctrine
that a predecessor's contractual obligations can be imposed on the
successor employer. That obligation was derived from the Supreme
Court's ruling in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston that "in appro-
priate circumstances . . . the successor employer may be required to
arbitrate with the union under the agreement [made by the predeces-
sorl."" The Board relied on the Supreme Court's refusal, in Wiley,
to relieve the successor from an obligation to arbitrate matters arising
under a collective bargaining contract on the ground that he had not
signed the contract. It interpreted Wiley as support for the doctrine
44 182 N.LR.B. 348, 74 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1970).
45 441 F.2d 911, 77 L.R.R.M. 2081 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. NLRB v,
Burns Intl Security Services, — U.S. —, 92 S.Ct. 99 (1971).
48 445 F.2d 625, 77 L.R.R.M. 2689 (10th Cir. 1971).
47 As this comment goes to press, the Supreme Court has handed down its decision
in Burns, holding unanimously that an employer had no obligation to honor a collective
bargaining agreement made by his predecessor and, by a bare five to four majority, that
the successor employer was obligated to bargain with the incumbent union. 40 U.S.L.W.
4499 (U.S. May 15, 1972).
48 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964).
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that an existing collective bargaining agreement could survive a merger
where there was substantial continuity in the employing industry."
Rejecting that interpretation, the Second Circuit argued in Burns
that the policy behind Wiley was not maintenance of contracts, but
rather the Court's recognition of " 'the central role of arbitration in
effectuating national labor policy.' ''" The court noted that the Su-
preme Court limited the effect of its holding by repeatedly emphasizing,
as the ground of the decision, its policy favoring arbitration."
The Second Circuit's rejection of the Board's doctrine rests, how-
ever, riot on its interpretation of Wiley but on its ruling that the Board's
action in Burns is contrary to the letter and the spirit of H.K. Porter,
Inc. v. NLRB.52
 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the limits
of the bargaining duty established in section 8(d) prevented both the
Board and the courts from compelling either an employer or a union
to agree to any substantive contractual provision.
It would appear that the Second Circuit's arguments are more
persuasive than the Board's. Whatever possibilities of expansion of
the duty to bargain were implicit in Wiley appear to have been ex-
tinguished permanently by H.K. Porter. Moreover, in another Survey
year decision, Allied Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 53
the Supreme Court ruled that unilateral change of a contract term did
not breach the duty to bargain unless the term involved were a man-
datory subject of bargaining. Pittsburgh Plate Glass may not conflict
outright with the Board's successor doctrine in Burns, but its narrow
interpretation of the 8(d) bargaining duty, an interpretation resting
on a close and literal reading of the statute, would not appear to cor-
relate with the Board's expansive interpretation of the duty in Burns.
Finally, the Board itself has appeared to narrow the applicability
of its Burns doctrine. The Survey year decision G.T. & E. Data Ser-
vices Corp." recognizes some of the practical problems implicit in the
doctrine." G.T. & E. Data had attached to itself a department of the
predecessor employer, and was its corporate affiliate. However, G.T.
& E. Data supplied a wide range of services to a number of unaffiliated
companies as well as providing the predecessor with the services once
supplied by its erstwhile department. The Board found a successor-
employer relationship, but it also found that many provisions of the
49 182 N.L.R.B. at 349, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1100.
BB 441 F.2d at 916, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2084, quoting 376 US. at 549.
51 Id. at 916 n.3, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2084 n.3.
02 Id. at 915, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2083.
B B 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
114 194 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 79 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1971). The Board noted that it bad
already refused to apply Burns "in a mechanistic fashion" in earlier cases. Id. at —,
79 L.R.R.M. at 1036.
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predecessor's contract were not practically applicable to the successor's
operation. The Board refused to apportion the successorship obliga-
tions on a pro tanto basis, on the ground that to do so would be to
make a new contract for the parties. Hence the Board held that it
would be "inappropriate" to require the successor to honor the con-
tract." It appears that the specific factors making for "inappropriate-
ness" derived from differences in the nature of the operations. Thus it
would appear that in fact, if not in theory, the Board will find a jus-
tification for imposing the contract on the successor only when his
operation closely resembles that of the predecessor. Such a conclusion
correlates with Wiley's underlying theory that the employing industry
remains, though the employer might change.
G.T. & E. Data suggests, then, that even should the Supreme
Court rule in favor of the Board in Burns, the Board will gradually
narrow its application of the decision. The various factors that made
for "inappropriateness" in G.T. & E. Data will be found, in various
forms, in many successor-employer cases.
4. Union Enforcement of Production Quota: Westgate Painting
In Painters District Council v. NLRB (Westgate Painting &
Decorating Corp.)," the Second Circuit upheld the Board's finding
that a union's enforcement of its production quota violated section
8(b)(3) of the NLRA.
Section 8 (b) (3)" establishes a union's duty to bargain collectively
with an employer, and section 8(d), which defines the scope of the
bargaining duty, requires that neither party modify an existing collec-
tive bargaining contract without first offering to bargain over the mod-
ification." In Westgate, the union had unilaterally put into effect a
union production quota limiting a journeyman painter's work to ten
rooms a week. Since the collective bargaining contract provided that
journeymen painters work thirty-five hours a week, and the painters
had painted an average of 11.5 rooms weekly before the production
quota was established, the enforcement of the quota necessarily re-
quired those painters who customarily painted more than ten rooms
a week to work less than thirty-five hours. Hence the majority of the
Board had found that the union's enforcement of the rule constituted
a unilateral change of an existing contract term and a violation of
8 (b) (3 ) ."
55 Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1036
56 453 F.2d 783, 79 L.R.R.M. 2145 (2d Cir. 1971).
57 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970).
58 See summary of the proviso to section 8(d), note IS supra.
59 Painters District Council (Westgate Painting and Decorating Corp.), 186 N.L.R.B.
No. 140, 75 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1970).
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In upholding that decision, the circuit court sustained the Board's
interpretation of Scofield v. NLRB," where the Supreme Court had
found lawful union fines enforcing a production quota. The Board had
refused to allow Scofield to protect the Westgate quota, relying on the
Supreme Court's characterization of the Scofield quota as one that did
not breach the collective bargaining agreement."
Judge Hays, however, rejected in his dissent the Board's inter-
pretation of Scofield. He also argued inter alia that even assuming that
the rule did breach the contract, the Board's remedial order to bargain
about the contract modification is itself wrong under section 8(d). The
judge pointed out that the order in effect requires the employer as well
as the union to bargain about a term in an existing contract, while sec-
tion 8(d) provides that the bargaining duty does not require either
party "to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms . . . con-
tained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become
effective before such terms .. . can be reopened under the provisions
of the contract!'" Hence, the judge argued, under 8(d) the parties in
this case had no duty to bargain further and, indeed, "no right to bar-
gain."" For that reason, and because under NLRB v. C'& C Plywood
Corp." the Board has no power to police the enforcement of collective
agreements, the company should seek relief from the courts in an ac-
tion for breach of contract under section 301.
Notwithstanding the arguments of the dissent, it is submitted that
the majority's position, and the Board's, appear correct in the light of
the Supreme Court's Survey year decision, Allied Chemical Workers
v. Pittsbugh Plate Glass." There, the Court held, inter alia, that uni-
lateral midterm modification of a. collective bargaining contract did
not constitute a violation of the bargaining duty if the term modified
were only a permissive subject of bargaining." The Court's rationale
implies that it does recognize modification of a mandatory bargaining
subject, such as that involved in Westgate, as a . violation of the 8(d)
bargaining duty. It would follow that the Board has authority to issue
its traditional bargaining order remedy' for such a violation, and..that
only if the breach pertained to a permissive subject of bargaining should
the injured party be required to seek relief from the courts in a 301
action.
oo 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
61 Id. at 433.
02 29 U.S.C.	 158(d) (1970), quoted in 453 F.24 at 789, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2149
(dissenting opinion).
68 453 F.2d at 789, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2149.
04 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
65 404 U.S. 157 (1971). See pp. 1405-OS supra.
00 See pp. 1407-08 supra.
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3. Coalition Bargaining: Lynchburg Steel and Shell Oil
In the past few years, unions have developed a variety of tactics
to enlarge the scope of bargaining. "Coordinated" or "coalition" bar-
gaining by a union team that includes representatives of other unions
that bargain with the same company has been recognized as lawful."
On the other hand, in Phelps Dodge" the Board found unlawful, as
an attempt to create unilaterally a company-wide unit, several bargain-
ing units' insistence on simultaneous settlement of contracts.
During the Survey year, the Board ruled on two techniques that
appeared to enlarge the scope of bargaining beyond the single bargain-
ing unit. In Steelworkers Union (Lynchburg Foundry Co.),°° the
Board accepted a "pooled ratification" tactic as lawful, while in Shell
Oil Co." it held that Shell was not required to engage in "simultaneous
bargaining" on company-wide fringe benefit plans with a committee
of union locals representing different units within the company.
In Lynchburg, a union whose locals represented two units of the
same company submitted to a pooled vote, by the members of both
units voting as a single group, the company's proposal regarding wage
increases and expiration dates for the contracts between the company
and the two units. The employees rejected the proposal. The General
Counsel contended that this strategy violated the union's bargaining
duty as established in 8 (b) (3) by requiring the employer, without his
consent, to bargain with the two units jointly rather than separately.
The Board, however, accepted the Trial Examiner's argument that dis-
tinguished this kind of pooled ratification from the tactics held unlaw-
ful in Phelps Dodge and similar cases.
The essence of the distinction lay in the union's purpose. In Phelps
Dodge the unions had insisted on a common expiration date, but the
Board had emphasized evidence showing their primary motivation to
have been consolidation of the separate units; their interest in a com-
mon expiration date was merely "peripheral."'" Here, in contrast, the
Trial Examiner found that each unit had a substantial and direct in-
terest in getting a contract whose expiration date was identical with
that of the other unit's contract, and that the union representatives had
determined upon the pooled vote as the most feasible means of insuring
the common expiration." In United States Pipe & Foundry Co, v.
67 See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 71 L.R.R.M. 2418 (2d Cir.
1969).
08 AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating Comm. (Phelps Dodge Corp.), 184 N.L.R.B. No.
106, 74 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1970).
02 192 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 78 L.11,12.M. 1021 (1971).
70 194 N.L.R.B. No. 166, 79 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1972).
71 184 N.L.R.B.	 74 L.R.R.M. at 1706.
72 192 N.L.R.B. at —, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1024.
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NLRB,73
 the Fifth Circuit had found similar insistence on a common
expiration date lawful, since each of the units concerned had a direct
and important interest in achieving common expiration of their con-
tracts with the company. Accordingly, the Lynchburg Trial Examiner
held, not only was the purpose underlying the pooled vote lawful, but
because each of the units had so vital an independent interest in a com-
mon expiration date, any "expansion" of the bargaining unit effected
by the tactic was only "apparent,' not "actual!'" Each of the units
was merely pursuing its best interest.
A subordinate argument, that utilization of the pooled voting
procedure had the "object and effect" of requiring the company to
bargain with a single combined unit, was decisively rejected. The
Lynchburg Trial Examiner refused to treat the technique as per se
suspect by inferring any unlawful object, and since the record showed
that consolidation of a single unit had not in fact been effected, and
that the actual motives were lawful, no violation could be found."
Shell Oil" at first appears unrelated to Lynchburg in theory and
inconsistent with it in that the Lynchburg tactics do not appear suf-
ficiently different from the Shell strategy to justify the different result.
Shell had company-wide fringe benefit plans. A union whose locals
represented nineteen Shell units formed a single committee to bargain
on behalf of all the units regarding the uniform plans and requested
Shell to appoint a similar committee. The union explicitly stated that
any agreement reached would be binding on each of the units repre-
sented. Shell refused to bargain with the committee. The Board accepted
the Trial Examiner's conclusion that Shell was not obligated to bargain
on the ground that the method of bargaining proposed would in fact
have removed fringe benefit bargaining from the separate units to a
pooled basis. The decision depended upon the Trial Examiner's
characterization of the proposed method of bargaining as one whose
"actual effect" would have been to merge the separately certified
units."
Although Shell rested squarely on a finding of "actual effect""
73 298 F.2d 873, 49 L.R.R.M. 2340 (5th Cir. 1962).
74
 192 N.L.R.B. at —, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1023, The Trial Examiner is quoting
from United States Pipe and Foundry.
75 Id. at —, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1025.
76 Id. at —, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1025. The Trial Examiner expressly stipulated that he
implied no view regarding the lawfulness of the pooled vote had the employer's proposal
not contained a common expiration date or had the problem been of direct concern to one
unit only.
77 194 N.L.R.B. No. 166, 79 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1971),
78 Id. at	 79 L.R.R.M. at 1134.
70 The Examiner did not reject the union's disclaimer of any purpose to effect a
merger. Id. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
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and Lynchburg relied on "purpose," the two decisions form a consistent
pattern. The correlation is evident in the Lynchburg examiner's theory
that, given each unit's direct and immediate interest in a pooling tech-
nique, whatever "merger" that technique produced was only "ap-
parent." Since the technique was simply a procedure by which each
unit could best work toward its own interests, the Lynchburg examiner
found that the technique did not actually effect consolidation. It
appears, then, that the "purpose" test is a close correlative if not a
duplicate of the "effects" test.
Although superficially the tactics employed in these two cases may
resemble each other, the fact remains that the Shell Trial Examiner
characterized the union's tactic as one neither intended by the union,
nor understood by Shell, "as simply calling for concurrent discussions
at which, though an agreement common to all units might be sought, the
separate unit identity of each unit was to be retained, and both sides
were to be left free to negotiate, . . . and to conclude divergent
settlements on an individual unit basis." 8° Indeed, the Shell union
virtually admitted that whatever benefit each unit would receive from
utilization of the tactic would be derived precisely from the fact of
common bargaining." The Shell union, then, was asking not that its
technique be regarded as a non-merger tactic, but that it be allowed as
"an exception from the normal rule permitting an employer to limit
bargaining strictly to the unit the Board has found appropriate."' This
the Trial Examiner refused to do, on the traditional ground that it was
not for the Board to " 'act at large in equalizing disparities in bar-
gaining power.' "83
It may be thought that the Lynchburg strategy failed, as much as
did the Shell technique, to allow "divergent settlements on an individual
unit basis."84 However, the Lynchburg strategy, unlike the Shell tac-
tics, in fact allowed the units to make divergent settlements with the
employer. It was only after each unit's representative concluded, in
response to the employer's proposal, that a common expiration date
was essential to his unit's interests, that the units turned to a tactic
devised to pursue that specific and limited goal, common expiration of
the contracts.
80 Id. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
81 The Trial Examiner reported that the union asserted that "separate unit
bargaining has been demonstrated .. to be 'sterile and ineffective.' " Id. at —, 79 L.R.R.M.
at 1134.
82 Id. at	 79 L.R.R.M. at 1134.
83 Id. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1134.
84 Id. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
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B. Employer Discrimination
1. Solicitation/Distribution Rules
a. McDonnell Douglas, Diamond Shamrock--in two Survey year
decisions, the Board and the Third Circuit reached different .conclu-
sions regarding the standards applicable to no-solicitation and no-dis-
tribution rules directed at activities engaged in by employees outside
of their scheduled working hours. The Board's fundamental policy,
established in Stoddard-Quirk Mfg.  Co.,' classifies as presumptively
invalid employers' rules forbidding employees to distribute union lit-
eratUre or to solicit for a union during nonworking time in nonworking
areas. The standard applied to rules regulating activity by non-em-
ployees is of course more lenient: in NLRB v. Babcock & Co.,2
the Supreme Court ruled that 'an employer may forbid non-employees
to solicit or distribute on his property, so long as the union organizers
can reach the employees through other available means and the em-
ployer does not discriminate against the union by allowing other solici-
tation or distribution on the premises. Thus Babcock & Wilcox requires
that, when non-employees are involved, the 'Board balance the section
7 rights of the employees to receive union information against the
employer's private property rights. 3
The two Survey year cases involved' rules that in varying degrees
treated employees who were not on their working shifts as though they
were non-employees. In Diamond Shamrock Co. V. NLRB,4
 the em-
ployer, a chemicals manufacturer, divided his premises into a fenced
and an unfenced portion; the former included the production area,
lunch room, and locker room, the latter the parking lot. The employer'
enforced a rule forbidding off-thity employees access to all areas within
the fence except during a thirty-minute period before and after their
shifts. Since he had no rule forbidding solicitation or distribution, em-
ployees could engage in those activities at times in the unfenced ,
area and, during their shifts, at nonworking times in nonworking areas
within the fenced area. The Board nevertheleis found the no-access rule
violative of section 8(a) (1).' The. Third Circuit reversed the Board.
1 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962).
2 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
3 Id. at 112. In Food Employees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968), the Supreme Court permitted picketing by union organizers on a parking lot
adjacent to a shopping center on the ground that it was generally open to the public. In
its recent decision in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, however, the Court made it clear
that Logan Valley will be limited to situations in which the employer's property assumes
"to some significant degree the functional attributes of public property devoted to public
use." 40 U.S.L.W. 4826, 4828 (U.S. June 22, 1972).
4 443 F.2d 52, 77 L.R.R.M. 2193 (3rd Cir. 1971). 	 •
5 181 N.L.R.B. 261, 73 L.R.R.M. 1348 (1970). Section 8(a) (1) provides that it shall
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The appellate court noted that there was a substantive difference
between the rights of off-duty employees and those of on-duty em-
ployees, inferable from the Babcock & Wilcox distinction between
employees and non-employees; hence the Board should not have
treated the no-access rule as presumptively invalid but should instead
have applied the Babcock & Wilcox balancing test appropriate to non-
employee rules. Under that test, the rule in question would appear to
be valid, since the company had advanced substantial business reasons
in defense of its rule, and the employees had suffered no restrictions
during their work shifts. The Board's reliance on Peyton Packing Co.
v. NLRB,' a progenitor of the Stoddard-Quirk presumption, was mis-
placed because the Peyton decision involved on-duty nonworking time.
Finally, even were a presumption of invalidity to be allowed, the court
intimated that the facts of the case would have overcome it.'
In the second case, McDonnell Douglas Corp.,' the employer, a
manufacturer of aircraft who was required by the government to main-
tain strict security, promulgated a rule forbidding non-employees from
distributing literature or soliciting anywhere on company premises, in-
cluding the parking lot, at any time. An addendum to the rule stated
that employees were allowed on company premises only during their
working hours "and a reasonable period before and after those hours";
at other times they were to be treated as non-employees. 9 A two-man
majority of the Board found the rule violative of 8(a) (1). Member
Kennedy dissented.
The Board ruled that the company had not established sufficient
justification for its rule limiting employee solicitation and distribution
rights to "some vague, undefined, 'reasonable' period." 14
 It ordered
that the company modify the rule insofar as it classified employees as
non-employees and prohibited solicitation and distribution during non-
working time in nonworking areas, "to any greater extent than the
employer can establish is required in order to maintain production, dis-
cipline, or security. . ."Il Thus both the holding and the order suggest
that the Board would find the rule valid if the employer would modify
it to apply to some definite, limited period of time before and after
shifts, and could make some showing of business need to justify such
a modified rule.
be an unfair labor practice for' an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. 29 U.S.C. 	 158(a) (1) (1970).
0 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 12 L.R.R.M. 183, enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
7 433 F.2d at 59-60, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2198.
8 194 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 78 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1971).
9 Id. at —, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
10 Id.
11 Id. at —, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
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Both the order and the dictum that "we do not hold . . . that .. .
employee rights are necessarily unlimited- at all times and in all
places"' indicate that the Board is softening the Stoddard-Quirk pre-
sumption when the rule under scrutiny is directed at employee activity
outside of shift periods. The Board appears to be establishing the policy
that an employer may prohibit solicitation and distribution on com-
pany property outside of shift periods, so long as he can establish
production, discipline or security reasons for so doing; and the Board
will be hospitable to entertaining such reasons. In sum, the Board's
emphasis on the "vagueness" of the' rule in McDonnell Douglas
strongly implies that that rule would have been found lawful, given
the company's security needs, had the before- and after-shift periods
been clearly stipulated.
Such an approach, it is submitted, represents a satisfactory adjust-
ment of the Stoddard-Quirk standard. Originally developed to protect
activity during nonworking time within the shift, it was too rigid to
be used to measure rules regulating activity wholly outside of the shift
period. In its earlier decision in Diamond Shamrock the Board had
taken an adamant position, finding the no-access rule unlawful despite
the ample business reasons that the company advanced in its defense."
Noting that the employer had cited no specific instances of employee
after-shift activity causing problems within the fenced area," the
Board had appeared to be relying on a strong Stoddard-Quirk pre-
sumption that any employer would find difficult to overcome, business
needs notwithstanding." The Board's receptivity to employer justifi-
cation in McDonnell Douglas indicates a 'definite relaxation of the
presumption.
Finally, the McDonnell Douglas test appears both more practical
and more legally proper than the Third Circuit's approach in Diamond
Shamrock. The latter's virtual identification of non-duty employees
with non-employees ignores the NLRA's persistent deference to em-
ployee rights. It also ignores such practical factors as the distinctions
that should be drawn between non-employee and non-duty employee
activity in, for example, a private parking lot." Establishing a business
justification for prohibition of the latter activity should rightly entail
a heavier burden than that required for prohibition of outsider activity.
The Board's retention of the Stoddard-Quirk presumption in McDon-
nell Douglas maintains the distinction, while its apparent readiness to
let that presumption be overcome, on a case-by-case basis, recognizes
12 Id. at —, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1706.
13 443 F.2d at 55, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2194.
14 Id. at 60, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2198.
15 Diamond Shamrock Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 261, 262, 73 L.R.R.M. 1348 at 1349 (1970).
le Cf. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, discussed at 1423-24 infra.
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the lesser distinction between nonworking times within and outside of
the shift.
b. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB—In Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB," the Eighth Circuit held that the Board was warranted in
finding violative of section 8 (a) (1) a broad no-solicitation rule directed
at non-employees. The rule prohibited outsider union organizers from
contacting employees on parking lots which were maintained by the
employer adjacent to its store and kept generally open to the public.
Both the Board" and the court decisions relied on Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.," where the Supreme Court found
non-employee organizational picketing in a shopping center to be con-
stitutionally protected activity. That decision emphasized that the
property in question, though private, was generally open to the public.
By relying on Logan Valley, the Board and the Eighth Circuit
have apparently limited the scope of the leading decision on the legality
of employer rules forbidding non-employee activity, NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co." In Babcock & Wilcox, the Supreme Court found lawful
employer rules forbidding distribution and solicitation by outside or-
ganizers, so long as the organizers, with reasonable efforts, could reach
the employees through other channels of communication and the em-
ployer did not discriminate against the union by allowing other solicita-
tion or distribution.
The employer in Central Hardware argued that the facts of the case
met the Babcock & Wilcox standards and so required a finding that
his rule was not violative of 8 (a) (1). 2' The Board, however, found
that the parking lots, though maintained for the use of the employer's
customers, were generally open to the public, and accordingly that
union activity on that property was protected under Logan Valley. It
then held that the employer rule forbidding such activity was not merely
ineffective under Logan Valley but violative of 8(a) (1). In upholding
that decision, the Eighth Circuit pointed out that " [t] he essential dis-
tinction between Babcock & Wilcox and Logan Valley Plaza rests upon
a determination as to the use of the properties in question."" Since
17 439 F.2d 1321, 76 L.R.R.M. 2873 (8th Cir. 1971). Since completion of this com-
ment, the Supreme Court has reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit, holding that Food
Employees Local .590 v. Logan Valley Plaza is limited to situations in which the em-
ployer's property has assumed "to some significant degree the functional attributes of
public property devoted to public use." 40 U.S.L.W. 4826, 4828 (U.S. June 22, 1972).
18 181 N.L.R.B. 491, 73 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1970).
19 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
20 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
21 439 F.2d at 1326, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2876. The employer also relied on NLRB v.
Solo Cup Co., 422 F.2d 1149, 73 L.R.R.M. 2789 (7th Cir. 1970).
za 439 F.2d at 1328, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2877.
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the record supported the Board's factual finding that the parking lots
had "quasi-public" status, Logan Valley controlled."
Central Hardware, then, stands for the Board's refusal to allow
the Babcock & Wilcox rationale to shelter a rule otherwise legal if it
pertains to activity in a quasi-public place. It appears to broaden Logan
Valley by applying Board Sanctions to forbid a rule regarding property
maintained by the employer for the use of customers, on the ground
that such property is as "public" as was the shopping center area in
Logan Valley. 24
 Since certiorari has been granted, the Supreme Court's
evaluation- of the Board's pOsition should be forthcoming within the
next Survey year.25
c. Magnavox Co.—In Magnavox .Co., 26, the'Board significantly ex-
panded its Gale Products" doctrine, which restricts contractual waivers
of employees' statutory rights, by expanding the Gale Products remedy.
The Board had held in Gale Products that a union's contractual waiver
of objections to an employer's broad no-solicitation and no-distribution
rule unduly interfered with the employees" statutory right to select a
bargaining representative. The Board held that the union's contractual
waiver was effective only insofar as it limited the rights of the em-
ployees to solicit and to distribute literature on behalf of the contracting
union itself. It ordered that the employer rescind the rule to the extent
that it prohibited employees from engaging in activity on behalf of any
other union. Gale Products engendered a conflict among the circuits.
The Sixth28
 and Seventh29 Circuits rejected the doctrine, while .the
Fifth" and Eighth" Circuits approved it and the Eighth Circuit ex-
panded the Board's order to insure to all employees equal literature
distribution rights " (on behalf of any labor organization or in opposi-
tion to any labor organization.' "82
-Faced with this conflict when Magnavox presented a clear-cut
factual situation involving both a broad no-distribution and no-solicita-
tion rule, and a contractual provision found to signify acquiescence by
28 Id.
24 Id.
25
 Since completion of this comment, the Supreme Court has reversed the decision of
the Eighth Circuit in Central Hardware. See note 17 supra.
26 195 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 79 L.R.R.M. 1283 (1972). 	 •
27
 Gale Products, Div. of Oittboard Marine Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 53 L.R.R.M.
1242, enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390, 57 L.R.R.M. 2164 (7th Cir. 1964). "
28 Armco Steel Carp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1965).
29 The Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order in Gale Products.
See note 27 supra.
88 NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 69 L.R.R.M. 2656 (5th
Cir. 1968).	
•
; 81 Machinists District 9 v. NLRB (McDonnell Douglas),' 415 F.2d 113, 72 L.R.R.M.
2206 (8th Cir. 1969).
32 Id. at 116, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2208.	 r
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the union to the employer's maintenance and enforcement of the rule,
the Board decided to adhere to Gale Products in the face of the adverse
decisions and to adopt the ,Eighth Circuit's expanded remedy. It or-
dered the employer to cease and desist from enforcing any rule pro-
hibiting employees from distributing literature in nonworking areas on
nonworking time, on behalf of any labor organization, relating to the
selection or rejection of a bargaining agent. In short, the contractual
provision was to be respected only insofar as it waived the employees'
right to distribute the union's "institutional" literature;" the em-
ployees were to be free to engage in other activity in support of the
incumbent union.
In support of its position, the Board reiterated the Gale Products
theory that employees' statutory rights must be accorded paramount
weight." It acknowledged that in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB the
Supreme Court had held binding a contractual waiver of the right to
strike, but noted the Court's insistence that the effect of such a waiver
is subject to the proviso that "the selection of the bargaining represen-
tative remains free."" The Board also relied on the Fifth Circuit's
distinction between statutory rights running to the individual em-
ployees, which include distribution and solicitation rights, and the
rights which the employees exercise by acting in concert through the
collective bargaining agent."
On these grounds it would appear that the Board's adherence to
Gale Products and expansion of its remedy are not only reasonable but
necessary. Recognition of the employees' right freely to select a bar-
gaining agent, a right emphasized in Mastro Plastics as a necessary
prerequisite to the bargaining agent's authority to bind the employees
in the collective bargaining agreement, apparently requires invalidation
of any contractual waiver of that right. Since the old Gale Products
remedy respected waiver of the right insofar as employees wished to
exercise it on behalf of the incumbent union, modification of the remedy
was required.
2. Racial Discrimination: Farmers' Cooperative Compress
In a 1969 opinion accompanying a remand to the Board, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia appeared to
take the position that an employer's racial discrimination necessarily
constitutes a violation of section 8(a) (1)." In its original decision on
33 195 N.L.R.B. at — n.9, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1285 n.9.
84 Id. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1284.
85 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956).
80 195 N.L.R.B. at — n.7, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1284-85 n.7.
87 Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 70 L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
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the case, Farmers' Cooperative Compress," the Board had found a
violation of section 8(a) (5) caused by the employer's refusal to bargain
over his allegedly racially discriminatory practices. The District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the Board's findings and in addition accepted
the union's argument that the employer's alleged racial discrimination
violated 8(a) (1). The court remanded the case to the Board for a
factual finding as to whether the employer did indeed pursue a racially
discriminatory policy, and, should such a policy be found, for a
remedial order to remove the effects of the violation. In a three to one
decision on the remand handed down during the Survey year, the
Board found no policy or program of discrimination. 39
An analysis of the Board's opinion in the context of the District
of Columbia Circuit Court's majority and concurring opinions requires
the conclusion that the Board does not consider itself authorized to
treat employer racial discrimination as per se violative of 8(a) (1). The
appellate decision had appeared to lay down an explicit doctrine that
discrimination is per se an unfair labor practice:
We remand the case to the Board for a hearing on whether
the company has a policy and practice of discrimination
against its employees on account of their race or national
origin. We hold that such a policy and practice violates Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act."
The court went on to admit that in order to hold employer discrimina-
tion violative of 8 (a) (1), ."it must be found that . . . it interferes
with or restrains discriminated employees from exercising their statu-
tory right to act concertedly. . . 2'41
 It then interpreted "concerted
activity" as the right of the employees to "asser [t] themselves against
their employer to improve their lot,"42
 and stated that an employer's
racial discrimination interferes with such assertion by setting up a
clash of interest among employees and inducing an apathy or docility
which inhibits them from asserting their rights. The court ruled: "We
find that the confluence of these two factors su f iciently deters the
exercise of Section 7 rights as to violate Section 8 (a)(1).” 48
 Thus in its
rationale, as well as.in the explicit language of its "holding," the court
classified racial discrimination as per se 44
 violative of the NLRA.
88 169 N.L.R.B. 290, 67 L.R.R.M. 1266 (1968).
89 Farmers' Cooperative Compress, 194 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 78 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1971).
Chairman Miller and Members Fanning and Kennedy were the majority. Member Jenkins
dissented.
40 416 F.2d at 1130, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2490 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 1135, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2494.
42 Id., 70 L.R.R.M. at 2495..
48 Id. (emphasis in the original).
44 The court nowhere used the term "per se violation," but its holding and language
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However, despite the decisiveness and clarity of its statements, the
court's opinion did not necessarily have to be taken as the teaching of
the case. The decision was made by Circuit Judges Wright, Danaher,
and Prettyman. Judge Wright wrote the opinion. Judge Danaher
joined him in the rationale expressed therein, as well as in the decision
to remand, but interpreted that rationale thus:
Our remand, in short, called forl hearings and a determination
as to whether this employer actually . . . had put that policy
into practice so' as to result in invidious "discrimination on
account of race or national origin." Such is the inquiry which
is to be conducted, and properly in my view, with an ultimate
conclusion to depend upon the Board's findings. There may
not be, but assuredly there "can" be a violation in the respects
under discussion and that is wh iat our opinion says. I adhere
to it.45
Judge Prettyman concurred only in the decision to remand. In a
separate opinion, he wrote that the complaints had alleged the existence
of a policy that interfered with section 7 rights, and that accordingly
the Board should be asked to receive evidence and make findings. It
made "no difference what the [employer's] program is called or how
it is catalogued" if by pursuing it the employer interfered with the
exercise of section 7 rights." In short, Judge Prettyman considered
the remand as one for a traditional 8(a) (1) finding.
A view of the case identical to that expressed by Judge Prettyman
was enunciated in the following year by the Sixth Circuit. In Tipler v.
E.I. duPont deNemours & Co.," that court explicitly distinguished the
scope of the NLRA from that comprehended in the broad anti-dis-
crimination mandate of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.48
Moreover, it cited the District of Columbia Circuit's decision as
illustrative of that distinction:
This case provides an excellent example of the differences
emphatically defined racial discrimination as necessarily constituting an unfair labor prac-
tice. Cf. the statement in the concluding paragraph of the opinion, repeating the "hold-
ing" almost verbatim: "CWie conclude that an employer's policy and practice of invidious
discrimination on account of race or national origin is a violation of Section g(a)(1)."
Id. at 1138, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2497.
46 Id. at 1139 (separate opinion). Judge Danaher made this statement in a brief sep-
arate opinion relating' to his vote to deny the petition for rehearing filed by Farmers'
Cooperative Compress.
46 Id. at 1138.
47 443 F.2d 125, 3 FEF Cases 540 (Gth Cir. 1971).
48 42 U.S.C. ft 2000e at seq. (1970). Current cases involving Title VII in the tabor
law context are discussed at 1348-75 supra.
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in two statutes. Racial discrimination in employment is an
unfair labor practice that violates Section 8(a) (1) of the
National Labor Relations Act if the discrimination is • un-
justified and interferes with the affected employees' right to
act concertedly for their own . . . protection. United Pack-
inghouse, Food & Allied Workers International Union v.
National Labor Relations Board . . . . In contrast racial dis-
crimination in employment is prohibitied [sic] by Title VII
without reference to the effect on the employees' right to unite.
Hence, certain discriminatory practices that are valid under
the National Labor Relations Act may be invalid under Title
VII."
Thus the Sixth Circuit accepted only the initial axiom of. the District
of Columbia Circuit's argument: that racial discrimination must be
shown to be inhibitive of the exercise of section 7 rights if it is to be
adjudged an unfair labor practice. It made no reference to that court's
conclusion that racial discrimination necessarily has such an effect
and hence is per se in violation of the NLRA.
This, then, was the context in which the Board made its Survey
year decision on the remand. It must be presumed that the Board was
aware of the conflict between the explicit language of the "holding" in
the appellate opinion, the interpretation of that language given to it by
one of the two judges on whom the holding depended, and the position
taken by the Sixth Circuit as well as by Judge Prettyman. Yet the
Board made its factual finding that no discriminatory policy had been
practiced by the employer without once referring to the per se violation
doctrine expressed in Judge Wright's opinion. Moreover, nowhere did
it refer to section 8(a) (1): that is, not even by an isolated reference
to 8 (a) (1) did the Board imply that it was accepting Judge Wright's
"holding" that the alleged racial discrimination under investigation was
per se violative of that provision. The Board also refrained from
commenting on Member Jenkins' assertion, in his dissent, that "[f]or
purposes of this case . . . the law is that racial discrimination violates
section 8 (a) (1).""
It is submitted that by its careful silence the Board revealed its
probably reluctant acceptance of Judge Prettyman's interpretation of
the law. It apparently interpreted the remand as a direction to make
a determination as to whether the employer had in fact breached
40 443 F.2d at 129, 3 FEP Cases at 542.
60 194 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1473.
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8(a) (1) : that is;to discover whether the discrimination had interfered
with the employees' exercise of their section 7 rights.
Such an interpretation of racial discrimination as a potential rather
than a per se unfair labor practice would appear to be both practical and
legally correct. It leaves the Board free to treat employer discrimination
on an ad hoc basis, and indeed to develop a presumptive rule that such
discrimination interferes with employees' statutory rights. It does not
require, however, that the Board become a forum for all charges of
racial discrimination, including those that apparently involve conduct
not within the legitimate scope of the Act. For such charges, develop-
ments involving Title VII actions discussed elsewhere in this Survey'
suggest the usefulness and propriety of a Title VII forum.
Moreover, the policy proposed by Judge Prettyman and apparently
accepted by the Board is consistent with the Board's per se doctrine.
Traditionally, the Board has required an explicit and necessary causal
connection between a violation of statutory rights and activity that it
classifies as a per se unfair labor practice. That is, a per se rule is a
shorthand statement, of a one-step relation between a certain kind of
behavior and infringement of a right protected by the NLRA; it may
not be a substitute for such a direct and necessary causal link." Even
when an action is condemned as a per se violation because of its
psychological effects, it is because those effects are themselves direct
inhibitions of statutory rights: for example, an employer's ill-timed
promise of benefits before a union election violates 8(a) (1) because it
interferes with the employees' freedom of choice for or against
unionization by reminding them that the employer can take away what
he gives, not because it makes them more docile—or indeed, more
friendly—toward the employer." The District of Columbia's argument
that discrimination induces apathy and docility, and that those qualities
in turn produce interference with section 7 rights, does not appear to
establish the immediate cause/effect relation underlying per se rules.
By refraining from saying anything that might suggest acceptance
of the circuit court's per se doctrine, the Board acted with a nice
appreciation of the scope of 8(a) (1) and of its own authority as an
instrument of the NLRA rather than of Title VII. At the same time,
however, it acted upon the principle that an act of discrimination could
in fact be found violative of 8(a) (1).
51 See pp. 1348-75 supra.
52 Cf. Section of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Association, The Developing
Labor Law (C. Morris ed. 1971) 322 ff., summarizing per se refusals to bargain.
53 See, e.g., NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964); Medo Photo
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 686 (1944).
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3. Discharge of Managerial Employee: North Arkansas Electric
Cooperative
In NLRB v. North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc.," the
Eighth Circuit reversed the Board and held that an employer did not
violate Section 8(a) (3)" of the NLRA by discharging a "managerial"
employee for aiding a union during an organizational campaign. The
decision marks appellate rejection of an attempt by the Board to loosen
a long-standing restriction on the scope of the Act. •
The NLRA contains no express provision excluding managerial
employees from its protection. Section 2(3), which defines "employees,"
does exclude "supervisors; "" it was passed in 1947 to eliminate the
Board's earlier practice of including supervisors in bargaining units."
Since the Board had consistently refused to include managerial em-
ployees in bargaining units before section 2(3) was passed," the
provision would appear to indicate congressional satisfaction with such
exclusion. The Board consistently maintained its exclusionary policy
and, in Swift and Co.," enunciated the broad principle that individuals
allied with management could not be considered employees for the
purposes of the Act. Thus the exclusion applied to protection from
unfair labor practices as well as to membership in bargaining units.
In the instant case, the Board had overruled Swift, holding that
although a managerial employee might not have the requisite com-
munity of interest with other employees to be included in the bar-
gaining unit, he could still be entitled to protection from unfair labor
practices as a section 2 (3) employee.°°
The circuit court reasoned that nothing in the Act or its legislative
history indicated that Congress intended the word "employee" to have
one definition for the purpose of determining an appropriate bargaining
unit and another for the purpose of determining which employees are
protected from unfair labor practices. Admittedly, the Board-created
category of "managerial" employees lacks clear definition; but when
51 446 F.2d 602, 77 L.R.R.M. 3114 (8th Cir. 1971). This was the second time the
case had come before the court; its first remand to the Board was NLRB v. North Ar-
kansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., 412 F.2d 324, 71 L.R.R.M. 2599 (8th Cir. 1969).
55 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment . . . to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . ."
Be 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
67 See 446 F.2d at 605-06, 77 L.R.R.M. at 3117-19, for a summary of the legislative
history of 1 2(3).
58 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322, 17 L.R.R.M. 394, 395 (1946).
69 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 37 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1956).
Oc' "[E]ven if we would have found that Lenox had insufficient community of interest
.. to include him [in the unit], we find him to be an 'employee' rather than an 'em-
ployer' . . ." North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, 185 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 75 L.R.R.M.
1068, 1069 (1967), supplementing 168 N.L.R.B. 921, 67 L.R.R.M. 1193 (1967).
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the record shows, as it does here, that the employee would not have
been included in the unit, the Board may not utilize imprecise categories
as a means of expanding coverage of the Act beyond the scope in-
tended by Congress."
The court's reliance on legislative history and on decisions in-
corporating the Swift principle seems well-placed and correlates with
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Allied Chemical Workers Local
1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.," where the Court refused to permit
the Board to expand the category of "employees" to include retired
workers. The decision is also consistent with an earlier Survey year
case, NLRB v. Wheeling Electric Co.," wherein the Fourth Circuit
refused to enforce a Board order requiring reinstatement of a con-
fidential employee discharged for refusing to work during a strike;
confidential employees, the court held, were not employees within the
scope of the Act.
Notwithstanding the legal deficiencies of the Board's position, it
would appear that discharges such as that in North Arkansas Electric
must affect the exercise of section 7 rights. Possibly the Board will
respond to the instant reversal by expanding its application of another
theory: that the discharge of even a supervisor, who is specifically ex-
cluded from protection, may be found to violate the NLRA if the dis-
charge was motivated by the supervisor's engaging in protected
concerted activities, and if the effect 'of such • a discharge is to intimi-
date other employees, who are protected by the Act, in their exercise of
the same rights." Presumably the theory could be applied to "mana-
gerial" and "confidential" employees as well as to supervisors.
C. Union Discrimination
1. The Conflict within Section 8(h)(1)(A): Granite State, Boeing,
and General Electric
During the Survey' year a series of Board and appellate cases
revealed further movement toward resolution of a major question
inherent in section 8 (b) (1) (A). The main clause of that provision
protects employees' exercise of their section 7 rights from union
restraint or coercion.' The proviso to 8 (b) (1) (A) then removes from
0 / 446 F.2d at 608-10, 77 L.R.R.M. at 3118-20.
62 404 U.S. 157 (1971). See pp. 1405-08 supra.
63 444 F.2d 783, 77 L.R.R.M. 2561 (4th Cir. 1971). The Eighth Circuit relied on
this decision in North Arkansas Electric. 446 F.2d at 606, 77 L.R.R.M. at 3118.
64 See, e.g., NLRB v. Better Monkey Grip Co., 243 F.2d 836, 40 L.R.R.M. 2027 (5th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 864 (1957).
1 29 U.S.C.	 158(b) (1970) provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or •
 its agents—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
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the sweep of the provision "the right of a labor organization to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein."8
 The problem inherent in 8(b) (1) (A), then, is that implicit
in the potential discrepancy or even conflict between the main clause,
which offers to the employee protection of his section 7 rights, and the
proviso, which protects from Board sanctions certain union disciplinary
rules that may abridge those rights. 8 Union discipline will necessarily
affect to some extent employees' freedom to participate or engage in
concerted activities. The problem is to determine how far 8 (b) (1)(A)
will be extended to prohibit what kinds of discipline, or, conversely,
when such discipline will be removed from the sweep of the main
provision, either on the grounds that the proviso protects it or because
it is found to be excluded from the range of activity Congress intended
to prohibit.
The 8(b) (1) (A) problem is of course a reflection of a dilemma
at the heart of the national labor policy. Underlying the proviso is the
principle that statutory protection of collective bargaining must include
protection of collective action necessary to enforce the union's status
as bargaining. agent. Yet the raison d'être of labor law is protection
not of the union but of the individual employee's rights. Although
LI. Case Co. v. NLRB' established the doctrine that the employee's
bargaining rights .must be subsumed by the bargaining rights of the
collective representative, the employee's other rights are carefully de-
lineated and protected by the labor laws. Section 7 above all establishes
his right to participate in and to refrain from concerted activities; and
section 8(b) (1) (A) and other NLRA provisions restrict the broad
I.I. Case principle that, if logically extended, would allow unions to
limit unduly, by the collective bargaining contract, section 7 rights.°
teed in section 157 of this title: Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein; or (B) an employer in the selec-
tion of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjust-
ment of grievances; . .
Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. * 157 (1970).
2 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A) (1970). See note 1 supra.
8 In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), the Supreme Court included
within the scope of the proviso disciplinary rules other than expulsion and admission rules.
4 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
6 Cf. Magnavox Co., discussed at 1424-25 supra, wherein the Board held invalid
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Such restrictions on union power must necessarily exist in tension with
the protection given to union rules by the 8(b) (1) (A) proviso and
court decisions.
Three Supreme Court cases, NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,"
NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers,' and Scofield v. NLRB,' at-
tempted to resolve or at least reduce that tension. Allis-Chalmers held
that a union could lawfully fine a member employee who crossed a
picket line to return to work during a lawful strike. Although the
holding rested on a broad ruling that Congress did not intend
8(b) (1) (A) to prohibit a fine that enforced a legitimate union rule,
the key reasoning was that the proviso's protection of union expulsion
power must necessarily protect the less coercive power to impose
reasonable fines in order to maintain the strike weapon .° Scofield then
developed Allis-Chalmers by ruling that union fines imposed on mem-
bers who exceeded a union piecework rule were lawful, primarily on
the grounds that the kind of piecework rule involved was traditionally
necessary to the union's collective bargaining strength and that en-
forcing such a rule by a reasonable fine was lawful under Allis-
Chalmers.'" In contrast, the Court in Marine & Shipbuilding Workers
found an 8(b) (1)(A) violation in a union's enforcement of a rule
requiring members to exhaust internal union remedies before filing an
unfair labor practice charge with the Board.li Such a rule, the Court
held, would frustrate the overriding statutory policy of allowing un-
impeded access to the Board.
It appeared that these three decisions delineated questions rather
than finally resolving them. Allis-Chalmers and Scofield protected
certain rules from the reach of 8(b) (1) (A), but they also required that
those rules meet certain standards in order to qualify for such
protection. Scofield dicta summarized those standards: "§ 8(b) (1)
leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a
legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in
the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who
are free to leave the union and escape the rule."'°
The two latter standards posed major questions. The last one
apparently requires voluntary union membership, a requirement under-
a union's contractual waiver of employees' rights to solicit and distribute literature on
behalf of the union.
0 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
7 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
8 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
0 This was the reasoning relied on by Justice White, who cast the swing vote in
the 5-4 decision. 388 U.S. at 198 (concurring opinion).
10 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
11 391 U.S. at 422 (1968).
12 394 U.S. at 430.
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lined by the statement in Allis-Chalmers that that decision implied no
view on the lawfulness of union discipline of "members" whose mem-
bership was limited to paying monthly dues." One fundamental ques-
tion, then—the membership question—was whether union disciplinary
rules could be lawfully imposed on employees for activities engaged
in after they had resigned from the union.
The second standard, which summarizes the Marine & Ship-
building doctrine, goes to the heart of the conflict within 8 (b) (1) (A).
It poses the question whether a union's enforcement of a rule that
infringed section 7 rights would be held violative of 8(b) (1) (A),
despite the proviso and the Allis-Chalmers test, on the ground that such
restraint would frustrate a policy imbedded in the labor laws. The
question may be put thus: will the proviso protect a rule that meets
the first and third Sco field tests and frustrates no policy aside from that
established in 8 (b) (1) (A); that is, assuming that the proviso and
8 (b) (1) (A) meet head on, should the proviso yield? Or, if the ques-
tion is framed in terms of congressional purpose, will legislative intent
to remove wholly internal union matters from Board jurisdiction be
found to override the legislative intent, expressed in 8(b) (1) (A), to
preserve section 7 rights from union restraint or coercion?
The Board made innovative decisions involving both questions
during the 1970-71 Survey year. In Textile Workers, Local 1029
(Granite State)," and Booster Lodge 405, Machinists (Boeing)," it
developed to a logical conclusion the Sco field dictum on the contractual
nature of union membership, ruling that even legitimate union discipline
could not be imposed on an employee who had resigned his union
membership before undertaking the activities for which the discipline
was imposed. In both cases the Board held that a union violated
8 (b) (1) (A) by fining individuals who had resigned from the union
before crossing a picket line and returning to work during a lawful
strike, and by instituting a court action to collect the fines." In a third
case, Machinists Local 504 (Arrow Development), the Board found
similar fines lawful where the employees involved had crossed the
picket lines without resigning."
In Arrow Development, and then in Boeing, the Board also at-
tacked the second, more fundamental problem when it dealt with the
13 388 U.S. at 197. Such membership is required by a union security clause in the
collective bargaining contract. The Court stressed that the employees in Allis-Chalmers
were presumably "full" union members. Id. at 196.
14 187 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 76 L.R.R.M. 1246 (1970).
13 185 N.L.R.B. No 23, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1970).
10 Consistently with Allis-Chalmers, the Board also held in Boeing that the union
could lawfully fine other employees, who had crossed the picket lines before resigning, for
activity engaged in up to the time of their resignations.
17 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1970).
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question of unreasonable fines. It was argued that the fines, though
found to be lawfully imposed on members as sanctions for violations
of a legitimate union rule," were violative of 8 (b) (1) (A) because they
were so unreasonably large as to be coercive." Since the only ground
on which the fines could be found unlawful was their restraint on
exercise of section 7 rights, this argument forced a confrontation be-
tween the policy of protecting those rights and the policy of im-
munizing from Board sanctions purely internal union matters. The
Board gave priority to the latter, holding in Arrow Development that
once the purpose of a union rule was found lawful under Scofield, the
severity of otherwise lawful discipline was not a question that Congress
intended the Board to consider." Member McCullock, dissenting,
argued that unreasonably large fines do frustrate legislative policy in
that their unreasonable size indicates that the union's purpose is not
legitimate and their impact on employees is necessarily coercive?'
During the current Survey year, the appellate decisions on Boeing's
and Granite State" and a new Board case, Machinists, District Lodge
99 (General Electric Co.)," further clarified both the membership and
the reasonable fine issues. The First Circuit reversed the Board in
Granite State, relying on a novel interpretation of the union-employee
contract. The court ruled that the NLRA permits employees to waive
their section 7 rights: that is, employees who agree to undertake specific
union activities should be held to have waived their right to refrain from
those activities." Such an interpretation, the court argued, would
reconcile the policy of allowing unions to maintain strike discipline with
that of allowing employees to refrain from concerted activities. How-
ever, the court explicitly restricted its holding to cases where employees
have voluntarily undertaken specific actions, as they had in Granite
State.'
18 In Boeing, the fines involved were those imposed on employees for activity en-
gaged in prior to resignation. See note 16 supra.
19 The $500 fine in Arrow Development was approximately equal to the net amount
earned by the strikebreakers after crossing the picket lines, 185 N.L.R.B. at —, 75
L.R.R.M. at 1008.
20 Id. at —, 75 L,R.R.M. at 1010.
21 Id. at
	 75 L.R.R.M. at 1011-14.
22 Booster Lodge 405, Machinists v. NLRB (Boeing), 459 F.2d 1143, 79 L.R.R.M.
2443 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
28 NLRB v. Textile Workers, Local 1029, 446 F.2d 369, 77 L.R.R.M. 2711 (1st Cir.
1971).
24 194 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 79 L.R.R.M. 1208 (1972).
28 The court quoted the Trial Examiner's finding that "practically all the members"
had attended the meeting at which the union took the strike vote and that only one mem-
ber dissented. After the strike began, the members voted unanimously to impose heavy
fines on strikebreakers. 446 F.2d at 370, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2712.
20 The court reached its conclusion "Mil light of our analysis of the specific obligation
to strike undertaken in this case. . ." Id. at 374, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2715.
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In Boeing,.the District of Columbia Circuit not only supported
the Board's decision on the membership issue. but went beyond . it by
insisting that the Board had a duty to consider the reasonableness of
union fines. 27• The court held, first, that although fines for pre-resigna-
tion conduct are lawful under Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, resignation
terminates the employees' obligations to observe union rules. The
court also rejected the union's argument that an obligation to support
a strike, once undertaken, should be held by implication to continue
until the end of the strike, resignation notwithstanding; the court re-
fused to imply offenses not specified in the union's constitution or by-
laws. The court also pointed out that nothing in Allis-Chalmers or
Scofield implied any restrictions on an employee's right to refrain from
concerted activities after resigning from the union.
The court then held that the Board had an obligation to examine
the reasonableness of the fines imposed on those employees who en-
gaged in strikebreaking prior to resignation. The court reasoned that
Allis-Chalmers did not protect an unreasonably large fine, since such a
fine could place a greater burden on the disciplined employee than
would mere expulsion from the union. Moreover, Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield expressly refer to "reasonable" fines as those which are
protected." In another argument, reminiscent of Member McCullock's
dissent in Arrow Development, the court pointed out that when the
amount of the fine is "inordinately disproportionate to the needed
protection," an inference is warranted that it is motivated not by a
legitimate intent but rather in reprisal for a member's exercise of
section 7 rights." Neither the possibility of conflicts between the Board
and the state courts—which would have to examine the reasonableness
of fines in actions brought by the union to collect them—nor questions
of preemption sufficed to negate the Board's duty to determine whether
the fines were reasonable. Finally, the court suggested standards that
the Board might consider in determining reasonableness on a case-by-
case basis. It also suggested that the Board consider whether a fine
might be so large as to frustrate the congressional policy protecting an
employee's employment status from union restraint under section
8(b)(2)."
Less than a month before the District of Columbia Circuit handed
down its decision in Boeing, the Board had independently affirmed its
commitment to the doctrine that union fines could not lawfully be
imposed for post-resignation activities. The case, Machinists, District
27 459 F.2d at 1155, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2452.
28 Id. at 1156, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2451.
29 Id. at 1159, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2453.
20 Id.
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Lodge 99 (General Electric Co.)," arose in the First Circuit after that
circuit had reversed the Board in Granite State. The union had fined
employees who crossed picket lines after resigning from the union and
in addition had barred them from union activity for five years. Mem-
bers Fanning and Jenkins foUnd, despite the Granite State reversal,
that both the fines for post-resignation conduct and the five-year bar
from membership were violations of section 8(b) (1) (A). They adopted
the Trial Examiner's proposed order, which required rescission not only
of the fines but also of the five-year suspensions insofar as they applied
to employees who had resigned before engaging in any strikebreaking
activity." Chairman Miller dissented from the holding and the remedial
order insofar as they pertained to the five-year suspension, arguing
that a literal reading of the 8(b) (1) (A) proviso precluded Board
interference with union rules regarding admission or suspension of
employees, so long as the employee's employment relationship was not
involved."
By ordering rescission of the suspensions, the majority is holding
only that the union may not discipline employees for post-resignation
activity; However, the practical result of the decision is that a disci-
plinary rule protected by the letter of the proviso is being subordinated
to the guarantee of employee rights given in the main provision of sec-
tion 8 (b) (1) (A). Thus the majority's rejection of the suspension
sanction suggests further development of the theory, evident in Boeing,
that protection of section 7 rights prevails over immunity of internal
union discipline when the two policies cannot be accommodated. It
should be noted, however, that the decision rests on two members:
should another two Board members agree with Chairman Miller in a
future decision, unions could discipline resigned members, who will
be immune to fining discipline if Boeing is sustained, by refusing to
readmit them to membership for a long time subsequent to resigna-
tion!'
The coming Survey year should bring a final resolution of the
membership and reasonable fine issues. Certiorari has been granted in
Granite State" and will probably be sought on the reasonable fines issue
in Boeing. It is submitted that the Board's membership doctrine will be
upheld as a logical derivative of Scofield and a necessary corollary to
section 7. The right to refrain must include the right to resign, and,
81 194 N.L.R.B. No, 163, 79 L.R.R.M. 1208 (1972).
82 The
 requirement that the five-year suspensions be rescinded was expressed in the
general command that the union "rr]escind fines and other sanctions imposed on former
members ... and amend records to reflect such rescission." Id. 79 L.R.R.M. at 1211.
33 Id. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1211-12 (dissenting opinion).
84 See discussion of Silas Mason at 1440-41 infra.
^. U.S. --, 92 S. Ct. 1247 (1972).
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unless such resignation ends an employee's duty to the union and the
union's corresponding right to discipline him, the section 7 guarantee
would be nugatory. If the First Circuit's ruling in Granite State is
upheld it will presumably be limited to those situations where employees
had expressly undertaken specific concerted activities.
However, affirmation of the membership doctrine will leave
derivative problems unanswered. Should Boeing be applied where union
constitutions prohibit or severely limit opportunities for resignation?
The Scofield standard suggests that fines might not be lawful if they
are imposed on members not free to leave the union." The District of
Columbia Circuit Court asserted in Boeing that it intimated no view
regarding the appropriate treatment of fines imposed on members where
the union constitution limited their right to resign during an ongoing
strike or required even resigned members to refrain from strikebreaking
if the strike commenced prior to resignation."
A Supreme Court decision on the reasonable fines issue will entail
either permanently immunizing from the 8(b) (1) (A) prohibition all
union discipline that remains "internal" or, conversely, recognizing that
protection of section 7 rights requires subjecting such discipline to
Board scrutiny, the proviso notwithstanding. The broad theory of
Marine & Shipbuilding, that no lawful discipline may frustrate a policy
embedded in the labor laws, supports the latter alternative. In Boeing
the District of Columbia Circuit outlined several specific ways in which
unreasonable fines could be found to frustrate the NLRA policy of
protecting an employee's section 7 rights. 88 It seems probable, then,
that the circuit court's doctrine will be upheld and the Board required
to inquire whether union disciplinary fines are reasonable.
Such a ruling would permit a practical case-by-case resolution of
the conflict in section 8 (b) (1) (A). It would not provide a final reso-
lution of the tension between 8(b) (1) (A) and the protection of union
discipline—that is, between the main provision and the proviso—since
that tension is inherent in the NLRA. It would, however, permit the
Board to apply to the inevitable conflicts between union discipline and
employee rights the same balancing tests by which it decides, in a case-
by-case fashion, other unfair labor practice issues that reflect the
tension between employer and union rights." In sum, the Board would
have the power to find violations of section 8(b) (1) (A) wherever
particular discipline in particular circumstances showed a purpose or
effect that restrained or coerced section 7 rights.
an See text at note 12 supra.
87 459 F.2d at 1154 n.20, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2449 n.20.
88 See text at notes 29 and 30 supra.
89 For example, the Board uses a balancing test with regard to the rights of the
employer during an economic strike; cf. discussion of economic strikers at 1441-48 infra.
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2. Unlawful Motivation of Union Discipline: Graziano
In Carpenters Local 22 (Graziano Construction Co.),4° a case de-
cided shortly after General Electric,4 ' the Board applied the Marine &
Shipbuilding principle" to a fine whose apparent purpose was lawful
but whose real motive frustrated national labor policy. The Board
found that a union fine had been imposed on a member who had in fact
violated legitimate union rules, but that notwithstanding its technical
propriety the fine violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) because the actual
motivation behind it was unlawful. The union's true motive was not to
discipline the member for breaking the rules but to retaliate for his
opposition to incumbent union officials. Hence, the Board held, the fine
sought to frustrate a policy embedded in the labor laws—the Landrum-
Griffin Act's guarantee of a union member's right to participate fully
and freely in intra-union activities," Accordingly the discipline was
unlawful under Marine & Shipbuilding.
By applying the Marine & Shipbuilding doctrine to find unlawful
a method of discipline that on its face satisfies the Sco field and Allis-
Chalmers tests," the Board appears to have moved appreciably nearer
the District of Columbia Circuit's position in Boeing." That court's
holding that unreasonably large fines raise the inference of an unlawful
purpose and must not escape Board scrutiny correlates with the Board's
insistence in Graziano that an unlawfully motivated disciplinary action
will not be held immune from Board review, even though technically
it deals with internal union matters lawful under Scofield.
The decision is also significant in that the policy that the Board
seeks to protect pertains to the Landrum-Griffin Act rather than the
NLRA. Thus Graziano marks continued development of a trend toward
Board reliance, in unfair labor practice decisions, on the "full panoply
of labor law"" rather than on the NLRA alone. One of the first full
statements encouraging such reliance was Justice Goldberg's concur-
ring opinion in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co.,47 in which he insisted that the Supreme Court look to the labor
statutes as a whole rather than rely only on the statute immediately
pertinent to the action. Justice White, dissenting in the Survey year
Lockridge decision, urged the Court to consider the Landrum-Griffin
4° 195 N.L.R.B. No. 5, 79 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1972).
41 See text at notes 31-34 supra.
42 See text at note 11 supra.
43 195 N.L.R.B. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1195.
" See text at note 12 supra.
4° See text at notes 27-30 supra.
42 Tillie Board is charged with considering the full panoply of congressional labor
policies in determining the legality of a union fine." 195 N.L.R.B. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at
1196.
41 381 U.S. 676, 709 (1965) (concurring opinion).
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"bill of rights" in ruling on an issue involving the Board's preemptive
reach under the NLRA. 45 Now Graziano's application of the Marine &
Shipbuilding doctrine to protect a Landrum-Griffin policy, an applica-
tion that will result in a significant expansion of the sweep of Marine
& Shipbuilding, illustrates the practical impact of .the "full panoply of
labor law" theory.
3. Enforcement of Union Fines by Expulsion: Silas Mason
The issue implicit in the Board majority's suspension of the union
membership bar in General Electric" was thrust into prominence by a
case handed down as the Survey year closed, Local 1255, Machinists v.
NLRB (Silas Mason Co.),5° where the Fifth Circuit found lawful a
union fine, imposed for post-resignation activity, enforceable by expul-
sion from the union.
The employee had resigned from the union after crossing a picket
line, and the union fined him and gave him the choice of paying the
fine or of being "expelled" or denied readmission to membership in any
local of the union. 5' The fine was levied on the strikebreaking activity
engaged in after resignation as well as before. The Board, relying on
Boeing, found the fine violative of section 8(b) (1) (A) insofar as it
sought to punish the employee for post-resignation activity, and ordered
the union to rescind that portion of the fine attributable to such activ-
ity.62 The Board's opinion reveals no explicit argument on the legality
of the expulsion enforcement method; indeed, the union rested its whole
case on the theory that a union member cannot relieve himself of his
obligations in a strike situation by resigning, a position that the Board
struck clown as directly in conflict with its Boeing doctrine.
When the case came before the Fifth Circuit, the union relied on
both its original theory and, alternatively, on the argument that the
proviso to 8(b) (1) (A), by extending protection to a union's expulsion
power, permitted it to punish even post-resignation strikebreaking ac-
tivity by giving an employee a choice between resignation and expul-
sion. The Board reiterated its Boeing doctrine, that "post resignation
acts are wholly beyond the pale of union discipline." 55
 The court ac-
cepted the union's second contention and denied enforcement of the
Board's order, holding that the union had an absolute right under the
98 Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 321 (1971) (dissenting opin-
ion).
40 See p. 1437 supra.
00 456 F.2d 1214, 79 L.R.R.M. 2787 (5th Cir. 1972).
51 The union used the term "expelled," which the court interpreted as equivalent to
"deided readmission." Id. at 1217, 79 L.R.R.M, at 2787-88.
62 Machinists, Local '1255 (Silas Mason Co.),-188 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 76 L.R.R.M.
1456 (1971).
00 456 F.2d at 1217, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2788.
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proviso to bar an employee from membership, whether for acts done
as a member or for those done while not a member:
Either [category of act] may be taken into consideration in
determining, who, is to be admitted to membership or retained
as a member. There is no doubt that the Union could have ex-
pelled . . . [the employee] unconditionally for strikebreaking.
It seems that if the Union may absolutely bar him from mem-
, bership it may conditionally bar him subject to the payment
of a fine.54
Thus the court held squarely that as long as the discipline im-
posed is protected by the proviso, the proviso prevails over the
guarantee of section 7 rights as interpreted in Boeing. Should that
holding stand, the power to admit and expel may be used to impose a
fine that otherwise would fall under Boeing; accordingly, Silas Mason
offers a strategy by which unions can circumvent the thrust of Boeing
in all situations where Membership in the union is desirable or neces-
sary to the employee. Silas Mason would appear to mean that in such
situations the proviso wins outright over the guarantee of rights in
section 8(b) (1) (A).
Apparently the Board flatly opposes that doctrine. In its argu-
ment before the appellate court, it lay down the doctrine foreshadowed
in the majority holding in General Electric: 55 that even discipline by
expulsion—i.e., discipline explicitly protected by the proviso—is
illegal if imposed for post-resignation activities. In other words, the
right of the member to resign, not the right of the union to expel, is
the absolute: the proviso does not even begin to operate whenever the
discipline is imposed for post-resignation conduct.
The conflict between the Board 'and the Fifth Circuit presumably
will provoke, in the future, a fuller explication of the Board's position;
in the instant case, the Board simply reiterated its Boeing doctrine
without explicating it vis a vis discipline by expulsion. It is possible, of
course, that fuller explanation will be obviated if the forthcoming Su-
preme Court decision in Granite State lays down principles sufficiently
broad .to resolve this and other subordinate issues arising from the
conflict inherent in section 8(b) (1).(A).
D. Economic Strikers
In two Survey year decisions, the Board and the First Circuit
clarified the rights of sympathetic strikers in an economic strike, and
in a third the Board broke new ground by ruling that an employer
84 Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 2789.
55 See p. 1437 supra.
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and a union could limit the duration of the reinstatement rights of
strikers if their agreement met certain standards.
The decisions further develop doctrines enunciated in two seminal
cases, NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co. 1 and NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc.2 In MacKay, the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployer struck for economic reasons may protect his business by hiring
replacements or discontinuing jobs for business reasons. In Great Dane
Trailers, the Court held that economic strikers retain their status as
"employees" until they find substantially equivalent positions else-
where, and that failure to reinstate economic strikers upon termination
of the strike will be construed presumptively as an unfair labor practice
because such failure tends to discourage employees from engaging in
protected concerted activity. However, the employer may rebut the pre-
sumption by showing that his failure to reinstate strikers was motivated
by "legitimate and substantial business justifications."'
1. Sympathetic Strikers: General Electric and General Tire and
Rubber
One of the questions deriving from the MacKay and Great Dane
doctrines involves the right of an employer to require nonstriking em-
ployees to do the work of the strikers and the degree of protection
afforded the employees who refuse to perform the struck work and
thereby become sympathetic strikers. Two Survey year cases distin-
guish earlier cases dealing with this question and, in conjunction with
the older cases, appear .to compose a fairly rounded answer as to the
rights of both the employer and the sympathetic striker.
In General Electric Co.,' a three-man panel of the Board held that
the company did not violate section 8(a) ( I) by laying off, for the
duration of the strike, seven clerical employees who were not members
of the striking unit and who refused to perform production work nor-
mally done by the strikers. The employer bad told the clerical workers
that it intended to continue operations during the strike and that super-
visory, management, and clerical employees would each have to take
a turn doing production work. When the seven affected employees were
given their production assignments and refused them, they were laid off.
Adopting the Trial Examiner's decision, the Board found that the
company had " 'legitimate and substantial business justifications' for
its action, which were paraMount in importance to any possible re-
1 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
2 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
Id. at 34.
4 193 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 78 L.R.R.M. 1241 (1971).
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straining effect such action may have had on the exercise of office
clerical employees of their Section 7 rights."'
The fact that the employees' refusal was protected concerted ac-
tivity did not protect them from layoff for the duration of the strike.
The Board emphasized the specific business reasons that the employer
had advanced for requiring all nonstriking employees to take turns
doing production work, the absence in the record of "any basis for
inferring [a discriminatory motive] ,"a and the nature of the employer's
action. The employer neither discharged the employees, an action un-
lawful under Cooper Thermometer Co.,' nor laid them off for a period
beyond the duration of the strike.' Rather it "merely treated them as
sympathy strikers who by their own choice elected to stay away from
work for the duration of the strike rather than assist [the company]
. . . in performing whatever duties might be assigned to them in order
to minimize the effect of the strike on [the company's] . • . business."°
Finally, although the General Counsel argued that the company bad
sufficient clerical work available to permit the seven to do that work
instead of production tasks, the company was found to have divided
production work among all nonstriking employees in the interest of
preserving the efficient operation of its business.
In sum, the Board's holding indicates that it will apply the Great
Dane balancing test to the employer's actions vis a vis employees who
refuse to perform strike work. Here the employer advanced substantial
business reasons for utilizing clerical employes as replacements; when
the employees refused, he treated that refusal as an election to join the
strike, and the subsequent layoff merely reflected that election. By
dealing with the employees as sympathy strikers, who by traditional
Board rule are entitled to neither more nor less protection than are
the strikers themselves, he passed the Board's test. Had the employer's
action taken another, more severe form, such as a discharge, the Board
would presumably have found the effect on section 7 rights to have out-
weighed the business justifications; or, conversely, had the business
justifications for utilizing the nonstrikers as replacements been weaker,
the Board might not have accepted them as sufficient reasons for re-
quiring the employees to do struck work in the first place.
5 Id. at —, 78 L,R.R.M. at 1242. The Board is quoting Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S.
at 34.
Id.
7 154 N.L.R.B. 502, 59 L.R.R.M. 1767 (1965).
8 This practice was ruled unlawful in Montana-Dakota Utilites Co., 189 N.L.R.B.
No. 111, 77 L.R.RM. 1029 (1971).
192 N.L.R.B. at —, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1242.
10 See, e.g., NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 74 L.R.R.M. 2080
(5th Cir. 1970).
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In the second case, General Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB," the
First Circuit upheld a Board finding that a company violated section
8(a) (1) by discharging a clerical employee who, after crossing a picket
line of striking production employees, refused to do struck production
work. The company admitted that, had the employee refused to cross
the picket line, she would not have been subject to discharge
under NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp.,12
 but it argued that once she had
crossed the line she was subject to penalties for insubordination and
could not enjoy the status of sympathetic striker. The court rejected
this argument, pointing out that the picket line was no Rubicon beyond
which alteration of commitment wasimpossible. The court also insisted
that the employee did not become a "partial striker," and so lose her
position as a sympathy striker, because she was willing to do her regular
work while rejecting struck work. Finally, the court rejected flatly the
company's attempt to justify the discharge by compelling business rea-
sons, finding that the company had shown no such exceptional circum-
stances as would "justify removing an employee from the protection
against discharge which the Act affords employees exercising their
section 7 rights.""
The rationale and the remedial policy of the First Circuit in
General Tire and Rubber are correlative with, or indeed subsumed by,
the Board's doctrine in General Electric. The court's central point,
recognizing an employee's sympathetic striker status although the
employee refused to work after crossing the picket line, duplicates the
Board's position in General Electric." The court's second argument,
that a sympathetic striker retains his protected status even though he
is willing to do his own—as contrasted with replacement—work,
mirrors the Board's finding of sympathetic striker status among the
General Electric clerical workers who were willing to do their cus-
tomary tasks but refused production work. Finally, the First Circuit
imposed a remedy that could provide a useful reinforcement to the
balancing doctrine used by the Board in General Electric. The court
not only enforced the Board's order" that the employer reinstate the
11 451 F.2d 257, 78 L.R.R.M. 2836 (1st Cir. 1971)'.
12 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971). Union Carbide held that
a worker who refuses to cross a picket line is not subject to discharge.
13 451 F.2d at 259, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2837.
14
 The court qualified its position on this point by stating that it did not determine
whether the company's Rubicon position would have validity had the company proved
that the employee knew before crossing that she would be obliged to do struck work.
General Electric appears to have given the Board's answer to this potential issue by recog-
nizing the employees in that case as sympathetic strikers even though they apparently knew
in advance—that is, before the day when they crossed the picket line and refused to do
struck work—that they were going to be asked to do struck work. 192 N.L.R.B. at'—, 78
L.R.R.M. at 1241.
15 General Ttre & Rubber Co., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 77 L.R.R.M. 1215 (1971).
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employee with back pay, but it awarded costs, including counsel fees,
against the employer, because the court found his position "friv-
olous."16
 Such a remedial policy could discourage smaller employers,
at least, from bringing before the Board "business justifications" that
are essentially "frivolous.""
2. Limitation of Reinstatement Rights by Agreement: United Aircraft
In its 1968 decision, Laidlaw Corp.," the Board held that economic
strikers remain employees, under the protection of the NLRA, even
after they have been replaced during the strike. Accordingly they must
be reinstated as vacancies occur unless they have obtained regular and
substantially equivalent employment elsewhere or unless the employer
can establish substantial business reasons to justify a failure to offer
reinstatement. Laidlaw is derived from a correlative of Great Dane
Trailers," NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.,2° where the Supreme Court
held that an employer's refusal to reinstate economic strikers whenever
jobs become available constitutes an, unfair labor practice unless the
employer can show that his action was based on legitimate and sub-
stantial business justifications. Now, in a Survey year decision, United
Aircraft Corp.," the Board has recognized a method of limiting the
protection afforded economic strikers under the Laidlaw doctrine.
The case arose from an economic strike by several unions against
an aircraft manufacturer, which ended when the unions and the em-
ployer entered into a settlement agreement that included a formula for
the recall of strikers. The formula provided that if neither of two al-
ternative routes to recall produced a job for a striker who wished to
return to work, he would be placed on a preferred hiring list and would
be recalled to any job openings in his occupational group and seniority
area which developed prior to January 1, 1961. 22
 Pursuant to the agree-
ment, the employer treated strikers who were put back to work on
January 1, 1961, or later, as new employees without seniority. In a
decision issued in 1969, the Trial Examiner found that by following
such a policy the employer had run afoul of Laidlaw; that is, he had'
10 451 F.2d at 259, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2837. Compare the Board's remedial policy in
Tiidee Products Inc., discussed at 1452-55 infra.
17
 The court found that General Tire's invocation of business reasons meant only
that "it does not like strikes." 451 F.2d at 259, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2837.
18 Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d
99, 71 L.R.R.M. 3054 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1971).
19 See text at note 2 supra.
20 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
21 192 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 77 L.R.R.M. 1785 (1971). The case involves several discrete
issues and holdings. This discussion is limited to the ruling on the strike settlement agree-
ment.
22 The agreement was made in August, 1970. Id. at —, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1785.
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discriminated against the strikers by terminating their employment
preference rights as of December 31, 1960, and so had violated Sections
8(a)(1) 23
 and 8(a) (3) 24
 of the NLRA.
A three-man majority" of the Board rejected that finding, but it
did not do so on the ground that Laidlaw, a 1968 decision, should not
be applied retroactively 2 6 Rather, it enunciated a broad doctrine that
an employer and a union could agree, in a strike settlement, to limit
the reinstatement rights of economic strikers, so long as that agreement
met certain standards. Specifically, they may agree that reinstatement
rights will terminate after a specified period if that period (1) is not
unreasonably short, (2) is not intended to be discrithinatory or mis-
used by either party with the intent of accomplishing a discriminatory
objective, (3) was not insisted upon by the employer to undermine the
union's status, and (4) was the result of good-faith bargaining. 27
The Board ruled that the instant agreement met all of these stan-
dards. Moreover, the employer, in settling the strike issues, had made
concessions to the unions which it might not have been willing to make
had it known that the unions would repudiate part of the recall agree-
ment. The Board also emphasized that the unions had accepted the
benefits of the agreement, and that the recall provision had been en-
tered into in good faith by both parties and performed in good faith by
the employer. In short, the Board found that both parties had intended
that the employer could terminate reinstatement rights as of December
31, 1960," that the agreement met the Board's standards, and that
accordingly the employer's termination actions taken pursuant to the
agreement did not violate the Act.
The majority's rationale underlines an issue inherent in one of the
major developments in labor law today: the limitation of employees'
statutory rights by contractual agreement. This development is, of
23
 29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(1) (1970).
24 29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(3) (1970).
28 The majority consisted of Chairman Miller and Members Jenkins and Kennedy,
the minority of Members Brown and Fanning.
20 This factor was explicitly mentioned by the Board although it was not used as a
ground of decision. 192 N.L.R.B. at	 77 L.R.R.M. at 1792.
27 Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1793. The dissent apparently accepted the broad principles
underlying the four standards but argued that the recall period in the instant agreement
was unreasonably short: that any settlement that purported to terminate reinstatement
rights in less than one year from agreement "would create a serious conflict with Section
9(c) (3) of the NLRA, which provides for the eligibility of economic strikers to vote in a
representation election for a period of twelve months after the commencement of a strike."
Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1799. The dissent also found the majority decision in conflict with the
principles of Fleetwood. Id.
28 One of the two major grounds of dissent (cf. note 27 supra) was the minority's
rejection of this finding. The dissent's view of the agreement was "that all strikers would
be recalled until the ... [employer] reached its prestrike complement, which occurred on
April 30, 1961." Id. at —, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1798.
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course, most evident in the Board's arbitration policy as set forth in
Collyer Insulated Wire," discussed elsewhere in this Survey." In the
instant case, as in Collyer, the Board has apparently taken the position
that the unions are responsible parties; if they enter into fair agree-
ment on certain issues, and the agreement meets Board standards, they
should be bound by it. Hence, the United Aircraft decision reflects a
firm Board position on the binding effect of a union's contractual agree-
ment.
Underlying such a policy, however, is a major question: to what
extent may a union contract away employees' statutory rights? Does
United Aircraft illustrate a broad policy stand, whereby the Board
gives priority to its policy favoring resolution of labor disputes through
settlements reached by collective bargaining, and subordinates thereto
its policy of protecting the rights of employees guaranteed by Section 7
of the Act? Discrete statements in the majority rationale in United
Aircraft appear to give encouragement of the bargaining process a very
broad priority over protection of statutory rights. Citing the Board's
past recognition of union waivers of the right to strike and its deferral
to arbitration,81 the majority stressed the Board's duty to pursue the
public policy embodied in the Act which favors collective bargaining,
and went on to emphasize that one particular manifestation of such
collective bargaining was the voluntary strike settlement." The Board
ought to accept the instant agreement "as effectuating the policies of
the Act which . . . includes as a principal objective encouragement of
. . . collective bargaining as a means .of settling labor disputes.""
On the other hand, this broad hospitality to settlement agreements
appears tempered by a conception of the Board as watchdog over such
agreements. At the outset of the policy argument, the opinion points
out that the Board is bound by no private adjustment of rights guar-
anteed by the Act and that it accepts such particular adjustments at its
discretion." The same theme is again emphasized at the end of the
opinion where, in accepting the instant agreement "as effectuating the
policies of the Act," the Boird grounds that acceptance on the fact
that the particular agreement met the four standards that the Board
set up as prerequisites for its approval." That the agreement resolved
a dispute by peaceful bargaining was insufficient qualification. Rather,
29 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
80 See pp. 1376-81 supra. See also Magnavox Co., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 79 L.R.R.M.
1283 (1971).
81 192 N.L.R.B, at —, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1791.
82 Id. The Board cited Retail Clerks Locals 128 and 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc.,
369 U.S. 17, 27 (1962).
88 192 N.L.R.B. at —, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1793.
84 Id. at —, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1791.
35 Id. at —, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1793.
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the standards show Board deference to statutory rights, and reveal a
policy of scrutinizing every agreenient to see if its general thrust is .
respectful of fundamental statutory rights, even though its details
might waive specific rights in the interest of obtaining a general good.
Finally, the general impact of the Board's holding must be quali-
fied by the nature of the particular right involved in the case. Citing
Fleetwood, the Board pointed out that an economic striker's right to
reinstatement was not absolute, but rather subject to the Board's
balancing test.86
 In contrast, the Board refused in another Survey
year case, Magnavor,87
 to approve a contractual waiver of a right that
it considered central and, by implication, absolute: the employee's
right to distribute literature or to solicit on behalf of a union.
Hence the priority seemingly assigned by United Aircraft to the
bargaining process is, in fact, limited by the Board's insistence on its
discretionary power to approve only those agreements whose impact
on statutory rights is acceptable by Board standards. In a decision
handed clovin on the same day as United Aircraft, the Board refused to
give effect to a settlement agreement whose reinstatement provision it
found wanting."
E. Jurisdictional Disputes: Plasterers' Local	 _
When a charge is filed under Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the NLRA,
the provision banning jurisdictional disputes,' Section 10(k) requires
86 Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1791. The Board noted too that in Fleetwood the Supreme .
Court had "specifically reserved the question of whether a union could waive the right of
strikers to reinstatement ahead of new applicants."'Id.
' 87 See pp. 1424-25 supra.
86 Laher Spring & Electric Car Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 77 L.R.R.M. 1800 (1971).
The Board found that the employer's discriminatory misuse of the agreement placed it
outside of the scope of United Aircraft: "[T]he policies of the Act would hardly be
effectuated by our deferring to an agreement, the terms of which have been utilized . .
to .cloak discrimination against strikers." Id. at —, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1802.
1
 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (D) (1970) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization '
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in,
a• strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles, materials,
or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,
where in either case an object thereof is-
.
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to
employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft,
or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another
trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order
or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for
employees performing such work. . .
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the Board to "hear and determine the dispute out of which [the]
unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless . • . the parties ,to such
dispute" adjust or agree upon a method for the voluntary adjustment
of the dispute.' Ever since 10(k) was enacted, the Board has con-
sistently interpreted the term "parties to such dispute" to include the
employer as well as the disputing unions and has refused to dismiss
the 10(k) proceedings when the unions, but not the employer, have
agreed to settle.' In NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 4
 the Supreme Court
upheld the Board's traditional interpretation and reversed a District
of Columbia Circuit ruling that the employer had no right to insist
upon participation in a 10(k) proceeding.'
The dispute in Plasterers' Local arose when the Plasterers began
picketing the job sites of two employer contractors, claiming for their
union work performed by the Tile Setters under collective bargaining
agreements with the contractors. Before the Plasterers had begun
picketing, however, they had submitted their claim to the National
Joint Board for Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes, a body estab-
lished by the AFL-CIO's Building Trades Department to which both
the Plasterers and the Tile Setters belonged and by whose decision
both unions were accordingly bound. The Joint Board had awarded
the work to the Plasterers, basing its decision upon a 1917 agreement.
When the Tile Setters refused to acquiesce in the Joint Board decision,
the Plasterers began picketing, and one of the contractors filed an
8(b) (4) (D) charge against the latter union. The Board held a 10(k)
proceeding that included both employers as parties, found that the
Joint Board decision lacked controlling weight, and awarded the work
to the Tile Setters. When the Plasterers indicated that they would
refuse to agree to the award, an 8(b) (4) (d) complaint was issued
against them and they were found in violation of that provision.•
In making both the 10(k) 6 , and the 8(b) (4) (D) 7 decisions, the
Board adhered to its traditional definition of "parties to the dispute"
2 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970) provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158(b) of this title, the
Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which
such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice
that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board
satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, agreed upon methods for the
voluntary adjustment of the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the
dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment
of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.
NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 126-27 and n.18 (1971),
4 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
5 Plasterers' Local 79 v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 174, 74 L.R.R.M. 2575 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
0 The 10(k) proceeding is reported at 167 N.L.R.B. 185, 66 L.R.R.M. 1012 (1967).
7 172 N.L.R.B. Nos. 70, 72; 68 L.R.R.M. 1401 (1968).
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and included the employers as parties. The Plasterers, however, con-
tended that since the competing unions had agreed upon a voluntary
method of adjustment—submission of competing claims to the Joint
Board—the provisions of 10(k) precluded a Board proceeding. That
is, the unions should be deemed the only "parties" to the dispute, and
since the Joint Board process was a method of settlement agreed upon
by those parties, the 10(k) proceeding was obviated. The Board re-
jected this contention, but the District of Columbia Circuit accepted it,
holding that "[i]t is not the employer but the rival unions . . . who are
parties to the jurisdictional dispute contesting which employees are
entitled to seek the work in question. 78
In reversing the appellate decision,u the Supreme Court held, first,
that interested employers, non-neutral as well as neutral, are parties
in 10(k) proceedings. This conclusion is dictated both by the em-
ployers' economic stake in the 10(k) decision and by congressional
intent. Evident in the legislative history of both sections 10(k) and
8(b) (4) (D) is that 10(k) should protect the employer as well as the
public from jurisdictional strikes. Moreover, the Court's previous
construals of the term "party" as used in other provisions of the
NLRA," require inclusion of the employer as a 10(k) party.
Accordingly, the Court reasoned, employers must also be deemed
parties to the settlement, or to the agreement to settle, a jurisdictional
dispute." This position is wholly consistent with the established policy
favoring arbitration, since the Court's hospitality to arbitration is
predicated on the view that the parties have voluntarily bound them-
selves at the bargaining table to use the arbitral mechanism." Here the
employers had entered into no such agreement. They did not even have
a collective bargaining contract with the Plasterers. The Court holds
that "we decline to narrow the Board's powers under 10(k) so that
employers are coerced to accept compulsory private arbitration when
Congress has declined to adopt such a policy.'" 8 It follows that any
agreement or settlement made without the employer may not preclude a
10(k) determination.
Finally, the Board's Safeway rule is held to be inapplicable here.
That rule holds that 10(k) proceedings are aborted if one of the
8
 Plasterers' Local 79 v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 174, 180; 74 L.R.R.M. 2575, 2579
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
9 404 U.S. 116 (1971). The Supreme Court remanded the cause to the circuit court,
which subsequently found the Board's 10(k) determination valid and enforced its order
against the Plasterers' picketing. Plasterers' Local 79 v. NLRB, F.2d 79 L.R.R.M.
2768 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
10 404 U.S. at 128-30 and n.24.
11 404 U.S. at 131.
12 Id. at 133.
18 Id, at 133-34.
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competing unions effectively renounces its claim to the work." The
Court of Appeals would extend the Safeway rule to foreclose Board
decision where the two unions have agreed to arbitrate; that is, it
would deem inter-union agreement equivalent to an effective disclaimer
by one of the unions. This view is inconsistent both with the Board's
consistently narrow application of the Safeway rule and with the
rationale of the rule: that when one union disclaims the work the
dispute has actually and effectively ceased to exist. In other words,
the functions of 10(k) and 8 (b) (4) (D) evaporate when the under-
lying dispute disappears."
Assuming that sections 10(k) and 8(b) (4) (D) do give rights to
the employer—an assumption required by the legislative history relied
on by the Court—Plasterers' Local constitutes a refusal to subordinate
statutory rights to voluntary agreements unless the party to whom the
statutory right runs has definitely waived the right. Not even the Court's
favored policy of deferring to arbitration was held sufficient to overcome
the interested employer's right under the statute to participate in 10(k)
proceedings." Hence the decision indicates that such recent decisions
as Magnavox,17 where the Board refused to allow contractual waiver
by a union-employer agreement of the employees' solicitation and
distribution rights, are correct. The ,Court's emphasis on contractual
agreement as a necessary prerequisite for deferral to arbitration also
implies that the Court will not favor any doctrines that involve binding
a non-contracting party by another's agreement, such as the Board's
new rule that would require a successor-employer to honor his pre-
decessor's contract's
Finally, the decision appears not only correct but necessary from
a practical point of view. The Court stresses that the employer's
survival may depend upon the outcome of such disputes and that any
decision made without consideration of his interest could lead to a
marked decline in the amount of work the employer could offer." Al-
though the Circuit Court had argued that its interpretation of section
10(k) would encourage employers to take part in private settlement
mechanisms, the Supreme Court pointed out that, if union agreements
were found sufficient to terminate 10(k) proceedings, there was no way
14 Highway Truckdrivers, Local 107 (Safeway Stores, Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 1320,
49 L.R.R.M. 1343 (1961).
15 404 U.S. at 135.
16 Id. at 136-37.
17 See discussions of Magnavox at 1424-25 supra and United Aircraft at 1445-48 supra.
18 William J. Burns MO Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 74 L.R.R.M.
1098 (1970).
19 404 U.S. at 125. The companies in the instant case claimed that they would lose
30-40% of their work to contractors who had contracts with the plasterers.
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of assuring that such private procedures would be open to employers."
The Court emphasized the Board's practice of considering "all relevant
factors" in making a 10(k) determination, and pointed out that ex-
cluding the employer would hardly ensure that all relevant factors
would indeed be taken into account 2 1 This last point suggests that
in the final analysis Plasterers' Local stands for the Court's firm
adherence to congressional preference for Board expertise in juris-
dictional disputes notwithstanding the current policy of deferring to
arbitration.' Hence the deciSion may come to be regarded as a water-
shed between the long line of cases extending hospitality to arbitration"
and a new line in which the Court is called upon to fix limits to such
hospitality on a case-by-case basis.
F. Remedies
1. Tlidee
The Board's remedial powers are limited to those explicitly set
out in Section 10 of the NLRA. Aside from the right to seek provisional
injunctions,' its power to remedy unfair labor practices is restricted
under section 10(c) to the issuance of cease and desist orders to take
"such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of the Act." 2
Lacking punitive power, the Board has had to exercise considerable
ingenuity in finding ways to discourage the commission of those unfair
labor practices which by their nature may bring to the violator benefits
that the Board's subsequent affirmative orders fail to eliminate.
One such unfair labor practice is an employer's refusal to bargain.
An employer in a strong position can successfully erode a union's ma-
jority position by a sustained refusal to bargain. When the case finally
reaches the Board after the long delay entailed by current 'procedural
requirements,' the traditional affirmative remedies, such as cease and
20 id.,at 132.
21 Id. at 132 and n.26.
22 The Court pointed out the Congress had expressed a clear preference for Board
decision as compared with Board-compelled arbitration at the time when 10(k) was
passed. Id. at 133. .
28
 Among recent landmarks in this line is Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), cited in Plasterers' Local. 404 U.S. at 133. Cf. the
Court's reminder: "Our conclusion . . . is wholly consistent with federal policy with
respect to voluntary arbitration . .. In the case before us, the LMRA requires that
the Board defer (to arbitration] only when all of the parties have agreed on a method
of settlement ...." 404 U.S. at 136-37 (emphasis in the original).
29 U.S.C. 160(j) (1970) gives the Board such authority.
2 29 U.S.C. 160(c) (1970).
8 Statutory measures currently ensuring due process include such proceduial steps
as (1) de novo examination of the Trial Examiner's record by the Board whenever a
party excepts to the Examiner's recommendations, (2) petition by the Board to the
Circuit Court for enforcement of an order that a party chooses not to obey, and (3)
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desist and post-notice orders, fail to repair the results of years of refusal
to bargain. A remedy that would effectively cure the situation, a make-
whole order imposing on the employer the obligation to pay the em-
ployees what he would have paid them absent his refusal to bargain,
has been considered unavailable. Not only does section 10(c) stipulate
that the Board may issue only affirmative, not punitive, orders, but
section 8(d) explicitly states that the duty to bargain does not compel
a bargaining party to make concessions. 4 The latter provision, then,
apparently has prevented the Board from issuing a make-whole order
in a refusal-to-bargain case. Such an order would in effect require the
employer to agree to a substantive contract term—in other words, to
make a concession—and hence would violate section 8(d).
In response to this dilemma, the District of Columbia Circuit at-
tempted to find authority for the Board to issue make-whole orders and
prompted a series of Board, appellate, and Supreme Court decisions
that apparently reached a final conclusion during. the Survey year. In
the seminal case on the issue, H.K. Porter, Inc. v. NLRB,' the Supreme
Court rejected the District of Columbia Circuit's initial position that
section 8(d) defines only the scope of the duty to bargain, not the scope
of possible Board remedies for violation of that duty.° Porter held that
the Board could not order an employer to grant a check-off he had pre-
viously refused to agree to; , the Court ruled that section 8(d) explicitly
denied to the Board power to require agreement on a substantive term
of the contract.
A subsequent case permitted the District of Columbia Circuit
to propose another theory. In Electrical Workers, IUE v. NLRB.
(Tiidee),' the appellate court ruled that although under H.K. Porter
the Board could not determine what the employer and union "should"
have agreed on, it could decide what they "would" have agreed on had
they bargained in good faith. Moreover, the court found justification
for a make-whole order in the motivation underlying the employer's
refusal to bargain. The Board had found that the employer had re-
fused to bargain, not in order to test the Board's certification of the
petition for review by one of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), (e), (f). In his dissent in
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, Justice Douglas gives statistics on the delays
entailed in seeking relief from the Board. 403 U.S. 274, 303-04 and n.1 (1971) (dissenting
opinion).
4 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) provides that "such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession...."
6 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
6 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 295, 302, 66 L.R.R.M. 2761, 2765 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
426 F.2d 1243, 73 L.R.R.M. 2870 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950
(1970).
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union as bargaining representative,8 but simply as a delaying tactic.
The court ruled that a remedy limited to a cease and desist order would
merely reward the employer for his "brazen" refusal. Therefore the
Board should determine on remand what backpay the employees were
entitled to, and issue a make-whole order.
Subsequently, but before the Board had heard the Tiidee remand,
the circuit court refined its theory by distinguishing "patently frivolous"
refusals to bargain from those motivated by fairly debatable objections
to certification; only "frivolous" motivation would justify a make-whole
order.° Meanwhile the Board had held in Ex-Cell-0 Corp." that H.K.
Porter precluded issuance of make-whole orders in refusal-to-bargain
cases. The union then appealed the Ex-Cell-0 decision to the District
of Columbia Circuit, and the court remanded the case to the Board for
a determination of the employer's motivation and a decision not incon-
sistent with the court's holding in Tiidee.11 Ex-Cell-0 was resolved
without open conflict on the grounds that the employer's refusal had
been "debatable" rather than brazen." However, in the Tiidee remand
the court and Board were bound to collide head on.
The Board's decision in remand, made during the Survey year,
appears to have settled once and for all the central issue of the validity
of make-whole orders and the subordinate question of the motive test.
In Tiidee Products, Inc.," the Board held unanimously that it does not
have the authority to issue a make-whole order, even where the em-
ployer's refusal to bargain is "flagrant." The make-whole order, then,
appears to be dead as a remedy in a refusal-to-bargain situation. The
result seems to be practical as well as consistent with both H.K. Porter
and section 8(d). Although the need for a new remedy was clear, a
make-whole order might have provoked as many difficulties as it would
have resolved. Since an employer can challenge a certification only by
refusing to bargain, threatening him with a make-whole order could
be regarded as having an unlawful chilling effect upon his right to chal-
lenge. A series of definitional problems would have arisen when the
Board sought to determine under what narrow and specialized cir-
8 An employer who has a good faith doubt as to the majority status of the union
can obtain review by refusing to bargain.
° Steelworkers v. NLRB (Quality Rubber Mfg. Co.), 430 F.2d 519, 521, 74 L.R.R.M.
2741, 2749 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
io 185 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970).
11 Auto Workers v. NLRB (Ex-CeI1-0), 449 F.2d 1046, 76 L.R.R.M. 2753 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
12 Ex-Cell-0 Corp. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058, 1065, 77 L.R.R.M. 2547, 2552 (D.C. Cir.
1971). The court accepted the Board's refusal to issue a make-whole order on the
grounds that the refusal to bargain was not "frivolous" or in bad faith.
IS 194 N.L.R.B. No. 198, 79 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1972).
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cumstances the remedy could properly be used, a determination that
advocates of the make-whole order admitted would have to be made."
However, in Tiidee the Board did more than kill the make-whole
order. It went on to devise a novel remedial approach aimed at the evils
endemic in a "frivoloUs" refusal to bargain." In addition to issuing its
initial bargaining order, it reqUired the employer to reimburse both the
Board and the union for all expenses incurred in the investigation,
preparation, and conduct of the cases at both the Board and the court
levels. The Board justified this unusual" order as a means of dis-
couraging frivolous litigation that serves merely to prolong the em-
ployer'S refusal to bargain. Moreover, the employer was required to
undertake certain actions that would give the union opportunity to
restore the majority position that had been destroyed by his years of
refusal to bargain. The employer was directed to give the union access
to its bulletin boards and'to furnish names and addresses of employees.
These remedies, the Board held, went "as far as we can go." 17
That the remedies may not go far enough, particularly as a means
of restoring the union's status, does not necessarily indicate inadequate
statutory authorization of remedies.' The problem may be primarily
one of Board backlog: had the Board been able to act on the original
complaint before 1969, the damage 'done by the original 1967 viola-
tion" would have been more amenable to traditional remedies. It might
be said, then, that Tiidee stands in. part for a wholesome refusal to
strain the NLRA in order to conceal or repair faults not in the Act
itself but in its administrative application.
2. Automotive Plating
In NLRB v. Local 485, IUE (Automotive Plating)," the Second
Circuit denied enforcement of a Board order requiring a union to make
an employee whole for wages lost due to the union's breach of its duty
of fair representation. This decision questions the Board's power to
issue a backpay order when the employee's claim against the union
involves an alleged breach of the collective bargaining contract by the
employer, and casts doubt on the desirability of taking such an action
14
 See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 30, 208-09
(1970).
18
 The circuit court had invited the Boaid to devise lesser alternative remedies if it
did not issue a make-whole order. 449 F.2d at 1064-65.
18 The Board noted that "inlormally, ..,. litigation expenses are not recoverable by
the charging party in Board proceedings even: though the public interest is served when
the charging party protects its private interests before the Board." 194 N.L,R.B. at —,
79 L.R.R.M. at 1179.
17 Id. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1178.
18 Id. at —, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1179.
19 454 F,2d 17, 79 L.R,RM. 2278 (2d Cir. 1972).
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to the Board rather than to the courts. The court's action is especially
significant in view of the fact:that the Board's order has already been
cited in an authoritative work. 20
The Board had held that the union violated section 8(b)(1).(A) 21
by refusing to• process an employee's wrongful discharge •grievance
against his employer.22
 After issuing an original order requiring • the
union to process the grievance and after •failing to seek enforcement
of that order, a divided Board issued a supplemental order' directing
the union to make the employee whole for loss of earnings from the
time he requested the union,to challenge his discharge until such time
as the union should fulfill its duty or the member obtain equivalent
employment.
The circuit court enforced the initial order but denied enforce-
.ment of the supplemental order on two grounds. First, the Board may
not find the union liable for all of the back pay due the employee: In
Vaca v. Sipes, the Supreme Court had held that a court awarding back
.pay in a section 301 suit .
 should "apportion liability between the em-
ployer and the union according to the damage caused by the fault of
each,"24
 if the court found that the employee's losses were caused in
part- by the union's breach of its representation duty. In the instant
case, the Second Circuit pointed out, the Board adopted as an unfair
labor practice remedy the Vaca damage remedy, but by failing to
apportion the liability for back pay between the union and the em-
ployer, it exceeded the express limitation imposed by Vaca.2' In the
second place, the court pointed out, no tribunal had decided that the
employee was indeed discharged in violation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Until such violation should be found, any assessment
" 20
 Section of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Association, The Developing
Labor Law (C. Morris ed. 1971) 748 and nn.105, 106. The editorial comment in note
-106 refers to the problems that the Second 'Circuit analyzed in the instant case: "These
remedial difficulties, attributable to limitations on the Board's jurisdiction, were foreseen
and commented upon in Morris, Procedural Reform in Labor Law—A Preliminary
Pciper, 35 J. Air L. & Corn. 537, 538, n.143 (1969)." •
21 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970), 	 •
22
 In IUE, Local 485 (Automotive Plating Corp.), 170 N.L.R.B. 1234, 67 L.R.R.M.
1609 (1968), the Board found that the refusal was motivated by the employee's out-
spoken opposition to a policy of the union business manager. Such criticism was protected
activity under section 7, so the union's refusal to process the grievance violated section
8(b)(1)(A). The Second Circuit pointed out that "Is]ince the Local's action was
calculated retaliation against Barclay for exercise of a right clearly protected by section
7 .. ., we are not forced to reconsider this court's controversial disposition of the
Board's broader theory in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), that any arbitrary or invidious action which violates
a union's duty of fair representation is prohibited by § 8(b)(1)(A).” 454 F.2d at 21 n.6,
79 L.R.R.M. at 2281 n.6.
23 183 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 74 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1970).
24 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967). 	 - .
25 454 F.2d at 22-23, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2281.
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of back pay against the union would be speculative and punitive and
hence beyond the scope of the Board's remedial powers. Enforcement
of the order must accordingly be denied'
However, the court then suggested that correction of these two
deficiencies would not necessarily justify enforcement: in an action
of this kind, the Board might lack authority to issue any back pay
order at all. The Board had claimed in its original order that it had
authority under NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.' to make the deter-
mination—which the circuit court considered an essential preliminary
to the back pay order—that the employer had indeed breached the col-
lective bargaining agreement, and that it refrained from so determin-
ing only in deference to the arbitral process." In C & C Plywood the
Supreme Court had recognized, as an exception to the general rule that
the Board lacks statutory power to interpret and enforce a collective
bargaining contract, that the Board may interpret an agreement "only
so far as ... [is] necessary to determine . . . [an unfair labor practice
case] .72° Whether this exception would indeed embrace the Board's
action here was, the court pointed out, "at least a substantial ques-
tion."3° Moreover, the court noted, Vaca explicitly denies to the Board
authority to remedy injuries arising out of breach of contract," a point
that Board Chairman McCulloch had made in his dissent to the back
pay order." There would seem to be, then, a real question as to whether
the back pay order were beyond the Board's authority as an attempt
to remedy the employer's breach of contract.
Although the court expressly refuses to resolve the question," its
doubts as to Board jurisdiction would appear to be more justified than
are the Board's assertions of authority. In the Survey year decision
Allied Chemical Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.," the
Supreme Court underlined the limits on the Board's authority regard-
ing contractual issues by holding, inter alia, that an employer's uni-
lateral change of a contract term was not an unfair labor practice if
that term were merely a permissible subject of bargaining. Also, a Sec-
ond Circuit judge recently pointed out that a Trial Examiner who had
20 Id. at 23, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2281-82.
27 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
28 170 N.L.R.B. at 1234, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1610.
29 385 U.S. at 428.
90 "There is at least a substantial question whether the reasoning of NLRB v.
C & C Plywood, ... applies where the Board seeks to 'interpret and give effect to the
terms of a collective bargaining contract' only for the purpose of invoking a back pay
remedy." 454 F.2d at 23-24, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2283.
81 386 U.S. at 187-88.
82 183 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1398 (dissenting opinion).
88 454 F.2d at 24, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2283.
84 404 U.S. 157 (1971). See pp. 1405-08 supra.
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awarded back wages against a union in a fair representation case in-
volving a question of improper discharge, "was in fact deciding that
the discharge was wrong . . . ";" the statement implies serious doubts
as to the Examiner's authority to make such a decision.
The legal question as to the Board's authority does not stand alone
but, as Automotive Plating reveals, incorporates several practical prob-
lems. Since the employee in the instant case must come away relatively
empty-handed if the Board in fact lacks power to award back pay, it
would seem that he should go to the courts rather than to the Board.
In any case, several details in the Board and court opinions on the case
suggest that the employee might have to bring a court action even
though he had originally gone to the Board. Chairman McCulloch, dis-
senting, had written that the desirable alternative to what he considered
an illegal back pay order would be an order directing the union to fur-
nish legal fees to the employees so that he might undertake a section
301 action against the employer and the union, in which action the
court could decide on the propriety of the discharge and apportion
damages by the Vaca principle." The Second Circuit noted that the
union would probably now have to bring a section 301 suit against the
employer in order to obtain arbitration after the long delay ensuing
since the original discharge.37 The court also set out the three types of
court action that the employee might have brought, thus prompting the
inference that the employee should have taken the court route in the
first .place." It should be observed;however, that the opinion explicitly
denies suggesting that his choice of the Board was unwise, and it notes
Professor Wellington's preference for that tribunal in unfair repre-
sentation cases generally,8°
Finally, the court implied that the Board does not lack the tools
necessary for providing practical relief: that the problems evident in
Automotive Plating have arisen from administrative more than stat-
utory inadequacy. The opinion suggests that the Board might have
supplied adequate relief had it used its traditional remedies promptly
and perhaps in conjunction with its little-used power to seek contempt
sanctions. The court notes, for example, that various problems occa-
sioned by delay could have been obviated had the Board immediately
88 Hays, Some Observations on the Rights of a Union Member against his Union,
ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, 1 Report of 1971 Proceedings 25, 33 (1971).
86
 183 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1399.
87 454 F.2d at 22, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2281.
38 Id. at 21, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2281. The employee could have brought a § 301 suit
against the employer for breach of a promise in the collective bargaining agreement
running to the individual employees, or he could have sued the union for breach of its
duty of fair representation, or he could have joined the employer and the union in a
§ 301 suit under the principle of Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
39 454 F.2d at 22, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2281.
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petitioned for enforcement of its first order and made use of the court's
contempt sanctions.° The opinion also refers with apparent regret to
the Board's failure to take Chairman McCulloch's suggestion that it
order the union to furnish the employee with reasonable legal fees so
that he might bring a section 301 suit.' It is submitted that use of such
a remedy would combine, for the employee, the advantages of a Board
suit—e.g., having the General Counsel prosecute his original cause—
with the availability of the judicial back pay order authorized by Vaca
v. Sipes.
However, the apparent advantages of combining Board and court
actions are diminished by the long delay involved in taking a case to
the Board. The extent of such delay is apparent not only in the Second
Court's expression of regret that the Board had failed to seek prompt
enforcement of its original order but in other cases noted in this Sur-
vey. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Lockridge, pointed out the impact
of delay on Board actions and the advantages in time and money that
an employee would gain if he could bring his suit initially in the local
court.' It would appear, then, that practical as well as legal considera-
tions urge an employee to go to the courts rather than to the Board
if his claim of action involves both an employer's breach of contract
and a union's breach of its duty of fair representation.°
FRANCIS J. CONNELL
ANN Fox
40 Id. at 24 n.18, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2283 n.18.
41 "But the Board has not so ordered and, accordingly, we will be forced to deal
with any inadequate representation claims [either in the § 301 suit that the union may
have to bring in order to compel arbitration, or in the arbitration proceeding itself] in
the context of contempt proceedings." Id. at 22 n.9, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2281 n.9.
42 Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 303-05 (1971) (dissenting
opinion). Justice Douglas wrote: "If he musters the resources to exhaust the adminis-
trative remedy, the chances are that he too will be exhausted." Id. at 304.
42 See note 38 supra. The requirements for such a suit are summarized in Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 299.
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